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INTRODUCTION

Trademark law is in trouble. Six years ago, Professor Lemley
diagnosed the "death of common sense" 1 in the courts' interpretations of
the modem Lanham Act.2 Unfortunately, his assessment has proven only
too true. Instead of a unified and well-integrated body of doctrine
sensibly covering all aspects of commerce, the courts have over the past
several years created a specialized "law of the horse" that applies to
prevalent fact patterns arising in the Internet context. 3 This species of

mutant trademark law 4 has "loosed trademark law from its traditional
economic moorings" and drastically, unjustifiably extended its reach. 5
As Professor Landes and Judge Posner famously conclude,
traditional trademark law is "a rationally designed system for
minimizing consumer search costs."' 6 In contrast, the courts' current
tendency to overprotect communicative symbols of all kinds via
trademark law impoverishes human discourse and leads inevitably to
collisions with the First Amendment. 7 In order for trademark law to
fulfill its function as a search cost minimizer and to avoid interference
with speech interests,8 trademark law's basic doctrinal structure of
1. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Modern Lanham Act].
2. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (2000):
3. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
208 (1996).
4. The phrase "mutant trademark law" is an adaptation of language from Dastar
Corporation v. 20th Century Fox Film Corporation,in which the Supreme Court held that the Ninth
Circuit's extension of the Lanham Act's unfair competition provision (section 43(a)) into the realm
of creative works such as movies constituted a "species of mutant [and hence unconstitutional]
copyright law." 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003).
5. Lemley, Modern Lanham Act, supranote 1, at 1688.
6. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 422 (2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE].
7. See Lemley, Modern Lanham Act, supra note 1, at 1711-13. It is, of course, well
established that First Amendment protection extends in principle to all communicative symbols
used by humans. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that burning the
American flag is constitutionally protected as an expressive act).
8. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Kozinski, J.) (arguing that traditional trademark law-in contrast to trademark dilution lawpossesses "a built-in First Amendment compass" making it "wholly consistent with the theory of the
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attenuated, perception-based rights must be preserved. But that structure
is under severe attack. A solid and nearly unchallenged line of cases
dating back to 1996 strikes at the heart of trademark law by negating its
central dogma, which holds that a trademark is any "'symbol' or
'device' . . . capable of carrying meaning" 9 that serves as a "commercial
signature [placed] upon the merchandise or the package in which it is
sold." 0 This concept is statutorily enshrined in the Lanham Act-the
modem codification of trademark law-under the rubric "use in
commerce."" It has traditionally effectuated a rigorous separation
between "a right in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or a
patent for an invention"' 2 on the one hand, and the legal protection of the
"psychological function of symbols"' 13 on the other hand. Put another
way, a symbol enjoys trademark protection only insofar as it possesses
"commercial magnetism" in the minds of consumers. 14 This crucial
limitation on trademark rights has been obliterated to a substantial
degree by decisions-most prominently by the Ninth and Seventh
5 Promatek,16 and Playboy,7
Circuits in decisions such as Brookfield,"
First Amendment, which does not protect commercial fraud"). Interestingly, this decision, and a
similar decision in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, which was decided a year later,
may have made trademark law considerably more supportive of speech interests by at least partially
implementing the "expressive genericity" doctrine proposed by Professor Cooper Dreyfuss as a
remedy for the law's inadequate understanding of "the evocative significance of trademarks."
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397, 398-99 (1990); Mattel, Inc., v. Walking Mountain
Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). As the Walking Mountain court explained, quoting heavily
from MCA, "when marks transcend their identifying purpose and enter public discourse and become
an integral part of our vocabulary, they assume[ ] a role outside the bounds of trademark law. Where
a mark assumes such cultural significance, First Amendment protections come into play. In these
situations, the trademark owner does not have the right to control public discourse whenever the
public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying function." 353 F.3d at 807"
(citations and quotation marks omitted). In other words, these courts have, at least to some degree,
created a doctrinal accommodation for Professor Litman's insight that trademarks are "also now
metaphors with meanings their proprietors would not have chosen." Jessica Litman, Breakfast with
Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1733 (1999).
9. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
10. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918).
11. 15U.S.C.§ 1127 (2001).
12. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. at 97.
13. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
14. Id. at 205, Under modem trademark law, anything that is capable of communicating with
consumers can in principle be a trademark. This includes words, slogans, sounds, colors, designs,
product configurations, product packaging-any, symbol, in short, that may be endowed with
commercial magnetism. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64.
15. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Group, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
1999).
16. Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Horphag
Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003).
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and numerous district court opinions-that 1treat
trademarks very nearly
8
as if they conveyed property rights in gross.
The doctrinal expression of the "commercial magnetism" principle
underlying all of trademark law is the requirement that a trademark be
used in commerce. This requirement permeates all facets of commonlaw trademark law and of the Lanham Act, and it holds that any conduct
to which trademark law is to apply must involve the use of a symbol in a
way that consumers can perceive the symbol so that it can exert its
commercial magnetism on them. 19 The logic behind the requirement is
simple: without use of a symbol, consumers cannot perceive it; without
consumer perception, the symbol cannot exert whatever commercial
magnetism it may have over consumers; without commercial
magnetism, the symbol does not function as a trademark. The cure for
trademark law's current decrepitude, I argue, lies in a re-application of
the concept of use, which is both a plain and simple statutory
requirement and the foundational structural principle of American
trademark law. By forcefully re-anchoring trademark law in the principle
of use, it can be restored to its inherent integrity and to its rightful role of
facilitating the functioning of a free and competitive economy.
Certain recent developments in the Internet world have caused
substantial uncertainty in trademark law among the courts, creating an
opportunity to correct misdevelopments and rescue trademark law. The
specific issue is contextual advertising. Contextual advertising means
online ads tailored to the content of a computer user's online searches or
browsing activity. It may take the form of pop-up ads, banner ads, and
sponsored links on search engines. For example, a search for "sneakers"
may cause ads for Nike or Reebok shoes to appear. 20 This is big
business. Google "makes most of its money selling contextual
advertisements on its site and on the sites of companies with which it has
partnerships.",21 Google's revenues amounted to nearly a billion dollars
in 2003.22 How do the providers of contextualized ads-search engines
such as Google, Overture, Excite, and Netscape, but also specialized
17.

Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).

18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127(2004).
20. See Jason Krause, Google Targeted in TrademarkDisputes, 3 ABA J. E-REP. 21 (May 28,
2004); see also Kristen M. Beystehner, See Ya Later, Gator: Assessing Whether Placing Pop-Up
Advertisements on Another Company's Website Violates TrademarkLaw, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 87,
95-99 (2003).
21. Robert Weisman, Google Registers Eagerly Awaited IPO, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2004,
at Al.

22. See id.
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companies such as WhenU and Gator.com-know which ads to put up?
By monitoring keywords (i.e., search terms and domain names) typed by
an Internet user, correlating them to terms contained in advertising
categories in their keyword directories, and delivering ads or sponsored
links for competitive goods.23 Sellers of goods and services pay the ad
providers for delivery of their ads in response to keywords falling into
specified categories, or for click-through rates or actual purchases
made.24
Unsurprisingly, ad providers tend to include trademarks in their
keyword directories. If "Nike" is a keyword in a category purchased by
Reebok, an Internet user's search for "Nike" may well cause a pop-up ad
for Reebok sneakers to appear on the screen. 25 Trademark owners are
not amused. Google, Gator.com, Excite, Netscape, and WhenU, among
26
others, have been sued for trademark infringement. But the courts do
not agree with each other. While some favor trademark infringement
liability, 27 others have vigorously maintained that, for a variety of
reasons, keyword use is not infringement.2 8 Notwithstanding these
divisions within the judiciary, the pro-liability forces may have the upper
hand2 9 since the keyword cases are markedly analogous to, and in fact
doctrinally indistinguishable from, a well-formed body of precedent
holding that using trademarks as metatags constitutes infringement.3 ° In

23. See, e.g., GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701-02 (E.D. Va. 2004).
24. See id.
25. See discussion infra Part III.B.
26. For suits against Google see GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 700; Jeffrey M. Glazer, Keyword
Advertising: American Blinds and Wallpaper Factory v. Google, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2004). For
suits against WhenU, see 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003); U-Haul
Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003). For suits against Netscape and
Excite see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
For suits against Gator.com, see, for example, Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 366 F.3d 789
(9th Cir. 2004); In re Gator Corp. Software Trademark & Copyright Litig., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1378
(J.P.M.L. 2003).
27. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1034; 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at
510.
28. See, e.g., U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 727-29; Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp.
2d at 757-69.
29. See GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (finding that Playboy and 1-800 Contacts are "better
reasoned" than U-Haul and Wells Fargo).
30. "[M]etatags are HTML code not visible to Web users but used by search engines in
determining which sites correspond to the keywords entered by a Web user." Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1061-62 n.23 (9th Cir. 1999)
(emphasis added).
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short, it is quite unclear what the law actually is, and substantial
commercial interests may be compromised by this uncertainty. 3'
I advocate that the metatag/keyword problem be used-by courts
and commentators-as a strategic opportunity to reform the badly
degenerated state of modem trademark law by firmly re-establishing the
use requirement. 32 My argument seeks to accomplish three main tasks.
First, it provides a resolution to the current uncertainty surrounding
keywords. Keyword use is not trademark infringement. It is, in fact, not
conduct that invokes the trademark laws at all because it does not
involve the primary predicate of trademark law, which is that a term or
symbol be used by the party as a mark-meaning in a way so that
consumers can plainly perceive the symbol and associate it with that
party's offering of goods or services. In other words, trademark
infringement claims based on a defendant's alleged use of plaintiffs
mark in metatags or keywords founders for failure to meet the trademark
use requirement. Second, I show that the trademark use criterion has
been systematically neglected in the metatag cases. Metatags, just like
keywords, do not involve trademark use, and no infringement liability
can be based on them. I therefore maintain that the entire line of metatag
cases, from 1996 to the present time, is wrongly decided-it is a body of

31. Professor Goldman proposes an empirical critique of the state of the law by testing current
trademark doctrines against "what information scientists know about Internet search behavior." Eric
Goldman, DeregulatingRelevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. *1, *4 (forthcoming
2005), available at http://law.marquette.edu/goldman/deregulatingrelevancy~pdf. He views the
Internet as "one of the great democratizing technologies, ranking alongside Gutenberg's printing
press and the rise of public libraries." Id. at *92. The law's fit with current search technologies is, in
Professor Goldman's view, extremely poor. "Trademark law threatens to take away what
technology enables. At a time when keywords show unprecedented promise to empower searchers,
the legal system is interposing itself as the new intermediary to guarantee content relevancy.
Unfortunately, any efforts to legally impose content relevancy are destined to fail dramatically." Id.
As a solution, Goldman proposes to "deregulate the keyword in Internet search," by implementing
an "integrated law of keywords," that is characterized by "mov[ing] infringement analysis back in
time," modernizing the standard likelihood of confusion test, and "immuniz[ing] search providers."
Id. at **71-72, *80, *85, *93. I agree with Professor Goldman's goal-keyword use ought not to be
actionable as trademark infringement-but I seek to achieve it via a different, and perhaps simpler,
route.
32. Professors Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley argue along these lines in their article,
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUSTON L. REv. 777 (2004). They
reason, "[t]he trademark use requirement serves a gatekeeper function, limiting the reach of
trademark law without regard to a factual inquiry into consumer confusion," and state that "[s]elling
advertising space based on an Internet keyword that is also a trademark does not use that trademark
as a brand" Id. at 805-07. The central argument of their article is, however, that expansion of
trademark infringement liability occurred along "two axes"-trademark use and initial interest
confusion. See id. at 779-81. In my opinion, expansion along the initial interest confusion axis is
merely a symptom of expansion along the trademark use axis.
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precedent that ought to be abandoned.3 3 Opportunities for doing so
abound. Judge Berzon, of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, has
called for an en banc review of the Ninth Circuit's Brookfield decision
(one of the main culprits).3 4 If the Ninth Circuit were to use such an en
banc review to hold that Brookfield wrongly imposed trademark
infringement. liability for metatag use, it would go a long way toward
straightening out the law. Third, I seek to show that the reaffirmation of
the trademark use criterion is the first and biggest step necessary to
restore, as Professor Lemley puts it, common sense to trademark law.35
33. Professors Dogan and Lemley disagree. "Some commentators have argued that courts
should take technological reality into account and deny infringement claims based on the use of
marks in metatags altogether because metatags simply allow competitors to present choices and do
not necessarily confuse consumers. We would not go that far because we think there are limited
circumstances in which the use of hidden content can deceive consumers and increase their search
costs." Id. at 823 (emphasis added). But Dogan and Lemley also believe (as do I, see Part II.C.
infra) that trademark use limits "the reach of trademark law without regardto a factual inquiry into
consumer confusion." Id. at 805 (emphasis added). They believe that the "use of hidden content"
can sometimes constitute trademark infringement. Id. at 823. As I explain in Part II and Part III, I
think otherwise. Moreover, their position introduces complexities into their theory of trademark use
that compromise its usefulness for legal reform.
34. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., dissenting).
35. Other authors have discussed or mentioned trademark use in this context. See, e.g.,
Christine D. Galbraith, Electronic BillboardsAlong the Information Superhighway: Liability Under
The Lanham Act for Using Trademarks to Key Internet Banner Ads, 41 B.C. L. REV. 847, 880
(2000) (stating, correctly, that to evaluate trademark infringement claims arising from banner
advertisements, "even before reaching the confusion inquiry, it is essential to determine if the
defendant's conduct constitutes trademark usage," but concluding that "if a search engine operator
used the word "APPLE" to key banner ads to computer products, this would amount to the use of
the Apple Computer Company's trademark by the search engine."); Thomas F. Presson & James R.
Barney, Trademarks as Metatags: Infringement or Fair Use?, 26 AIPLA Q. J. 147, 159, 164, 176
(1998) (discussing trademark use "to raise the possibility that invisible trademarks on the intemet
might not trigger the 'use' requirement of the Lanham Act and, thus, should not be considered a
violation," but arguing that "probably the strongest argument in favor of allowing the unauthorized
use of trademarks as metatags is that the results of such use could constitute a form of comparative
advertising," and recommending enhanced judicial focus on consumer confusion); Julie A. Rajzer,
Misunderstanding the Internet: How Courts Are Overprotecting Trademarks Used in Metatags,
2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C. OF L. 427, 429, 464 (2001) (arguing that Brookfield is
"flawed," and that metatag use should "almost always be considered fair [use]"); Benjamin F.
Sidbury, ComparativeAdvertising on the Internet: Defining the Boundaries of TrademarkFair Use
for Internet Metatags and Trigger Ads, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 35, 61-62 (2001) (arguing that
"[b]ecause trademark law has traditionally been applied to visible uses of marks, the framework
proposed in this article-to focus on the defendant's intent to deceive or intent to usurp the
plaintiffs goodwill-is an attempt to bridge traditional trademark analysis with contemporary
technology."); Beystehner, supra note 20, at 110, 115 (arguing that contextual advertising
constitutes trademark use, and advocating application of "traditional legal doctrine, particularly
trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair competition claims" to contextual advertising practices,
especially as engaged in by Gator.com.); Yelena Dunaevsky, Comment, Don 't Confuse Metatags
with Initial Interest Confusion, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1349, 1360, 1383 (2002) (assuming that
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Until and unless trademark use is once again taken seriously, adjusting
judge-made subdoctrines such as initial interest confusion-the growth
of which is driven by the judicial disregard of trademark use-amounts
to "studying deck chairs on the Titanic. 36

II. THE STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LAW
A. AttenuatedRights
U.S. trademark law does not create true property rights. Instead,
rights in a trademark are based on public and commercial use of the
mark, and on consumers' association of the mark with the source of the
goods or services sold in connection with it. At every moment of their
existence, trademark rights are contingent on those two elements.

metatag use is trademark use, and arguing that applying initial interest confusion doctrine to
metatags is appropriate because "Internet consumers are too savvy to be confused by metatags."); F.
Gregory Lastowka, Note, Search Engine, HTML, and Trademarks: What's the Metafor?, 86 VA. L.
REV. 835, 877 (2000) (arguing that "competitor use of meta tags merely attempts to recreate some
of the spatial realities of the marketplace. .. [and] simply fosters competition through providing
consumers with more choices"); Tom Monagan, Note, Can an Invisible Word Create Confusion?
The Need for Clarity in the Law of TrademarkInfringement Through Internet Metatags, 62 OHiO
ST. L.J. 973, 1004 (2001) (arguing that "there are substantial questions about whether a metatag use
is a use as a mark at all[; therefore,] courts should begin their analysis with a rebuttable presumption
that the use of a trademark in a keyword metatag is fair use[, which would force courts to consider]
whether there exists a likelihood of confusion.") (emphasis excluded); Erich D. Schiefelbine,
Comment, Stopping A Trojan Horse: Challenging Pop-up Advertisements and Embedded Software
Schemes on the Internet Through Unfair Competition Law, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 499, 511, 530 (2003) (arguing that contextual advertising constitutes trademark use
under Brookfield, and urging that contextual advertisement "should be banned from the Internet
[because it] is specifically designed to 'hijack' customers amongst competitors."); Michael R. Sees,
Note, Use of Another's Trademark in a Web Page Meta Tag: Why Liability Should Not Ensue
Under the Lanham Act for Trademark Infringement, 5 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 99, 120 (1998)
(concluding that "the inherently concealed nature of a meta tag is the defining characteristic that
precludes extending protection to the unexposed trademarks contained therein [because] the viewing
public does not readily see the trademark [and] no confusion or misrepresentation can result[,
because] the inherently concealed nature of the meta tag prevents a plaintiff from establishing the
requisite element of causation, [and because] this characteristic nullifies the intent requirement of a
trademark infringement action"); Gregory Shea, Note, Trademarks and Keyword Banner
Advertising, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 530 (2002) (arguing that "using trademarks for keyword
banner advertising is not trademark infringement, as users have expectations about what they
encounter on the Internet that do not lead to consumer confusion.").
36. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1290 (1996). Accord Goldman, supra note 31, at 71 ("Recognizing
the ... problems, some commentators have tried to salvage [initial interest confusion] by limiting it
to competitors or metatags. While these alternatives would improve upon the existing law, minor
patches.., do little to cure the problem. We need more structural doctrinal reform.").
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Without use, no trademark rights arise. 37 Without continued use,
trademark rights will-after a lag time of a few years-be extinguished;
the mark is abandoned.3 8 Without consumers' belief that the mark
indicates a source (even if consumers don't know the source), the mark
ceases to exist or never comes into being in the first place. 39 In other
words, if consumers think the mark is the name of the product rather
than a source indicator, the mark has ceased to function as a trademark;
it has become the generic-and hence unprotectable-term for the
product itself.40 Words such as aspirin, 41 yo-yo, 42 and cellophane 3 were

37. This is an ancient principle. E.S. Rogers explained in his influential 1914 book Good Will,
Trade-Marks and Unfair Trading: A trademark "is not a grant from the government or from a
governmental bureau. It is not dependent upon invention or discovery, or evidenced by imposing
documents embellished with red seals and tape. It depends upon one thing only, priority of adoption
and use, and continuous occupancy of the market with goods bearing the mark." EDWARD S.
ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 54 (1914); see also Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) ("At common law the exclusive right to [a trademark] grows out of
its use, and not its mere adoption.") (emphasis in original). The Lanham Act has preserved, with
only marginal qualifications, the centrality of use. See discussion infra Part II.C. 1.
38. The Lanham Act provides:
A mark shall be deemed to be 'abandoned' if either of the following occurs: (1) When its
use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may
be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie
evidence of abandonment. 'Use' of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made
in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. (2)
When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as
commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or
in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark.
Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining abandonment under this
paragraph.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004); see also General Healthcare Ltd. v. Quashat, 364 F.3d 332, 336 (1st Cir.
2004) ("A trademark owner who fails to use a mark for three consecutive years may be deemed to
have abandoned the mark, which would then fall into the public domain.").
39. See, e.g., Nautilus Group, Inc., v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (stating that "generic terms... are not [capable of receiving trademark protection].
Generic terms describe a category of products, and therefore cannot signal any particular source: A
trademark answers the buyer's questions 'Who are you? Where do you come from? Who vouches
for you?' But the generic name of a product answers the question 'What are you?') (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
40. "A generic word is one which is the language name for the product. BUTTER is the
language word for butter. There can be no trademark rights in a generic term. They remain in the
public domain as a part of our language." Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc., v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
408 F. Supp. 1219, 1243 (D. Colo. 1976), modified on other grounds, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir.
1977).
41. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505,514 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
42. See Donald F. Duncan, Inc., v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655,668 (7th Cir. 1965).
43. See Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936)
(permitting use of the word "cellophane," by other parties other than the trademark holder, but only
when prefixed by the maker's name).
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once valuable trademarks that have become mere generic product names
due to shifts in consumer perception.
The two elements that form the sine qua non of trademark rightsuse and association-are empirical facts, and therefore subject to
empirical proof. Use, genericness, and abandonment are routinely
established via empirical evidence in the assertion of trademark rights
and to defend against infringement claims. So is consumer confusion,
that gravamen of all infringement claims (assuming, of course, that both
plaintiff and defendant make trademark use of the symbol in question).
Assume you have a trademark for certain products. If, after you have
established your rights, I start using the same or similar term to market
the same or similar products, you can stop me if you can empirically
prove that my use of that term is likely to cause consumers to believe
that you are putting out my products (or I am putting out yours), or that
we are otherwise somehow associated with each other. Once you make
that empirical showing, I will be enjoined from further use of the term.
If, however, I can show, again by empirical proof, that consumers will
not in fact get confused, or that several years ago you stopped using your
mark and put out a press release that you have renamed the product, 4 or
that everyone believes your claimed trademark is in fact the name of the
product itself (a not-yet-adjudicated example would be the mark HULA
HOOP for hula hoops 45), or that you never made proper trademark use of

44. This is called abandonment with intent not to resume use. Abandonment obliterates any
rights an owner may have had in the mark prior to the abandonment. See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc., v.
Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1551 (1Ith Cir. 1986) ("That Kraft in fact used the mark in 1980 does
not mean that Kraft intended to use the mark in 1978."). The court found that Kraft had abandoned
the mark. See id. at 1550.
45. You can test for genericness quite simply by trying to come up with a reasonably clear
and concise description for the product without using the name. If you can't, the mark is probably
generic. What, for example, is a hula hoop? It's hard to describe it concisely without using the term
"hula hoop" itself. But forty years ago the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held, inexplicably,
that HULA HOOP was a trademark. See In re Wham-O Mfg. Co., 134 U.S.P.Q. 447, 449 (1962).
(In the interest of full disclosure, I state that I recently represented a client in an opposition
proceeding involving the HULA HOOP mark before the Patent and Trademark Office. The case
was settled before genericness became an issue.)
Dictionaries often reflect a mark's drift into genericness quite precisely, and
notwithstanding the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's decision, "hula hoop" may be completing
just such a drift. For example, the 1998 edition of Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary has an
entry for "hula hoop" in lowercase and defines it as "a plastic hoop that is twirled around the body."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 564 (10th ed. 1998). The 1991 edition of the

Random House Webster's College Dictionary, in contrast, expressly identified HULA HOOP as a
trademark. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 652 (1991). This change, and your

inability to come up with a concise description of the product that doesn't use the term "hula hoop,"
is good evidence that HULA HOOP is in the process of making the transition from trademark to
generic term. In short, trademarks are vulnerable to what Dr. Johnson, in the preface to his
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the symbol that you are claiming as a mark, then you will lose your
infringement claims and I will be permitted to use the symbol to my
heart's content.46 That, in a nutshell, is trademark law. I hasten to add
that this account is a stark simplification of a large and complex body of
law. But it captures the essence. The genius of trademark law lies in its
contingency on empirical proof, its flexibility, its lack of dogmatism and
of black-and-white responses, the richness of its layered safety valvesuse, genericness, abandonment, confusion, and others such as secondary
meaning and functionality-that prevent monolithic, exclusionary rights.
B.

The Use-ContingentNature of TrademarkRights-A Historical
Perspective

Throughout the history of U.S. trademark law, trademark use has
been an absolute requirement for the acquisition and maintenance of
trademark rights. Conversely, a showing that defendant used or is using
the plaintiffs mark, or a mark similar to it, is an absolute requirement
for making out a claim for trademark infringement. This follows from
both the deep structure of trademark law as a common law doctrine and
from the plain language of its modem codification in the Federal
Lanham Act of 1946, as amended in 1989.
The twentieth century's most perceptive exposition of the nature of
trademarks comes from the pen of Justice Frankfurter in Mishawaka
Rubber:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols,
it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a
merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he
wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a
mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a
congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the
same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears.
celebrated 1755 Dictionary of the English Language, called a word's passage "from its primitive to
its remote and accidental signification." SAMUEL JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY 34 (Jack Lynch ed.
2002). It may be impossible for trademark owners to contain that "exuberance of signification," by
which "the original sense of words is often driven out of use by their metaphorical acceptations." Id.
46. For an example of requiring such empirical proof, see Dan Robbins & Assoc., Inc., v.
Questor Corp., 599 F.2d 1009, 1014 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("Whether the relevant purchasing public
regards a term as [generic] is a question of fact to be resolved on the evidence. Purchaser testimony,
consumer surveys, and listings in dictionaries, trade journals, newspapers and other publications, are
useful evidence.") (citation omitted).
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Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If
another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has
created, the owner can obtain legal redress.... The "right to be
has been
protected against an unwarranted use of the registered mark
47
made a statutory right" by [the Trade-Mark Act of 1905].
Justice Frankfurter's authoritative summary of the purpose and
foundation of trademark law remains as true as ever. Trademarks are a
psychological phenomenon, deriving their function and efficiency from
the human propensity to rely on a congenial symbol for making
purchasing choices. It is the peculiar virtue of Justice Frankfurter's
explanation to focus squarely on the signifying function of trademarks.
For a symbol to be a trademark, "commercial magnetism" must be
"conveyed through" the mark to consumers. It is therefore of the very
essence of the concept of trademark that consumers perceive the mark
sensorily-see it, hear it, smell it, feel it, taste it.
While Justice Frankfurter's phrasing of the issue is particularly
felicitous, there is nothing novel about the concept he is expressing.
Here, for instance, is what the Supreme Court had to say on the topic in
1879:
The general doctrines of the law as to trade-marks, the symbols or
signs which may be used to designate products of a particular
manufacture, and the protection which the courts will afford to those
who originally appropriated them, are not controverted. Every one is at
liberty to affix to a product of his own manufacture any symbol or
device, not previously appropriated, which will distinguish it from
articles of the same general nature manufactured or sold by others, and
thus secure to himself the benefits of increased sale by reason of any
peculiar excellence he may have given to it. The symbol or device thus
becomes a sign to the public of the origin of the goods to which it is
attached, and an assurance that they are the genuine article of the
original producer. In this way it often proves to be of great value to the
manufacturer in preventing the substitution and sale of an inferior and
different article for his products. It becomes his trade-mark, and the
courts will protect him in its exclusive use, either by the imposition of
damages for its wrongful appropriation or by restraining others from
applying it to their goods and compelling
••48 them to account for profits
made on a sale of goods marked with it.

47. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,205 (1942).
48. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51, 53 (1879); accord Manhattan Med. Co. v.
Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1883).
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This commentary, which has lost none of its validity over the last
126 years, does not address any particular statutory tests or
requirements, but rather summarizes common law notions. Trademarks
are originally creatures of the common law.49 They derive their validity
from use in the marketplace.
The trade-mark recognized by the common law is generally the growth
of a considerable period of use, rather than a sudden invention. It is
often the result of accident rather than design, and when under the act
of Congress it is sought to establish it by registration, neither
originality, invention, discovery, science, nor art is in any way
essential to the right conferred by that act.... The trade-mark may be,
and generally is, the adoption of something already in existence as the
distinctive symbol of the party using it. At common law the exclusive
right to it grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.5 °
Trademarks, then, have been understood as commercial signifiers
from the earliest times the Supreme Court has spoken on the issue. In the
1871 decision of Canal Co. v. Clark,5' for instance, the Court stated:
"The office of a trade-mark is to point out distinctively the origin, or
ownership of the article to which it is affixed; or, in other words, to give
notice who was the producer., 52 The Court in the 1918 decision, United
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., viewed trademarks as "a
convenient means for facilitating the protection of one's good-will in
trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol-a commercial
53
signature-upon the merchandise or the package in which it is sold.,
Use and customer recognition-i.e., the act of communicating through
the mark to the consumer-are what give trademarks value, efficiency,
and protectability.
These principles are as true today as they were in 1879, 1918, or
1942-the years Amoskeag Manufacturing, Theodore Rectanus, and
Mishawaka Rubber were decided. Take, for example, Justice Breyer's
description, in the Qualitex decision, of the broad range of symbols that
can, in principle, function as trademarks because they possess the ability
to communicate meaning to consumers:
The Lanham Act gives a seller or producer the exclusive right to
"register" a trademark, and to prevent his or her competitors from

49.
50.
51.
52.

See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1880).
Id.
80U.S. 311 (1871).
Id. at 322.

53.

248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918).
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using that trademark. Both the language of the Act and the basic
underlying principles of -trademark law would seem to include color
within the universe of things that can qualify as a trademark. The
language of the Lanham Act describes that universe in the broadest of
terms. It says that trademarks "includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof." Since human beings might use as
a "symbol" or "device" almost anything at all that is capable of
carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is not restrictive. The
courts and the Patent and Trademark Office have authorized for use as
a mark a particular shape (of a Coca-Cola bottle), a particular sound
(of NBC's three chimes), and even a particular scent (of plumeria
can
blossoms on sewing thread). If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance
same? 54
act as symbols why, one might ask, can a color not do the
In Qualitex, the Court held that "there is no rule absolutely barring
the use of color alone" as a trademark since it is capable of functioning
as a symbol that identifies and distinguishes the owner's goods or
services.5 5 And that, of course, is the essence of a trademark. As Justice
Breyer put it (referencing Professor Landes's and Judge Posner's
article), "[i]t is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark-not its
ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign-that permits
it to serve these basic purposes.' 56
It is this relentless focus of trademark law on the psychological
function of symbols-which assumes, of course, that the consumers are
actually confronted with and perceive the mark in the relevant
commercial context, so that they are in a position to experience the
desired psychological effect-which so sharply distinguishes trademark
rights from rights under the copyright or patent laws. The Theodore
Rectanus Court provided an outstanding explanation of this distinction
and demonstrated the fundamentally use-contingent nature of trademark
rights. The sentence from that decision describing a trademark as a
"commercial signature," is preceded by a lucid explanation of the
profoundly use-contingent nature of trademark rights:
[Petitioner's argument] is based upon the fundamental error of
supposing that a trade-mark right is a right in gross or at large, like a
statutory copyright or a patent for an invention, to either of which, in
truth, it has little or no analogy. There is no such thing as property in a

54. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1994) (citations omitted).
55. Id. Of course, the color claimed as a trademark must have acquired secondary meaning.
Id. at 163.
56. Id. at 164 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, TrademarkLaw: An Economic
Perspective,30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 290 (1987)).
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trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or
trade in connection with which the mark is employed. The law of
trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition; the
right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its
function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular
trader and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product
as his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an
existing business. The owner of a trade-mark may not, like the
proprietor of a patented invention, make a negative and merely
prohibitive use of it as a monopoly. In truth, a trade-mark confers no
monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a convenient
means for facilitating the protection of one's good-will in trade by
placing a distinguishing mark or symbol-a commercial
57 signatureupon the merchandise or the package in which it is sold.
There is nothing in modem trademark law to contradict the truth of
this statement.58 Sometimes, however, the focus of trademark law may
have shifted to the consumer confusion requirement to the exclusion of
the trademark use issue. Beverly Pattishall, a prominent attorney widely
regarded as the "Dean of the American Trademark Bar," 59 wrote an
influential article in which he took strong exception with the view,
prevalent in many federal courts in the first half of the Twentieth
Century, that trademark rights may confer dangerously monopolistic
rights. 60 He sought to refute that position, prominently held by Judge
Jerome Frank, 61 by reference to the "likelihood of confusion"
requirement for proving trademark infringement. 62 "[A court] need have
no fear that in protecting a trade-mark a monopoly may be granted in
anything that is public property so long as it adheres to the likelihood of

57. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. at 97-98.
58. The Supreme Court's holdings on this issue are relevant to the claims made by John R.
Warner, in which he argues that the invisibility of metatags is no hindrance to a finding of
trademark use because the consumer's use of the trademark-by typing it into a search windowcan be imputed to the defendant. See John R. Warner, Trademark Infringement Online: Appropriate
Federal Relief From the Illicit use of Trademarked Material in Web Site Meta Tags, 22 T.
JEFFERSON L. REv. 133, 169-70 (1999). This, I believe, is another version of the "constructive
trademark use doctrine" that I address infra Part III.E.
59.

See, e.g., MARK T. BANNER, PTO FEE INCREASES, ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES COMING,

7 A.B.A. CHAIR'S
jan03chair.html.
60.

BULL.

5 (Jan.

2003)

available at

http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/

See Beverly W. Pattishall, Trademarks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REV. 967,

968 (1951).
61. See id. at 975 ("Perhaps the foremost judicial exponent of the 'monopoly' notion is Judge
Jerome Frank of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.").
62. See id. at 977-78, 984.
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confusion test. 63 Pattishall is right to the extent that the likelihood of
confusion requirement is a crucial limiting factor to the assertion of
trademark rights and in most infringement cases is the central focus of
litigation.
But consumer confusion is but a kind, a subcategory, of consumer
perception. And perception is made possible only by the use of the mark
in connection with goods and services. In other words, trademark use is
a more basic concept than confusion. It is, I believe, use, rather than
confusion, that ultimately anchors the basic difference between
trademark rights and the protection regimes of patent and copyright law,
let alone real property rights. The Supreme Court, in Theodore Rectanus,
sharply recognized this fact. Its explanation of the unity of use and
64
trademark rights remains, in principle, as true today as it was in 1918.
It is the courts' obliviousness to the centrality of the use requirement that
has led to muddled thinking and a pronounced inability to think about
the expansion of trademark protection in correct and analytically
ways, thus causing many of the troubles in current trademark
productive
65
law.
C. The Use Requirement and the Modern Lanham Act
1. The Statutory Definition of Trademark Use
The centrality of trademark use, emphasized by the Supreme Court
in Theodore Rectanus, is fully reflected in the modem Lanham Act.
Trademark use is a basic element of all provisions relating to trademark
rights and infringement. Section 1127 is the definition section of the
Lanham Act. By the section's own terms, these definitions are
controlling "[i]n the construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is
plainly apparent from the context." 66 Section 1127 shows that the
Lanham Act codifies the common law's deep structure of trademark law.
In particular, it leaves wholly intact the requirements of trademark use

63. Id. at 978.
64. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918).
65. Many commentators have in principle recognized the importance of the use question. See
supra note 35 (citing pertinent articles by, among others, Glazer, Saunders Cody, Rajzer, and
Monagan, who correctly focused on the use issue, but also-and, I believe, unnecessarily-reintroduced a confusion inquiry; Presson and Barney, who, like Monagan, reached the correct
conclusion on trademark use, but viewed it as not the "strongest argument" against imposing
liability in the metatag context, and thus did not fully develop it; and Sees, who came to the same
conclusion).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004).
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and consumer perception. The following definitions in § 1127 are
determinative:
The term "mark" includes67any trademark, service mark, collective
mark, or certification mark.
The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof used by a person .... [The terms service
mark, collective mark, and certification marks are separately defined,
but these definitions are substantively identical to68that of the term
"trademark" and differ only in administrative detail].
The word "commerce"69 means all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress.
The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a
mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use
in commerce (1) on goods when (A) it is placed in any manner on the
goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the
tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods
or their sale, and (B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce,
and (2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or
advertising of services and rendered in commerce ....
"Use in commerce" is the Lanham Act's terminology for trademark
use. It is a term of art that, as I will explain, has several layers of
meaning that are not always properly kept separate by the courts. Again,
the definition of "use in commerce," in § 1127, is plenary for the entire
Lanham Act. 7' Use is the decisive element for establishing trademark
rights.72 Because of this, the entire federal trademark registration scheme
set up by the Lanham Act depends, in the end, on trademark use. Federal
trademark registrations do not confer rights independent of use. Use
remains primary.7 3
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. A party can apply for a federal trademark registration if one or more statutory criteria are
met: (1) The party makes actual use in commerce of the mark, see § 105 1(a); (2) the party has a
bonafide intent to use the mark in commerce, see § 1051(b); (3) the party has a bonafide intent to
use the mark in commerce and holds a foreign trademark application, see § 1126(d); (4) the party
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2. Use and Infringement Claims
Use is a necessary condition not only for claiming trademark rights,
but also for stating a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham
Act. For registered marks, infringement claims are set forth in section
32, 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(l). It provides:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services 'on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be liable in a civil action by the

registrant for the remedies... provided.74

With respect to unregistered marks, known as common law marks,
the Lanham Act provides an analogous remedy in section 43(a)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a). It states:
[A]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
has registered the mark in a foreign country, see § 1126(e); (5) the party is requesting an extension
of a mark registered internationally, see § 1141f(a). Trademark applications filed under section 1 of
the Lanham Act require a showing of actual use of the mark in commerce prior to issuance of the
registration. See § 105 1(d). Trademark applications under sections 44 and 66 of the Lanham Act can
ripen into registrations without a showing of actual use of the mark in commerce. See §§ 1126(e),
1141h(a). All registrations remain in force for an initial term of ten years, but can be maintained
only upon a showing of actual use in commerce within six years after issuance of the registrations.
See §§ 1058, 1141k. All registrations can be renewed for successive ten-year periods. See § 1059. It
is important to note that a federal registration is not necessary for a trademark to be enforceable. See
§ 1051; see also infra note 75 and accompanying text. In other words, the Lanham Act supplements,
but does not supersede, the common law of trademark infringement. However, federal registrations
confer certain advantages of priority (i.e., date of first adoption of the mark), notice, and
enforcement. Among those advantages are nationwide constructive notice of ownership and
nationwide constructive use, see §§ 1072, 1057(c)), federal question jurisdiction, see § 1121, the
ability to stop importation of confusingly similar goods, see § 1124, a rebuttable evidentiary
presumption that the registrant has the exclusive right to use the mark in commerce for the goods
and services specified in the registration, see § 1057(b), and, if the mark has been used continuously
for five years after issuance of the registration, incontestability of the mark, see § 1065.
Incontestability means that the registrant's claim to exclusive use of the mark can be defeated only
by a showing of specific defenses such as fraud, abandonment, fair use, genericness, antitrust
violations, functionality, and equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel and acquiescence. See
§ 1115(b). In other words, the registrant's failure to use the mark in commerce is fatal to even an
incontestable mark.
74. § 1114(1).
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association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
75
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
In other words, the Lanham Act does not provide for liability
without a showing that the defendant made trademark use of the symbol
in question.
3. Trademark Use: A Necessary Condition for Applying the
Lanham Act
There are a number of logical gradations with respect to the use of a
symbol. Only if all relevant criteria are met can a given use of a symbol
become relevant with respect to trademark infringement claims.76 The
Lanham Act is based on Congress's power to regulate commerce under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 77 Thus, if any conduct by any
person is to fall within the purview of the Lanham Act, such conduct
must take place "in commerce." This is a jurisdictional (or more
precisely, a constitutional) requirement. As a matter of the Supreme
Court's longstanding interpretation of the reach of the Commerce
Clause, "in commerce" means in or affecting interstate commerce. 7' The
Lanham Act's "use in commerce" expressly includes this constitutional
inquiry.79
But for the Lanham Act to be invoked, it is not enough that conduct
take place in interstate commerce. 0 Obviously, there is an entire
universe of conduct affecting interstate commerce, and thus falling under
Congress's regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause. Congress
regulates conduct affecting commerce under a vast panoply of civil
legislation and regulation that it has issued over time.8 ' Only a small
75. § l125(a)(1)(A)-(B).
76. See§ 1051.
77. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"); see
also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1879).
78. See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003).
79. § 1127 (including in the definition of "use in commerce" that "the goods are sold or
transported in commerce").
80. See, e.g., § 114(l)(a) (requiring use of a mark to invoke the Lanham Act, as well as
simply use in commerce).
81. For example, CERCLA ("[Congress acted] under the Commerce Clause to enact
CERCLA." U.S. v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1356 (3d Cir. 1987)); ERISA ("this subchapter
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slice of conduct that takes place in interstate commerce is relevant to
trademark law and, therefore, addressed by the Lanham Act. The
Lanham Act carries within it a necessary principle: distinguish between
conduct.
That
and
trademark-irrelevant
trademark-relevant
distinguishing principle, and the second limiting factor for Lanham Act
applicability, is trademark use, which is statutorily subsumed into the
second prong of the "use in commerce" inquiry, and which refers to the
use of a term on goods, their containers or tags, or, if that is not
practicable, on documents associated with goods or their sale.8 2 With
regard to services (rather than goods), the meaning of trademark use, in
the "use in commerce" inquiry, is analogous and means the use or
display of the term in the sale or advertising of the services.
The following inquiry thus emerges. Suppose a plaintiff claims a
defendant's use of a certain term infringes the plaintiffs trademark. The
defendant can make four discrete claims with regard to trademark use,
each one of which would, if true, preclude Lanham Act liability. The
defendant can claim that (1) the plaintiff's use of the allegedly infringed
mark is not in commerce under the Constitution; (2) the plaintiff's use of
the allegedly infringed mark is not trademark use under the Lanham Act;
(3) the defendant's use of the allegedly infringing term is not in
commerce under the Constitution; or (4) the defendant's use of the
allegedly infringing term is not "use in commerce" under the Lanham
Act. If either argument (1) or argument (2) is true, the plaintiff cannot
prevail because it, the plaintiff, has no rights under the Lanham Act in
the claimed mark. Without rights subject to violation, no claim is
possible. If either argument (3) or (4) is true, the plaintiff cannot prevail
because the defendant's conduct does not amount to wrongdoing
cognizable under the Lanham Act.
Once a plaintiff has adequately shown use in commerce of both its
own mark, and the defendant's allegedly infringing term, the concept of
fair use then comes into play as a potential defense. A defendant's use of
a term that qualifies as "use in commerce" is not infringing where it
meets the fair use criteria. The fair use defense has long been
acknowledged by the courts as being merely a partial codification of a
shall apply to any employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained (1) by any employer
engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any employee
organization or organizations representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or
activity affecting commerce; or (3) by both." 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (a) (2002)); and the Sherman Act
("Congress enacted the Sherman Act pursuant to its authority in the Commerce Clause." 324 Liquor
Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 358 (1987)) are just three of the many laws passed under Congress's
Commerce Clause powers.
82. See § 1127 (defining "use in commerce").
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broad common-law defense based on the notion of fair use of a term that
someone else claims as his or her trademark. 83 As codified, the fair use
defense is contained in section 33, 15 U.S.C. § 1115, which provides in
relevant part that a defendant's use that is "subject to proof of
infringement as defined in Section 32" (in other words, "use in
commerce") is not actionable where the use is of a kind "otherwise than
as a mark," and of a term that is "descriptive of and used fairly and in
good faith only to describe the goods or services" of the defendant.8 4
The statutory scheme leaves us with the following levels of use of a
symbol by a defendant and the following legal consequences of such
use. (1) If the use qualifies as being "in commerce," as that term in
understood with regard to the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, there is potential liability under the Lanham Act. If the use
does not so qualify, the inquiry ceases. (2) If the use qualifies as
trademark use, there is potential liability under the Lanham Act. If the
use does not so qualify, the inquiry ceases. (3) If the use does not qualify
as "fair use" under § 1115, there is potential liability under the Lanham
Act. If the use qualifies as fair use, the inquiry ceases. (4) Use having
been established by this three-step analytic process, the inquiry proceeds

83. See, e.g., Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac, Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2001).
84. The relevant statutory language is:
Any registration issued under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905,
or of a mark registered on the principal register provided by this chapter and owned by a
party to an action shall be admissible in evidence and shall be prima facie evidence of
the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's
ownership in the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark
in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration
subject to and conditions or limitations stated therein, but shall not preclude another
person from proving any legal or equitable defense or defect, including those set forth in
subsection (b) of this section, which might have been asserted if such mark had not been
registered. To the extent that the right to use the registered mark has become
incontestable under section 15 [15 U.S.C. 1065], the registration shall be exclusive
evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the
registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark
in commerce. ... Such conclusive evidence of the right to use the registered mark shall
be subject to proof of infringement as defined in section 1114 of this title, and shall be
subject to the following defenses or defects: (1) [fraud in obtaining the registration], (2)
[abandonment], (3) [permission of registrant], (4) That the use of the name, term, or
device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's
individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with
such party, or of a term or device which is DESCRIPTIVE OF AND USED FAIRLY AND IN
GOOD FAITH only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic
origin ....
§ 1115.
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to other defenses (abandonment, genericness, laches, etc.) and to an
inquiry into likelihood of confusion. 5
D. Use and TrademarkRights
As we have seen from the Supreme Court cases setting forth the
deep structure of trademark law, common law trademark rights cannot
come into existence without proper use of the mark. Likewise, under the
Lanham Act, a trademark registration generally cannot be obtained 86 and
maintained without a showing of actual use of the mark in connection
with the goods or services set forth in the trademark registration.87
Importantly, the criteria of use for establishing trademark rights88 and the
criteria of use for establishing trademark infringement8 9 are the sameuse of the mark by the rights holder, or use of the symbol in question, or
a similar symbol, by the alleged infringer. Since this is so, a defendant's
use of an allegedly infringing (or dilutive) term can form the basis of
liability only where it meets the fundamental requirements of trademark
use imposed by the Lanham Act, and by the common law of trademarks,
on the plaintiff to obtain its rights in the first place. The existence of this
well-settled body of law makes the departures from traditional doctrine
in the Internet context even more perplexing-and even less justifiable.
1. Use and Plaintiff's Rights in a Mark
In this section, I will analyze a few pertinent cases in order to
demonstrate what kinds of use do or do not suffice to establish
trademark rights. In the case law, this issue often appears in the context
of a defendant challenging the plaintiffs right in the mark that the
defendant is allegedly infringing. In a recent case from the Federal
Circuit, Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Services, Inc.,90 the court
rejected the plaintiffs trademark infringement allegations on precisely
such grounds. The court explained: "Transclean brought a cause of
action for trademark infringement, asserting that Bridgewood infringed
85. See § 1114(1) (providing for a claim for trademark infringement); § 1115(a)-(b)
(providing for legal and equitable defenses to trademark infringement).
86. With two exceptions: trademark-applications brought under section 44 and under the
Madrid Protocol can ripen into a registration without any showing of actual use; an affidavit that use
is intended suffices. See §§ 105 1(b), 1141(5) (allowing for registration based on intended use under
the Madrid Protocol and section 44). However, even in this instance, the registrations thus obtained
cannot be maintained without a showing of actual use. See §§ 1064(3), 1141(c).
87. See supra Part II.C.
88. More specifically, the plaintiffs use of its mark.
89. More specifically, the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark or confusingly similar terrr.
90. 290 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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Transclean's TOTAL FLUID EXCHANGE and TOTAL FLUID XCHANGE unregistered trademarks under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), and Minnesota law." 9' The court held that
92
plaintiff Transclean had not adequately used the marks in commerce.
Citing the "the universal requirement for actual usage of the mark in
commerce," 93 the court found that "[u]se of the mark on documents does
not satisfy the usage requirement when the mark can be affixed to the
goods themselves as is the case here.",94 That is a rather strict
requirement of affixation. It suggests that proper trademark usage-that
is, usage that can support trademark rights-requires use of the mark as
closely associated with the goods sold under the mark as possible.
Where the mark can be affixed to the goods themselves, the court holds,
use merely on accompanying documents is not good enough. 95 The court
may be applying the law in an unusually harsh way here. But it is
unquestionably true that the Lanham Act itself, in its definition of "use
in commerce," establishes a similar hierarchy of uses and appears to
require that the use most closely associated with the goods themselves
be used. The rule is, in fact, more flexible than Transclean suggests. At a
minimum, though, Transclean shows that some form of close
association of goods and mark, resulting in immediate consumer
perception of the relationship of goods and mark, is essential for the
creation of trademark rights.
In McDonald's Corp. v. Burger King Corp.,96 the court held that the
use by McDonald's of the particular mark on which it was basing its
infringement claim against Burger King was too short and too
geographically limited to vest McDonald's with enforceable rights.97
Use sufficient to establish common law trademark rights must be
"sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an
appropriate segment of the public mind as those of the adopter of the
mark.".. . In addition, proper use of a trademark, to establish common
law trademark rights or to form the basis for federal98 trademark
registration, requires that the mark be affixed to the goods.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1379.
See id. at 1380.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
See id.
107 F. Supp. 2d 787 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
See id. at 790.
Id. (citation omitted).
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For the purposes of this article, the point is not the precise nature and
quantum of the use a party must make of its mark to establish trademark
rights; rather, it is to show that the courts consistently require open and
visible use of the mark in close proximity to the goods sold under it so as
to permit consumers to perceive goods and mark together and thus to
form a source-indicating association between the two. McDonald's
makes that point unmistakably.
Lands' End, Inc. v. Manback99 may seem to be in some tension with
Transclean. In Transclean, if physical affixation of the mark on the
goods was possible, it was therefore required.' l0 Lands' End has a far
more lenient standard. Analyzing the plaintiffs rights in the mark
allegedly infringed by the defendant, the court stated: "The trademark
statute does not require that the mark be affixed or have 'close physical
association' to the goods. The terms of the statute are met if the mark is
placed in any manner on a 'display associated' with the goods."''
Lands' End offers a choice to the putative trademark owner, whereas
Transclean appears to take that choice away.' 0 2 What matters though, is
that with regard to the issue relevant for our purposes, the two cases are
in full agreement. The Lands' End court explained how the plaintiff met
the use requirement in the following terms:
Lands' End's use of the term 'KETCH' [in its catalogue] with the
picture of the purse and corresponding description constitutes a display
associated with the goods.... A customer can identify a listing and
make a decision to purchase by filling out the sales form and sending it
easily
in or by calling in a purchase by phone. A customer can
03
associate the product with the word 'KETCH' in the display.1
This explanation nicely crystallizes the point to be made. That point is:
the essence of trademark use is plain-view display of the mark in
association with the goods.
2. Use and Defendant's Infringement of a Mark
So far we have discussed the consumer visibility--or rather,
perceptibility-requirement in trademark law from the perspective of a
party trying to establish or assert trademark rights. The issue is no
different in principle when it comes to the question of whether a

99.
100.

797 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1992).
See Transclean Corp., 290 F.3d at 1380.

101.
102.

Lands'End,Inc., 797 F. Supp. at 513.
Compare Lands'End,Inc., 797 F. Supp. at 513, with TranscleanCorp., 290 F.3d at 1380.

103.

Lands'End,Inc., 797 F. Supp. at 514.
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defendant made trademark use of a term, i.e., whether the defendant's
use of that term can form the premise of a trademark infringement claim.
This holistic approach of the Lanham Act to the trademark use
requirement underscores its centrality and importance. Perhaps
surprisingly, given that Internet fact patterns have caused the
misdevelopments of current trademark law, some recent cases applying
the trademark use requirement in such holistic fashion arose in the
Internet context. These cases are the exceptions that prove-in the
the rule by "probing" it-the trademark use
original sense of confirming
04
rule I have set forth.1
In June 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its
opinion in Interactive Products Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions,
Inc.,105 which addresses-and resolves-many of the relevant questions.
At issue in the case was the defendant's use of the plaintiffs trademark
in the "post-domain path" of certain web pages on defendant's
website.10 6 The court defined "post-domain path" as follows. "Each web
page within a website has a corresponding uniform resource locator...
which
a2zsolutions.com!desks/floor/laptraveler/dkfl-lt.htm),
(e.g.,
consists of a domain name and a post-domain path. A post-domain path
(e.g., /desks/floor/laptraveler/dkfl-lt.htm) merely shows how a website's
data is organized within the host computer's files.' °7 The plaintiff's
trademark was LAP TRAVELER; the defendant used that trademark
merely in its 08post-domain path on defendant's website at
a2zsolutions.com. 1
The court resolved the issue rather elegantly. It posed the right
question. "[T]he issue is whether a consumer is likely to notice
'laptraveler' in the post-domain path and then think that [defendant's
product] may be produced by [plaintiff or a company affiliated with
plaintiff]."' 0 9 Noting that a defendant's use of the plaintiff s trademark in
defendant's web site address is routinely held to constitute trademark
infringement, the court swiftly distinguished this line of argument and
showed that it was inapplicable to the situation at hand. 10
104. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 940 (10th ed. 1998).
105. 326 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2003).
106. See id. at 694.
at691.
107. Id.
108. Id.at692, 695.
109. Id.at696.
110. See id. (citing Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036
(9th Cir. 1999)); PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., LLC, 319 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding a
trademark violation where defendant incorporated plaintiff's marks into defendant's domain
names); see also discussion infra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.
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But these courts have all relied on the fact that domain names usually
signify source.... The post-domain path of a URL, however, does not
typically signify source. The post-domain path merely shows how the
website's data is organized within the host computer's files....
Typically, web pages containing post-domain paths are not reached by
entering the full URL into a browser; instead, these secondary pages

are usually reached via a link from the website's homepage, which
does not contain a post-domain path. For example, a consumer wanting
to purchase [plaintiff's] Lap Traveler product would probably not enter
"a2zsolutions.com/desks/floor/laptraveler/dkfl-lt.htm" into a browser.
The consumer would more likely enter 'Laptraveler.com,' which
would bring the consumer to [plaintiffs] website, which sells the Lap
Traveler.' 1
In other words, the court held that "post-domain paths do not typically
signify source." '1 12 Therefore, "it is unlikely that the presence of
another's trademark in a post-domain path would ever violate trademark
law." 113 The court, then, resolved the case on a trademark use analysis.
Since, as the court held, post-domain paths do not signify source, terms
contained in them do not function as trademarks. 1 4 Why not? Because
consumers do not notice the terms in that location.' 15
Is the court's determination empirically accurate? The court offered
no support beyond its factual conjectures. What matters for present
purposes, though, is that the court applied the correct methodology. The
court's holding reaffirmed the traditional view of trademarks as source
signifiers, a ftnction they can fulfill only if consumers actually perceive
them. Because the consumer perception element was lacking, the term in
question was not used as a source identifier, and trademark infringement
liability was foreclosed. The Interactive Products court thoroughly
understood all that. Regrettably, however, the court neglected to
generalize its conclusion that use of a trademark unperceived by
consumers cannot constitute trademark infringement, and the court
addressed the numerous cases on the books in 2003 which held that
defendants' invisible metatag use (i.e., use in "keyword" metatags) of
plaintiffs' trademarks did constitute trademark infringement only in the

111. Interactive Prods.Corp., 326 F.3d at 696-97 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 698.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 696, 698.
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most rudimentary fashion." 6 According to the rationale of Interactive
Products,such liability should be foreclosed afortiori.
The Interactive Products court based its holding heavily on the
reasoning in Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc.,117 an
unpublished 1997 decision by the District Court for the Northern District
of California." 8 Patmont analyzed defendant's alleged trademark
infringement under the rubric of nominative fair use. 19 The allegations
included a claim that defendant's use of plaintiffs mark in the postdomain path of defendant's website constituted trademark
infringement. 20 Despite the court's use of the so-called nominative fair
use doctrine as the overall analytic framework for its decision on the
trademark claims, the court treated this claim separately and disposed of
it swiftly:
[T]he court finds as a matter of law that [post-domain] use does not
suggest [plaintiffs] sponsorship or endorsement, because the Go-Ped
mark did not appear in the website's "domain name."... A website's
domain name signifies its source of origin, and is therefore an
important signal to intemet users who are seeking to locate web
resources.... However, the text that follows the domain name in a
URL... serves a different function. This additional text, often referred
to as the "path" of the URL, merely shows how the website's data is
organized within the host computer's files. Nothing in
12 the post-domain
path of a URL indicates a website's source of origin. 1
Just like the Interactive Products court, the court in Patmont
refused to recognize the presence of a plaintiffs mark in the postdomain path of a defendant's website as trademark use, as an indicator
of source of origin. Absent this indicator function, such use of the term
simply does not constitute trademark use at all, and no consequences
under the Lanham Act follow. The determination that the term is merely
part of the organization of the host computer's files and thus has purely a
machine function, rather than a human-communicative function, ends
the trademark inquiry.
This is a deep and salutary principle, one that pays proper respect to
the foundational premises of trademark law. Apart from seemingly fact116. See id. at 698 n.7 (discussing Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th
Cir. 2002)).
117. No. C96-2703, 1997 WL 811770 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1997).
118.

See Interactive Prods.Corp., 326 F.3d at 697-98.

119. See Patmont Motor Werks, Inc., 1997 WL 811770 at *3-*4.
120. See id. at *4 n.6.
121. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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contingent decisions such as Interactive Products, however, the courts
have mainly honored the Patmont principle in the breach. It bears
emphasizing that Patmont's post-domain analysis says nothing new. It
merely recites and applies basic ideas of U.S. trademark law, ideas that
have been established for well over a century. Patmont, and Interactive
Products after it, simply avoid falling into the trap-which has proven
so successful in snaring other courts-of creating a special law for the
Internet by including invisible, imperceptible, or otherwise
noncommunicative uses by defendants of plaintiffs' marks within the
gamut of uses that qualify as trademark uses and thus can give rise to
liability under the trademark infringement laws.
An application of the principles set forth in Patmont and Interactive
Products occurred in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp.'22 This is a case dealing with keyword-linked
banner advertising, where search engines deliver banner advertising that
is intended to relate to the search terms typed into the search engine by
the Internet user.1 23 Inevitably, some of those search terms are
24
trademarks, much to the chagrin of the owners of those marks. 25
Playboy Enterprises sued for trademark infringement and dilution.
Defendants' initial argument seemed most promising. "Defendants
respond that while plaintiff may have a trademark on 'Playboy®' and
'Playmate®,' defendants do not actually 'use' the trademarks qua
trademarks."'' 26 This, of course, is the decisive threshold inquiry. No use
122. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999). The opinion was reversed in Playboy Enterprises,
Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004), in which the Court of
Appeals reversed Judge Stotler's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. See id.
1034. That opinion is discussed in detail infra Part III.D.2.
123. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
124. See id. The court describes the pertinent facts as follows:
Defendants sell advertising space on the search result pages. Known as "banner ads," the
advertisements are commonly found at the top of the screen. The ads themselves are
often animated and whimsical, and designed to entice the Internet user to "click here." If
the user does click on the ad, she is transported to the web site of the advertiser. As with
other media, advertisers seek to maximize the efficacy of their ads by targeting
consumers matching a certain demographic profile. Savvy web site operators
accommodate the advertisers by "keying" ads to search terms entered by users. That is,
instead of posting ads in random rotation, defendants program their servers to link a preselected set of banner ads to certain "key" search terms. Defendants market this contextsensitive advertising ability as a value-added service and charge a premium. Defendants
key various adult entertainment ads to a group of over 450 terms related to adult
entertainment, including the term "playboy" and "playmate." Plaintiff contends that
inclusion of those terms violates plaintiffs trademark rights in those words.
Id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 1073.
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of the "trademark qua trademark"-i.e., no "use in commerce" under
section 45 of the Lanham Act-means no possibility of trademark
infringement. The court adopted, as a matter of factual determination,
defendant's argument. "Excite and Netscape do not use the words
'playboy' or 'playmate' to identify any goods or services. ' 27 This
finding, then, suggests a straightforward resolution of the case-denial
of Playboy's motion for preliminary injunction for failing to meet the
Lanham Act's trademark use requirement. Without linking its analysis to
this statutory requirement, and instead via a somewhat inchoate policybased inquiry into the nature of the property right represented by
trademarks generally, the court arrived at the same conclusion. 28 The
court developed the following list of propositions, supporting each with
case citations:
A trademark is not an omnibus property right or a monopoly on the use
of the words in the trademark.... A trademark holder may not bar all
use on the Internet of words in the English language.... [A] party may
"use" another's trademark for purposes other than to identify the
source of products.... A competitor may also use another's trademark
in its own advertising, as long as there is no confusion.... An
unauthorized retailer may sell trademarked products without the
a trademark by itself,
trademark holder's consent.... The sale of
29
unattached to a product, is not infringement.
All true, of course. But this list of somewhat unconnected
trademark truisms would have immediately coalesced into a coherent
analytic whole when viewed against the central dogma of trademark law,
established through the common law of trademarks and codified via the
"use in commerce" requirement in the Lanham Act-that only sourceidentifying uses qualify as trademark uses. In other words, a citation to
§ 1127 and to the Supreme Court's decisions in, for example, Theodore
Rectanus or Mishawaka Rubber would have strengthened the court's
analysis. As it stands, the opinion applies precisely the right principles,
but endows them with analytically shallow, or altogether misguided,
support. Take for example, the court's entirely unnecessary First
Amendment analysis. Playboy, the court reasoned,
[wa]s seeking to leverage its trademarks "Playboy®" and
"Playmate®"... into a monopoly on the words "playboy" and
"playmate." Indeed, by seeking a prohibition on all advertisements that
127. Id. at 1078.
128. See id.at 1080-82.
129. Id. (citations omitted).
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appear in response to the search words "playboy" and "playmate,"
[Playboy] would effectively monopolize the use of these words on the
Internet. This violates the First Amendment rights of (a) Excite and
as
Netscape; (b) other trademark holders of "playboy" and "playmate";
30
well as (c) members of the public who conduct Internet searches.,
It may well be that the First Amendment provides part of the ultimate
barrier against the kind of over-application of trademark law that
Playboy sought (and unfortunately ultimately obtained). But there is no
reason to reach the level of constitutional law here. Trademark doctrine
can handle the matter perfectly well. 131 This shows quite effectively the
inefficiency-in terms of ensuring the right results in subsequent
decisions-of broad policy or proto-constitutional statements where
strong doctrinal grounds are readily available. Despite these weaknesses,
the court's heart was plainly in the right place. One cannot put the matter
better than this: "The use by Excite and Netscape of the words 'playboy'
and 'playmate' is not a use of [Playboy's] trademarks. The words are not
or services.... This reason
used to identify the source of any goods
' 13 2
alone justifies denial of the injunction."
That, indeed, is a most satisfactory application of the first principle
of trademark law, as well as an apt summary of the central thesis of this
article. Where the allegedly infringing terms are not used to identify the
source of goods or services, a trademark infringement claim (or, for that
matter, a trademark dilution claim) cannot stand. This limitation is
powerful and efficiently keeps trademark law within appropriate bounds,
fostering competition and curtailing monopolistic tendencies that might
arise through broader protections of words. Alas, it was not to carry the
day. In 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants in this case on essentially the
same grounds. To get around the district court's trenchant trademark use
analysis (even in its doctrinally underdeveloped state, the district court's
analysis packs substantial common-sense wallop), the Court of Appeals
had to invent an entirely new principle, a principle that finally put the
many prior courts' blatant disregard of the trademark use requirement on
a clear (albeit utterly unjustified and statutorily unsupported) doctrinal
footing. It is the principle of "implicit labeling." The radicalness of the
court's doctrinal invention serves to emphasize its novelty and lack of
130. Id. at 1085.
13 1. Of course, courts are obligated under Ashwander v. TVA to avoid parlaying a dispute into
a constitutional struggle wherever possible. See 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
see, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2308 (2004).
132. Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss2/7

30

Widmaier: Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law
2004]

USE, LIABILITY & STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARKLAW

any foundation in the deep structure of trademark law or its codification.
"Defendants," the Court of Appeals held in 2004, "argue that [liability]
cannot be found because they do not label their own goods with
[Playboy's] marks. However, when one considers things from the
consumers' perspective, defendants' argument fails. According to
[Playboy's] evidence, in the minds of consumers, defendants implicitly
label the goods of [Playboy 's] competitors with its marks.' 3 3 In other
words, wherever there is no actual trademark use by the defendant of the
allegedly infringing term-a fact that under traditional trademark law
ends the inquiry-a form of constructive trademark use can be supplied
by showing (how?) that consumers implicitly label the goods in question
with the allegedly infringing term. That doctrinal innovation drastically
strengthens trademark owners' rights.
The court's holding has at least the advantage of honesty. It allows
us to see what drastic measures are needed to refute the district court's
analysis and holding, and to accommodate doctrinally the expansion of
Internet trademark infringement liability so that it encompasses nontrademark uses by defendants. Unfortunately, the district court's
reasoning in denying Playboy's motion for a preliminary injunction,
although sound in terms of capturing the essence of the deep policy of
trademark law; was insufficiently doctrinally thorough to ward off the
perversion of trademark law that has culminated in the Ninth Circuit's
doctrinal enshrining of the theory of implicit labeling, or constructive
trademark use. 134 Constructive trademark use is, of course, an oxymoron
in this context. It is a basic principle of trademark law that use of a
symbol-whether for purposes of establishing rights in it or of basing
liability on it-must be actual in order to be of relevance for trademark
35
law purposes.1

133. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir.
2004) (emphasis added).
134. The strangeness of this "implicit labeling" doctrine is brought home even more clearly
when contrasted with Playboy's concession at the district court level, made as a matter of course,
that "Interet users who type in 'playboy' and 'playmate' as search terms are not infringing
[Playboy's] trademarks. See Reporter's transcript of May 24, 1999 Hearing at p. 43 ('We're not in
any way claiming that people who use the Internet, Playboy, Playmate, themselves are infringing')."
Playboy Enters., Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 n.6. Neither Internet users nor the defendant search
engines are making trademark use of these marks, yet trademark use is found. Where does it come
from? From judicial creativity.
135. The obvious exception-the Lanham Act's specific provision of constructive use of an
applied-for trademark as of the date of the filing of the federal application for purposes of
establishing temporal priority, see 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c)-is limited in scope and, at any rate, merely
serves to confirm the truth of the broader point. Recall, for example, that every federal trademark
registration is subject to cancellation without a showing of actual use via "an affidavit setting forth
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"Use" or "Commerce"?

As we have seen, the Lanham Act's use of the term "commerce"
refers to the constitutional requirement that attends every law passed by
Congress in the exercise of its powers under the Commerce Clause. That
is precisely how section 45 of the Lanham Act defines "commerce."
"Use in commerce," on the other hand, is defined by section 45 as a term
of art referring, not only to the constitutional requirement under the
Commerce clause, but also to the general requirement of trademark law
that a mark or term be "used" in a certain manner, i.e., on goods "when
placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays
associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the
nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on
documents associated with the goods or their sale," and on services
when "used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and
rendered in commerce.', 136 These are two separate inquiries. As I shall
discuss in Part III, several courts, ruling on trademark infringement
allegations in the Intemet context, are rather careless about the
distinction between these inquiries. 137 Such carelessness creates a
substantial risk that an affirmative answer to an inquiry into the
"commerce" prong of the "use in commerce" analysis will be taken to be
an affirmative answer to the entire analysis. The consequence of such a
substitution is, of course, that the trademark use requirement (the second
prong of the "use in commerce" inquiry) will be obliterated and the
application of trademark law drastically broadened-from symbols used
to any conduct regulable
on, or in connection with, goods and services
138
by Congress under the Commerce Clause.
those goods or services recited in the registration on or in connection with which the mark is in use
in commerce and such number of specimens or facsimiles showing current use of the mark." 15
U.S.C. § 1058. Likewise, the definition in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 of "use in commerce" (a term utilized

ubiquitously throughout the Lanham Act) is couched entirely in terms of actual, rather than
constructive, use.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
137. See, e.g., OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000);
SNA, Inc. v. Array, 173 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v.
Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313 (SD.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1997); discussed infra Part
III.C.
138. Professors Dogan and Lemley point out this issue.
While the use of a trademark as keyword may well be a use in interstate commerce
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, satisfying this minimal

requirement is not the same as proving that the defendant have made trademark use of
the plaintiffs brand. Unfortunately, an increasing number of courts equate the two and
thus do not analyze the requirement of trademark use directly. This is a crucial error.
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 30, at 806 (footnotes omitted).
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Some courts confronted this issue head-on and tried their best to
resolve it, but nevertheless ended up muddying the waters. Buti v.
Perosa139 shows how difficult an analytically clean inquiry can be in this
area. It is a good example of a decision that made a resolute but not
entirely successful attempt to draw a careful distinction between the
"commerce" inquiry and the "use" inquiry. The case dealt with the
conflict between the owners of a New York restaurant by the name and
mark of "Fashion Caff' and an Italian corporation that owned the
identical mark in Italy and was seeking to establish rights to the mark,
for clothing and restaurant services, in the United States. 140 The
plaintiff-the owner of the New York caf-brought a declaratory
judgment action, seeking a ruling'that the defendant, who had applied to
register the mark "Fashion Caf", with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
14 1
Office, had no rights in the "Fashion Caff" mark in the United States.
The defendant's use of the mark in the U.S. was limited to certain
advertising and promotional activities. 142 The precise question
confronting the Court of Appeals was whether those activities
"constituted sufficient 'use' of the Fashion Caf&name 'in commerce' as
to merit protection under the Lanham Act." 143 In other words, the
parties' dispute was entirely about the concept of "use" under the
Lanham Act. 144 It was undisputed by the parties-and, in fact supported
by crucial concessions of the defendant-that the "commerce" prong of
the "use in commerce" inquiry was satisfied, and that the defendant's
took place "in commerce" for
advertising and promotional campaign
145
purposes of the Commerce Clause.
Despite this crucial agreement by the parties on the commerce
prong of the "use in commerce" inquiry, the court's analysis remained
oddly muddled. The court briefly recited the controlling principles.
We recently affirmed that the history and text of the Lanham Act show
that "use in commerce" reflects Congress's intent to legislate to the
limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause.... The power of

Congress to register marks stems only from the "Commerce Clause" of
139.

139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998).

140.
141.

See id. at 99-101.
Id. This case, then, fits into the category of a party trying to establish trademark rights,

rather that a party trying to show that another's use of a term constitutes trademark use and, hence,
trademark infringement.
142. Seeid. at99-101.
143. Id. at 102.
144. See id.
145. See id. ("Notwithstanding this disagreement over the statutory concept of 'use,' however,
the parties are in complete accord as to the meaning under Section 45 of 'commerce."').
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the U.S. Constitution.... The Supreme Court, moreover, has made

clear that Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause extends to
activity that "substantially affects" interstate commerce. In the
trademark context, the limits of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority are manifested 146by the cases that define the extraterritorial
reach of the Lanham Act.
With regard to the "use" inquiry, the center and source of the parties'
conflict, the court noted that the question whether promotional activities
under the Fashion Caf6 name by themselves-that is, without any
accompanying offering of goods or services under that-can constitute
trademark use. Turning to "first principles, 14 7 the court cited the
Supreme Court's Theodore Rectanus opinion for the proposition that a
party's right in a trademark arises only "'as a right appurtenant to an
established business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed.' 148 Based on this test, the court concluded that
"[defendant's] mere advertising of the Fashion Caf6 mark, standing
alone, did not149constitute 'use' of the mark within the meaning of the
Lanham Act."

This is not as clear as it could be. The Buti court's inquiry into
"use" and "commerce" tended toward circularity. For example, the court
rephrased its holding with the following words: "[Defendant's] activities
in the United States were insufficient to establish 'use in commerce' of
the Fashion Caf6 name absent proof that [defendant] offered any
restaurant services in United States commerce."1 50 This way of putting
the issue appears to re-introduce commerce considerations into the use
inquiry. It actually does not, because the court here merely restated the
evidentiary fact that the defendant offered no relevant goods or services
in the U.S., and it put that evidentiary fact-accurately but
confusingly-in "commerce" terms. But the court's inquiry itself
centered on use, as the following passage in the court's opinion makes
clear.

146. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
147. Id. at 103.
148. Id. (quoting United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)).
149.

Id.

150. Id. The Buti court further restated the central issue, with its emphasis on use, but a strong
secondary reference to commerce: "Mere advertisement of a product by use of a mark would not
constitute common law trademark use.... [T]rademark rights develop when goods bearing the
mark are placed in the market and followed by continuous commercial utilization." Id. (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
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We believe the answer [to the question posed by the case] lies in first
principles. The Supreme Court explained long ago that "the right to a
particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function
is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader
and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his;
of property except in connection with an
and it is not the 1' subject
51
existing business."
This use requirement characterizes trademark law qua trademark law.
The apparent circularity is created by the fact that the requisite use has to
be in connection with a business, a commercial venture, which
inescapably introduces commerce notions into the use inquiry.
Regardless of the court's analytic difficulties, "use" and
"commerce" are nevertheless separate. Take, for instance, the
defendant's actions in Buti. Because the promotion of "Fashion Caf&'
was unconnected with restaurant services in the U.S. (i.e., restaurant
services offered in U.S. commerce), the defendant had no rights in the
U.S. to the "Fashion Caf" trademark or service mark. Therefore,
defendant's advertising did not qualify as "use in commerce," as Buti
repeatedly and undifferentiatedly stated. 152 Does that mean that the
advertising activities of the defendant-which, as we know from the
court's holding, do not qualify as "use in commerce"--do not take place
in commerce and are therefore beyond Congress's legislative powers
under the Commerce Clause? Absolutely not. Defendant's promotion of
"Fashion Caf" may be subject to other laws and regulations passed by
Congress under the Commerce Clause since it has jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute deceptive advertising. 153 This proves that
"commerce" and "use" are different inquiries. These activities are not
associated with the actual offering of goods or services. Ergo, whatever
other commercial activity they may constitute, they are not trademark
use.

A case in which the court was more successful in drawing a
distinction between the "use" and the "commerce" prong of the "use in
commerce" test for Lanham Act purposes is United We Stand America,
Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, Inc.,' 5 4 also from the

151. Id. (quoting Theodore Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 97).
152.

See id.passim.

153. See, e.g., Novartis Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 223 F.3d 783, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Defendant's advertising activities are subject to Federal Trade Commission oversight. The F.T.C. is,
of course, an agency established by Congress under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gillies,
851 F.2d 492, 493 (lst
Cir. 1988).
154. 128 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Second Circuit, and decided approximately around the time of Buti. The
issue in United We Stand, with regard to the use prong, illuminated a
different aspect of the use question than in the Buti decision. In Buti, the
question was whether the defendant used its mark in connection with
any services offered in U.S. commerce.155 In United We Stand, the
question was whether the services in connection with which defendant
used its mark qualified as services within the meaning of the Lanham
Act.1 56 The defendant in United We Stand contended that its political
activities did not constitute "services" for Lanham Act purposes. The
court noted that "[t]he protection of the trademark or service mark of
non-profit and public service organizations requires that use of the mark
by competing organizations be prohibited... [and that] [t]he Lanham
Act has thus been applied to defendants 15furnishing
a wide variety of
7
non-commercial public and civic benefits.'

The court concluded that defendant offered "services
characteristically rendered by a political party to and for its members,
adherents, and candidates. Although not undertaken for profit, they
unquestionably render a service. We have no doubt that they satisfy [the
Lanham Act's] requirement
that the mark be used in connection with
158
services."'
or
goods
A profit motive, then, is irrelevant for whether an activity
constitutes a service under the Lanham Act. Thus, the defendant
organization, which was created "to solicit, collect and otherwise raise
money in support of the presidential candidacy of Ross Perot,' 59 offered
services under the Lanham Act, and any mark used in connection with
that offering of services was in principle "covered by the Lanham
155. SeeButi, 139 F.3dat 103.
156. See United We StandAm., Inc., 128 F.3d at 89.
157. Id. at 89-90.
158. Id. at 90. There is some rather powerful case law contradicting, or arguably contradicting,
the court's conclusion. In Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, for example, the court held that
"[p]urveying points of view [are] not a service" contemplated by the Lanham Act, and stated that
"[d]efendants' only activity is trying to communicate their ideas." 622 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D.D.C.
1985). The United We Stand court rejected this holding.
[W]e respectfully suggest that the court reached the right result but did not correctly
describe the reason. If the court were fight that communicating ideas and purveying
points of view is not a service subject to the controls established by trademark law, then
one who established a learning center would be free to call it Harvard or Yale
University. We do not think the Lucasfilm court intended such a rule. In our view, the
justification for denial of relief in that case lay in the fact that the defendants were using
plaintiffs mark not in a manner that would create confusion as to source, but rather as
part of a message whose meaning depended on reference to plaintiffs product.
United We StandAm., Inc., 128 F.3d at 91.
159. United We StandAm., Inc., 128 F.3d at 90 (quotation marks omitted).
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Act.' 160 Having reached this threshold determination with regard to
"use," the court then proceeded to analyze whether defendant's use of
the mark in question took place "in commerce.' 16' The court stated:
[Defendant] argues that [the court's] interpretation of "services"
ignores the specification of § 1114(1)(a) that the use prohibited must
be "in commerce." We disagree with its reading of the statute. The
history and text of the Lanham Act show that "use in commerce"
reflects Congress's intent to legislate to the limits of its authority under
the Commerce Clause, rather62than to limit the Lanham Act to profitseeking uses of a trademark.1
That latter sentence, while true in the context of the opinion, is an
example of language that can easily be misunderstood to mean that the
entirety of the "use in commerce" inquiry is exhausted by answering the
questions whether the defendant's activities fall within Congress's
legislative power under the Commerce Clause. As the remainder of
United We Stand clearly shows, this is emphatically not the case.
Instead, "use" and "commerce" are separate inquiries that combine into
a conjunctive test for Lanham Act applicability.
I have discussed the question of trademark use in two
circumstances. (1) Defendant only promoted its mark, but offered no
goods or services under it in the United States. Buti held that this does
not constitute trademark use. (2) Defendant uses the allegedly infringing
mark in connection with the offering of services, but argues that the
services are not for profit and thus do not constitute "services" as that
term in understood in the Lanham Act. Analogous to the reasoning in
Buti, the defendant in United We Stand inferred from this lack of
services that it did not "use" the mark, and hence could not be held liable
for infringement. United We Stand held that intent to profit from the
services offered is not a necessary condition for those services to fall
within the ambit of the Lanham Act, and specifically, that a mark used in
connection with such services can infringe upon another party's
trademark rights. 163 In both instances, the inquiries on "use" and on
"commerce" were analytically separate, and the courts made substantial,
albeit perhaps not entirely successful, efforts not to conflate them. But
the lesson is clear: an affirmative answer to the "commerce" question
permits no inference with regard to the "use" question.

160. Id.at 92.
161. Seeid. at 92-93.
162. Id.at 92.
163. Id. at 92-93.
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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LAW OF THE HORSE: TRADEMARK
LAW AND THE INTERNET

A. Novel Facts and Legislative Reactions
The issue of trademark use was well settled in traditional trademark
doctrine and did not tend to raise any substantial questions. The reason
for this is quite obvious. The structure of the physical environment in
which life, and commercial activities, tended to largely take place put
substantial limitations on human conduct. In the current Age of the
Internet, it has become a truism that many such limitations have been
removed.
Trademark law reacted quickly to a perceived threat of an explosion
of infringement via the Internet. Some legislative help was felt to be
necessary to adjust the traditional balance to account for the changed
empirical situation. Particularly with regard to the phenomenon of
cybersquatting, 164 traditional trademark law was plainly unable to cope
with the new challenges. Individuals, such as Dennis Toeppen,
succeeded initially in registering large numbers of well-known
trademarks as domain names, and then proceeded to offer them--often
for steep sums-to the owners of the trademarks for purchase. 65 PreInternet trademark law did not offer much in terms of an effective
weapon against such conduct. Where a domain name was being
passively held by a cybersquatter, and did not point to any web site,
thorny questions arose regarding both trademark use and consumer
confusion. It was for this reason that the courts increasingly relied on the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA") 166 as the tool of choice to
combat cybersquatters. The main reason for using the FTDA was that
claims for dilution do not require a showing of likelihood of confusion.
But the FTDA itself has serious limitations. It protects only famous
marks, thus providing no protection to owners of "ordinary"
trademarks. 167 Moreover, like all other trademark protections in the
Lanham Act, it requires trademark use by the defendant of the allegedly
infringing term. 168 That requirement is not met where a cybersquatter is
164. Cyber-squatting is the illicit registration of domain names containing a well-known
trademark by a third party, done with the aim of making a profit by selling the domain name to the
mark's owner. See, e.g., Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
165. See id. at 1230; Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (9th Cir.
1998).
166. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(l)-(3) (2004).
167. See § 1125(c)(1).
168. See id.
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merely passively holding a domain name without connecting it to a web
site. Thus, to accommodate the desire of trademark owners to protect
their valuable marks against cybersquatting, Congress in November
1999, passed the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
("ACPA"). 169 The ACPA enables trademark owners to recover domain
names that incorporate terms identical with, or similar to, the plaintiffs'
marks from parties who have registered such domain names in bad
faith. 7 ° Bad faith is determined by reference to a statutory list of
factors.171 Where the defendant cannot be found, or personal jurisdiction
over the defendant cannot be established, the ACPA provides for in rem
proceedings against offending domain names directly. Such proceedings
must be brought in the federal district in which the domain name
registrar, registry, or other domain name authority for the defendant
domain names is located. The in rem provisions are problematic because
they have sometimes tended to put U.S. courts in charge of disputes over
the territorial reach of trademark rights that have little, if anything, to do
with legitimate U.S. interests. Fortunately, though, these decisions are
doctrinally and factually extremely narrow. Despite the vast potential
overbreadth of the ACPA in this regard, the decisions-one thinks of
cases such as Harrods,Porsche, and Cable News Networks172-have not
given rise to an expanding body of precedent. They may be problematic
in themselves, but they are no more than that. They do not reach beyond
themselves. In other words, neither the in personam, nor the in rem,
provisions of the ACPA have shown any tendency of the "doctrinal
creep" of which Professor Lemley has so rightly warned. 173 It seems
they simply address too specific a problem to be capable of expansion.
Rather, Congress, by passing the ACPA, has done the health and
integrity of trademark law a great service. 174 It was clear prior to passage
of the ACPA that trademark owners felt an almost desperate need to
protect their marks against domain name infringement. While existing
doctrine was insufficient, judges were sympathetic, particularly where
169. § 1125(d).
170. See§ 1125(d)(1)-(2).
171. See§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
172. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 224-25 (4th Cir. 2002);
Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248, 259-60, 262 (4th Cir. 2002); Cable News
Network L.P. v. Cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 510, 527 (E.D. Va. 2001), afd, 56 Fed. Appx.
599, 600 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003).
173. See Lemley, Modern Lanham Act, supranote 1, at 1698.
174. Note that the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, or UDRP, passed by Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, or ICANN, also has helped tremendously to relieve
the pressure on the legal system to adjudicate domain name issues that were not easily
conceptualized by existing law.
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the defendants were plainly bad actors intentionally using legal
loopholes and revolutionary and confusingly novel technology to get
away with conduct that had all indicia of wrongdoing, but could not be
pigeonholed into existing doctrinal structures. As a result, prior to
passage of the ACPA, trademark law got stretched, sometimes beyond
recognition, to achieve an imposition of liability, which the court's sense
of right and wrong seemed to be plainly calling for. 175 Of special interest
in this regard is language from several courts pertaining to the "use in
commerce" requirement. This requirement is careless and motivated by
highly specific facts and the peculiar legal problem explained above, and
should accordingly have been abandoned long ago. 176 Yet some of this
ill-founded use in commerce language continues to live on in the wrong
context, causing an overbroad application of trademark law.
B.

Brookfield, Metatags, and the Demise of Trademark Use

As we saw, one source of distortion of traditional trademark
doctrine caused by the Internet was the phenomenon of cybersquatting,
and the relative helplessness of trademark owners vis-A-vis the early
cybersquatters. That problem has been largely solved, via both the
ACPA and the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy. The more important
problem, though, persists to this day. It, too, has been a rich source of
doctrinal confusion and misdevelopment. Unfortunately, while some
courts are starting to express plain disaffection with the state of the law,
and some have taken encouraging steps to rectify the situation, a
thorough readjustment is still outstanding.
The problem is the courts' treatment of computer code that the
consumer or Internet user does not ordinarily see, but that causes a
defendant's web site to appear favorably placed on a search result list for
plaintiffs products, or that activates a banner ad or pop-up ad that is
tailored to the search terms used by the consumer and, thus, is likely to
hawk the products or services of the plaintiffs competitors. The issue of
banner ads and pop-up ads is rather new and has recently given rise to
thoughtful and important decisions that have the potential to move the
law in the right direction. They will be discussed below. 177 The issue of
175. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320-21, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1998);
Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Intermatic and Panavision are
prime examples of such undue stretching of existing doctrine to fit elusive fact patterns. In
particular, note the Panavision court's stretching of the FTDA, and of the law of personal
jurisdiction, in order to allow the plaintiff to maintain a dilution claim.
176. For a discussion of such cases see supra Part II.B and Part II.C.
177. See infra Part III.D.
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placement on a search engine list goes back several years earlier. It
centers on the defendant's use of invisible metatags to enhance
positioning of defendant's web site. What is allegedly actionable about
this? The fact that the metatags of the defendant's web site include the
plaintiffs trademarks. Search engines used to rely on the frequency of a
term on a web site (including in its metatags) to determine the putative
relevance of that web site to the Internet user's inquiry. So repeating the
word NIKE several hundred times in the metatags of a web site, for
a
example, would make it likely that that web site would 1receive
78
prominent place in the list of search results for the term NIKE.
Regardless of modem search engine technologies that have
marginalized or obviated metatag-based search techniques,' 79 the law on
trademark infringement based on metatag use is very much with us
today. The principles developed in that line of precedents remain, in fact,
a mainstay of trademark law as applied to the Internet.' 80 I maintain that
the central tenets of this body of law-specifically, those tenets
addressing the issue of trademark use-are mistaken, from both a
doctrinal and a policy perspective. Since the Internet version of
trademark law reigns relatively unchallenged in the courts today, and
since the Internet has become such a large part of human reality and
given rise to a substantial body of trademark law, this represents a
serious problem.
The most important case, much discussed in subsequent decisions
and in academia, is the Ninth Circuit's 1999 decision in Brookfield.
Many students of trademark law have commented on, and often harshly
criticized, the Brookfield decision,' 81 and I am much indebted to their
178. These kinds of metatags are also known as "keyword" metatags. "The keyword meta tag,
in theory, increases search engine accuracy by offering more efficiently condensed and accurate
information about the contents of a page than the search engine's machine-driven algorithm might
provide." Lastowka, supra note 35, at 844-45.
179. See Goldman, supra note 31, at **23-46.
180. Unfortunately, such a specialized body of law-even apart from expressly specialized
statutes like the ACPA-developed quickly under the pressures of radical technological innovation.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
181. The issue of trademark liability in the keyword and metatag context in general, and its
resolution in Brookfield in particular, has received extensive scholarly attention. See Goldman,
supra note 31, at **56-58 (presenting a representative, but non-exhaustive selection of other
pertinent articles, arguing pro and con on the liability question); see also Chad J. Doellinger,
Trademarks, Metatags, and Initial Interest Confusion: A Look to the Past to Re-Conceptualize the
Future, 41 IDEA 173, 225 (2001) (arguing that "the initial interest confusion doctrine as applied to
metatags and in the internet context is well-settled law," but seeking to reconceptualize Brookfield's
application of the doctrine in light of "normative suggestions for its application to metatags, driven
by the brick and mortar history of the doctrine as well as policy considerations."); David Hricik,
Reading Too Much Into Nothing: The Metaphor of Place and the Internet, in 55 MERCER L. REV.
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work. As I mentioned before, a Ninth Circuit judge recently called for an
en banc reassessment of Brookfield's central innovation-the
application of the initial interest doctrine to trademark infringement via
metatags. 182 But many courts and commentators have missed

859, 863 (2004)-(stating that a "metatag is text that is invisible to web users but is seen by search
engines like Google or Yahoo! ... [and can] create initial interest confusion in a trademark case.");
David M. Klein & Daniel C. Glazer, Reconsidering Initial Interest Confusion on the internet, 93
TRADEMARK REP. 1035, 1063-65 (2003) (Klein and Glazer argue against trademark infringement
liability for metatag use because "the unauthorized use of a trademark in a website's metatags is not
likely to cause actionable harm," and "[tihe mere uncertainty that Internet users may have when
deciding among several different hyperlinks listed in response to a search engine query is not the
confusion that is relevant for purposes of trademark law." They reach this conclusion via an analysis
of the confusion requirement.); Dan McCuaig, Halve the Baby: An Obvious Solution to the
Troubling Use of Trademarks as Metatags, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 643, 681-88
(2000) (arguing in favor of creating a "Trademarks" metatag to avoid overprotecting trademarks in
the metatag context); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace:
Trademark Liability for Metatagging, 33 GONZ. L. REv. 277, 298, 308 (1997) (arguing that
unauthorized use of trademarks in metatags is actionable as free-riding under the Lanham Act
because "[mletatags are adopted with the purpose of influencing consumers to travel to the site");
Rachel Jane Posner, Manipulative Metatagging, Search Engine Baiting, and Initial Interest
Confusion, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 439, 443, 505 (2000) (arguing that "federal courts
should uniformly apply the Ninth Circuit's reasoning [in Brookfield]" because "manipulative
metatagging... creates a likelihood of initial interest confusion"); Kurt M. Saunders, Confusion is
the Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword Banner Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 543,
575-76 (2002) (arguing that generally "[k]eyword banner advertising does not confuse consumers as
to source because consumers expect that the ads are not commercially connected to the trademark
that they have entered as a search term in the search engine," and "[t]o the extent that keyword
banner advertising implicates a competitor's trademark rights, the practice should be recognized and
permitted as fair use or comparative advertising," but not providing any meaningful analysis of the
trademark use requirement); Lisa M. Sharrock, Realigning the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine
with the Lanham Act, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 53, 78 (2003) (arguing that recent court decisions have
"overextended the doctrine, which now, in its broadest form, permits trademark proprietors to
pursue infringement suits without demonstrating that a defendant's behavior has a likelihood of
appreciably impacting the opinions or decisions of reasonable members of the public," and calling
for restricting the doctrine "to only those instances in which initial interest creates a true likelihood
of marketplace confusion among reasonable consumers"); Jason Allen Cody, Note, Initial Interest
Confusion: What Ever Happened to Traditional Likelihood of Confusion Analysis?, 12 FED.
CIRCUIT B.J. 643, 679, 684-85 (2002) (arguing that metatag use "can be a serious and actionable
problem if it produces a likelihood of confusion," but criticizing Brookfield for abandoning
traditional confusion analysis and its central question "whether consumers are likely to be
confused," with initial interest confusion analysis); Dunaevsky, supra note 35, at 1360, 1383
(assuming that metatag use is trademark use, and arguing that applying initial interest confusion
doctrine to metatags is appropriate because "Internet [c]onsumers [a]re [t]oo [s]avvy to [b]e
[c]onfused by [m]etatags"); Note, Confusion in Cyberspace: Defending and Recalibrating the
InitialInterest Confusion Doctrine, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2410 (2004) (arguing that "the initial
interest confusion doctrine [should be applicable to pop-up ads because it] not only encourages the
provision of high-quality online services and online communications by prohibiting free-riding, but
also safeguards reasonable consumer expectations in reaching desired online services").
182. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034-36
(9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss2/7

42

Widmaier: Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law
2004]

USE, LIABILITY & STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LA W

Brookfield's deep doctrinal mistake, and have therefore launched
criticisms and proposed remedies that fail to solve the problem. The
problem, in a nutshell, is the drastic broadening of liability for trademark
infringement on the Intemet-via the obliteration of the trademark use
requirement-for conduct that may not actually result in high levels of
consumer confusion, and that simply does not seem to be trademark
infringement in the sense lawyers and judges have been understanding
this body of law.
Ironically, the facts of Brookfield carry within them the refutation
court's theory of liability. Therefore, although this is rather wellthe
of
trodden territory, 183 we must examine them in depth. The plaintiff,
products
other
among
offers
Communications,
Brookfield
"comprehensive, searchable, entertainment-industry databases and
related software applications containing information such as movie
credits, box office receipts, films in development, film release schedules,
entertainment news, and listings of executives, agents, actors, and
directors."' 84 Brookfield sells these databases and applications under the
trademark MovieBuff. 8 5 They can be purchased on Brookfield's
websites: moviebuffonline.com and brookfieldcomm.com." 8 Enter
defendant, West Coast Video. "In October 1998, Brookfield learned that
West Coast-one of the nation's largest video rental store chains with
over 500 stores-intended to launch a web site at 'moviebuff.com'
containing, inter alia, a searchable entertainment database similar to
'MovieBuff."", 187 Understandably, Brookfield was unhappy. It sued West
Coast Video, but failed to obtain preliminary injunctive relief from the
district court. 88 West Coast launched its web site at moviebuff.com. 189
Brookfield sought emergency relief from the Court of Appeals,
which proved to be a decidedly more sympathetic forum than the district
court. It granted an emergency motion for injunctive relief to block West
Coast's moviebuff.com web site.' 90 The appeal was quickly decided, 19 1
and Brookfield prevailed across the board. 192 The court's analysis of the
183.
184.
1999).
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
to decide
192.

See cases cited supra note 181.
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir.
See id.
See id. at 1042.
Id.
See id. at 1043.
See id.
Seeid.
It took the Court of Appeals less than five months from the filing of the notice of appeal
the case and issue a lengthy and detailed opinion. See id. at 1043-44.
See id. at 1066-76.
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93

parties' respective rights to the trademark MovieBuff is unremarkable. 94
The court found that Brookfield was the senior user of the mark.
Therefore, the court further found-entirely correctly and
unremarkably-that West Coast's use of the domain name
moviebuff.com, pointing to a website that sold products that directly
competed with Brookfield's products, infringed Brookfield's rights in its
use of the mark MovieBuff. 95
So far, so good. Had the opinion stopped there, it would have
remained both obscure and uncontroversial. But the court boldly struck
out into new doctrinal territory. In the latter part of its opinion, the court
analyzed Brookfield's claim that West Coast's use of the MovieBuff
mark in the "buried code" of its web site constituted trademark
infringement. 196 "[W]e conclude," the court held, "that the Lanham Act
bars West Coast from including in its metatags any term confusingly
similar with Brookfield's mark."' 97 This is remarkable. Note that the
web site under discussion in this section of the opinion is not West
Coast's website at moviebuff.com, but rather another web site it
domain
name
the
plainly
uninfringing
maintained
at
198
As the court put the issue: "Here, we must
westcoastvideo.com.
determine whether West Coast can use 'MovieBuff or 'moviebuff.com'
in the metatags of its web site at 'westcoastvideo.com' or at any other
domain address other than 'moviebuff.com' (which we have determined
that West Coast may not use)."' 199 What, however, did the court mean by
"metatags"? The definition is crucial. "[M]etatags are HTML code not
visible to Web users but used by search engines in determining which
sites correspond to the keywords entered by a Web user., 200 To say it
again-metatags, the court found, are not visible to web users.20 '
How, then, can they function as trademarks or infringe trademarks
(which, as we have seen, in terms of the use in commerce requirement
and the signification function of marks, comes to the same thing)? I
argue that they cannot. To hold otherwise would clash with the core
193. See, e.g., id. at 1046-61.
194. See id. at 1053.
195. Seeid.at 1061.
196. See id. at 1061-66.
197. Id. at 1065.
198. See id. at 1062.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1061-62 (emphasis added).
201. A reasonably computer-literate Internet user can, of course, cause metatags to be made
visible, and can review them. This fact plays no role in the court's analysis. Neither, to my
knowledge, does it play any role in the analysis of metatags in other U.S. decisions pertaining to
trademark law.
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meaning of both the "use in commerce" requirement under the Lanham
Act and the common law-rooted, deep structure of trademark law in
general. But the court's blindness to the foundations of the law it is
dealing with is complete. Brookfield betrays not a hint of awareness that
the court's ruling turns trademark law upside down. The court stated that
"West Coast's use of 'moviebuff.com' in metatags [of the
westcoastvideo.com website] will still result in what is known as initial
interest confusion. 20 2 With this sentence, Brookfield elevated the
hitherto rather obscure initial interest confusion doctrine to a position of
prominence in Internet trademark law. 0 3 But the court had it backwards,
doctrinally and logically. Trademark use by the defendant-"use in
commerce" in Lanham Act lingo-must be established before an
analysis of the likelihood of confusion is even meaningful. It is the
Brookleld court's cardinal mistake to disregard the trademark "use"
requirement-a mistake that has bequeathed upon U.S. law the by-now
infamous "Blockbuster Video" parable.20 4 That exercise in judicial
202. Brookfield, 74 F.3d at 1062. The court explains the initial interest confusion doctrine as
follows:
Web surfers looking for Brookfield's "MovieBuff' products who are taken by a search
engine to "westcoastvideo.com" [(parenthetically, reputable search engines do not "take"
users to web sites-it always requires an affirmative act by the user to go so a web site
from a list of search results)] will find a database similar enough to "MovieBuff" such
that a sizeable number of consumers who were originally looking for Brookfield's
product will simply decide to utilize West Coast's offerings instead. Although there is no
source confusion in the sense that consumers know they are patronizing West Coast
rather than Brookfield, there is nevertheless initial interest confusion in the sense that, by
using [(the court provides no analysis of what "use" means in the metatag context)]
"moviebuff.com" or "MovieBuff' to divert people looking for "MovieBuff' to its web
site, West Coast improperly benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its
mark.
Id. Apart from there being no trademark use because West Coast's metatags are hidden
from the consumers' view, this is an accurate analysis of the initial interest confusion
doctrine.
203. See id.
204. The Blockbuster parable, in full, states:
Using another's trademark in one's metatags is much like posting a sign with another's
trademark in front of one's store. Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it
"Blockbuster") puts up a billboard on a highway reading-"West Coast Video: 2 miles
ahead at Exit 7"-where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located
at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive
around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right
by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer West
Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast since there
is a Blockbuster right there. Customers are not confused in the narrow sense: they are
fully aware that they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe
that Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored by, West Coast. Nevertheless, the
fact that there is only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that Blockbuster
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storytelling has, as we shall see, wreaked havoc with trademark law on
the Internet, and the misguided doctrinal thinking it has engendered has
proved remarkably difficult to eradicate. Why? Because the court's
metaphor was well integrated in the narrative of the opinion and appears
to flow naturally from the court's premises. The falsity of those premises
was thereby effectively hidden.
Brookfield treated the question of liability on the basis of metatags
entirely separately from the question of domain name liability, and even
noted that this inquiry is "quite different" from the domain name
inquiry. 20 5 Furthermore, as shown above, the court was also perfectly
aware that metatags are ordinarily not visible to consumers. The court
distinguished the two issues, and rather effectively so:
Although entering "MovieBuff' into a search engine is likely to bring
up a list including "westcoastvideo.com" if West Coast has included
that term in its metatags, the resulting confusion is not as great as
where West Coast uses the "moviebuff.com" domain name. First,
when the user inputs "MovieBuff' into an Internet search engine, the
list produced by the search engine is likely to include both West
Coast's and Brookfield's web sites. Thus, in scanning such list, the
Web user will often be able to find the particular web site he is
seeking. Moreover, even if the Web user chooses the web site
belonging to West Coast, he will see that the domain name of the web
site he selected is "westcoastvideo.com." Since there is no confusion
resulting from the domain address, and since West Coast's initial web
page prominently displays its own name, it is difficult to say that a
consumer is likely to be confused about whose site he has reached
206 or to
think that Brookfield somehow sponsors West Coast's web site.
The domain name westcoastvideo.com was, as the court correctly
observed, not confusingly similar to any mark owned by Brookfield.
Moreover, the list of search results, created in response to a consumer
inquiry for the term "MovieBuff," showed both West Coast's and
Brookfield's websites, and West Coast's website prominently displayed
the West Coast name. 20 7 Thus, the likelihood of consumer confusion was
small to nonexistent. Without the aid of the initial interest confusion
doctrine, then, liability could not be imposed (or, at a minimum, the

would be misappropriating West Coast's acquired goodwill.
Id. at 1064.
205. Id. at 1062.
206. Id.
207. See id.
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court would not be justified to impose a preliminary injunction on
Brookfield).
Missing in all of this, however, is any discussion of the use West
Coast was actually making of the MovieBuff trademark in terms of the
"use in commerce" requirement under the Lanham Act. Instead, after
drawing the above distinction, the court discussed the initial interest
confusion doctrine and its applicability to the metatag situation, in great
detail and to considerable effect. 208 The court then undertook a thorough
review of the main cases on initial interest confusion, including Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.209 and Grotrian v. Steinway &
Sonsl2 °-the Second Circuit precedents that first gave expression to the
doctrine. 211 That case review led up to the famous--or infamousBlockbuster Video metaphor, by which the Brookfield court sought to
make the evils of trademark use in metatags palpable.
There is an irony here. All of the cases the court discussed in its
initial interest confusion section, without exception (and even including
the few cases the court cites that rejected the doctrine), dealt with
situations where the defendant made use of the plaintiffs marks or a
confusingly similar term that was plainly visible to consumers. For
example, in Grotrian,the foundational case for initial interest confusion,
the court found that the district court's finding of willful infringement
was strongly supported by, among other evidence, the
"obvious visual and audible similarity between 'Steinway' and
'Steinweg', which is enhanced when the German 'veg' is translated to
the English 'way.' The probability of audible identity of the marks is
virtually assured by plaintiff s instructions to its dealers." Such finding
is squarely supported by an advertising brochure published by Grotrian
in which instructions were given to the English-speaking reader on
how to pronounce "Grotrian-Steinweg": "The name should be
pronounced as shown phonetically thus--GRO-TREE-AN SHTYNEVAKE-the final letter K being soft or voiceless. 212
In other words, the presentation of the defendant's infringing mark to
consumers' senses of vision and hearing was at the heart of the Grotrian
decision. Obviously, this deliberately prominent use by the defendant of

208. See id.
209. 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
210. 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
211. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062-64.
212. Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 13-38 (citing the district court's findings as related to the audible
identity of the marks) (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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the infringing mark was the exact opposite of the covert use to which
West Coast put the "MovieBuff' mark.21 3
The irony becomes even more pronounced once we reach the
court's famed simile. The court's entire rhetorical edifice was centered
on billboards-flashy signage, in other words, that people driving by on
the highway are sure to notice. The first sentences give it all away.
Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster") puts up a
billboard on a highway reading--"West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at
Exit 7"-where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster
Coast's store will pull
is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West
214
off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it.
What is the infringing conduct here? The putting up of a prominent sign
using another party's mark. Potential consumers read the sign and then
213. The other cases cited by Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1063-64, show that the use in commerce
requirement was met every time without any need for further analysis. The facts of these cases with
respect to use are as follows: Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1396 (9th Cir. 1997) (Defendant used allegedly infringing mark as title of book and in advertising
for book.); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1987)
(Defendant used allegedly infringing mark on materials sent to potential customers.); SecuraComm
Consulting, Inc., v. SecuraCom Inc., 984 F. Supp. 286, 295 (D.N.J. 1997), rev 'd on other grounds,
1666 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 1999) (Plaintiff, named SecuraComm, and defendant, named SecuraCom,
were direct competitors. The court found that "the use of the almost identical words "SecuraCom"
and "SecuraComm" has caused repeated confusion between the corporations using these names.);
Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1204 (1st Cir. 1983)
(Defendant's allegedly infringing mark was "printed in block letters on the console" of defendant's
product.); Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 1990) (Defendant
used allegedly infringing mark as its corporate name, in its advertising and marketing materials, and
to identify itself to callers on the telephone.); Green Prods. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Prods.
Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (Defendant used plaintiff's trademark as domain
name for defendant's web site.); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. (Cal.), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977
F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (Defendant used allegedly infringing mark in a domain name
for the defendant's web site.); Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167, 1171
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (Defendant created and marketed a product line that closely resembled plaintiff's
product line. A preliminary injunction for trademark infringement granted in part.); Blockbuster
Entm't Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (Defendant used allegedly
infringing name prominently on its store); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp.
506, 509-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Declaratory judgment plaintiff ran highly visible advertisement
campaigns that used a term that allegedly infringed upon the defendant's marks.); Sara Lee Corp. v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., No. 92-00460, 1992 WL 436279, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 1992) (Defendant
was preliminarily enjoined from marketing and selling its LEG LOOKS hosiery based on trade
dress and trademark infringement of plaintiff's trade dress and incontestable L'EGGS mark for
hosiery.); Television Entm't Network, Inc. v. The Entm't Network, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 244, 245
(D.N.J. 1986) (Declaratory judgment plaintiff aired television programs under an allegedly
infringing name and mark.); Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 838, 855
(W.D. Pa. 1981) (Preliminary injunction granted against defendant's use of an allegedly infringing
mark in advertising, marketing and selling its services in the United States.).
214. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064.
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act on the message they have received from it. This, of course, is the
very epitome of trademark use, and thus (potentially, depending on the
facts) of trademark infringement. The defendant in this scenario is
literally using a "sign to the public," as the Qualitex court put it, 21 5 thus

trading off of the "commercial magnetism" of plaintiffs
impermissibly
216
mark.
Brookfield's simile is substantially informed by Blockbuster
Entertainment Group v. Laylco, Inc.,217 a 1994 case from the Eastern
District of Michigan.2 18 To appreciate the remarkable extent of
Brookfield's blindness, it pays to look a little closer at the Blockbuster
decision. That decision-just like the others on which Brookfield relies
to explain the initial interest confusion doctrine2 19 -- is fully in keeping
with traditionally accepted notions of trademark use. Since 1986,
Blockbuster, "the world's leading home video rental company" 220 and
the plaintiff in the lawsuit, "has continually used [its BLOCKBUSTER]
marks and has spent millions of dollars in promoting its name." 22 1 The
defendants, who are also in the video rental business,2 22 own three stores
in the Detroit area that are named "Video Busters. 2 23 Blockbuster sued,
alleging the name Video Busters infringed on the BLOCKBUSTER
trademark.224 As the court correctly observed, "the issue in this case is
the degree of likelihood that the name 'Video Busters' would attract
potential customers based on the reputation built by Blockbuster." 225 As
226 the "use in commerce" requirement was obviously met in
in Grotrian,
this case. To make this point even more clear, the Brookfield court itself
emphasized the open and notorious way in which the defendant in
Blockbuster used the allegedly infringing mark: the Blockbuster court
found "trademark infringement where the defendant, a video rental store,

215.

Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51, 53 (1879).

216. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
217.
218.
219.
220.

869 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
See id.
See cases cited supra note 213.
Blockbuster Entm't Group, 869 F. Supp. at 507.

221.

Id.at 508.

222.

See id.

223.
224.
225.
226.
(2d Cir.

See id.
See id.
at 513.
See id.
See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331
1975).
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attracted customers' initial interest by using a sign confusingly [sic] to
its competitor's .... ,227
The Blockbuster defendant affirmatively used a sign to attract the
interest of the public. In one form or another, so did every other
defendant in every initial interest confusion case on which Brookfield
relied.228 But the defendant in Brookfield did not, as far as the metatag
issue is concerned. 229 The metatags were readable by search engines. But
machines are not susceptible to the "commercial magnetism," the
"drawing power of a congenial symbol., 230 They were not visible by
consumers, as the court clearly stated.231
But if they are not visible-and since smell, sound and touch are
not at issue here-then they cannot act as a "sign to the public '232 and
communicate with consumers. This being true, metatags cannot act as
trademarks, or, more precisely, they are not being "used in commerce,"
as the Lanham Act defines that term.233 The factual distinction between
the metatags in Brookfield and the signage in Blockbuster is palpable
and drastic.2 34 The court made nothing of it.
With Brookfield, the idea that a defendant's invisible-or more
generally, imperceptible-use of the plaintiffs mark can support a
finding of liability for trademark infringement became firmly entrenched
in U.S. law. Brookfield cited a few precedents in support of its metatag
theory, all from the district court level. 235 "The few courts to consider
whether the use of another's trademark in one's metatags constitutes
trademark infringement have ruled in the affirmative. 236 These

227. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th
Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
228. See cases cited supranote 213.
229. We know, because the court tells us, that the court is analyzing the metatag question
entirely separately from the domain name question. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064. The domain
name question in Brookfield is, of course, an easy and straightforward case of trademark
infringement (once various complications concerning priority are resolved).
230. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
231. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1061-62 n.23.
232. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51, 53 (1879).
233. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004).
234. Professor Goldman provides the following analysis of Brookfield's billboard analogy:
[T]he analogy makes an apples-to-oranges comparison. In the search engine context,
keyword metatags act as a trigger to cause the display of filtering content, but the
searcher never sees the text contained in the keyword metatags. In the billboard analogy,
the billboard is the filtering content. Therefore, keyword metatags and billboards do not
perform the same function.
Goldman, supranote 31, at *67. This is precisely correct and refutes the court's finding of liability.
235. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064-65.
236. Id. at 1064.
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precedents, then, are-at least in part-the true originators of this
wrongheaded development in trademark law.237 Calvin Designer23 8 is the
earliest of the three. It is both exceedingly short and devoid of
meaningful analysis. The facts were straightforward: "Defendants have
used the marks PLAYBOY and PLAYMATE as part of their domain
names on the Internet and used the marks PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY
within Internet Web pages offered at the sites at Internet addresses
all without
and www.playmatelive.com,
www.playboyxxx.com
[plaintiff's] authority. 23 9
This would appear to be a plain case of trademark infringement.
That is exactly how the court treated it. The court found Playboy was
likely to succeed on the merits and thus granted Playboy's motion for a
preliminary injunction. 240 This is correct with regard to the trademark
use requirement since the defendant's use of Playboy's marks in the
defendant's domain names and on its web site was prominently visible.
But then the court, in its brief and entirely descriptive, rather than
analytic, findings on likelihood of success, lumped the above facts
together (in the same run-on sentence, no less) with a finding that
defendants' "repeated use of the PLAYBOY trademark in machine
readable code in Defendants' Internet Web pages, so that the
PLAYBOY trademark is accessible to individuals or Internet search
engines which attempt to access Plaintiff under Plaintiffs PLAYBOY
registered trademark., 241 This is unproblematic insofar as it pertains to
the domain names and use of the mark on defendants' web site. It is,
however, very problematic with regard to the "machine readable code."
That use of Playboy's mark was plainly not for human eyes. It should,
therefore, have been incapable of establishing trademark use. Trademark
use was, of course, already plainly established via the other conduct of
the defendants. Thus, there was no need for the court to spend any
analytic energy on tackling the possibly thorny question of whether
"machine-readable code, 242 can constitute trademark use. Unfortunately,
Brookfield subsequently removed the phrase "repeated use of the
PLAYBOY trademark in machine readable code in Defendants' Internet
237. The precedents in question are: Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F.
Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-734-A,
1998 WL 724000 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998); Playboy Enters. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp.
1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
238. 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
239. Id.at 1221.
240. Id.

241.

Id. (emphasis added).

242.

Id.
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Web pages ' 243 from its factual context and utilized it to support the
entirely different and unrelated-and nonsensical-proposition that a
defendant's use of plaintiffs trademark solely in machine-readable code
can constitute trademark infringement.244 The genie is out of the bottle,
and no one has as yet been able to return it there.
The factual situation in Asiafocus was quite similar to that in Calvin
Designer. The plaintiff once again was Playboy, and the trademarks at
issue were PLAYBOY and PLAYMATE. 245 The defendants not only
"provided adult nude photos on the Web pages located at ... ASIANPLAYMATES.COM and PLAYMATES-ASIAN.COM, ' '246 but also
used those trademarks "to promote the sale of goods and services
including playing cards, calendars, wrist watches, and key
chains ....
Moreover, there was at least some evidence of actual
confusion.248 Undoubtedly, then, Playboy had a strong trademark
infringement claim against these defendants. Given the plain visibility of
domain names, using the facts as found by the court as the basis for
imposing liability for trademark infringement is unproblematic. It seems
clear that these defendants were bad actors bent on exploiting the
goodwill of Playboy's marks.
Then the court reached the issue of invisible, machine-readable
code, in which the defendants included Playboy's marks.2 49 The court
stated:
The defendants have purposefully employed deceptive tactics to attract
consumers to their Web site under the guise that their sites are
sponsored by or somehow affiliated with [Playboy]. Specifically, the
defendants embedded [Playboy's] trademarks "playboy" and
"playmate" within the Web sites' computer source code which is
visible to "search engines" that look for Web sites containing specific
words or phrases specified by computer users. Thus, a consumer
conducting a search for [Playboy]'s Web site by typing in the
trademark "Playboy" or "Playmate" would receive a search enginegenerated list which included the asian-playmates Web site. Through
the defendants' willful deception, consumers have been misled into

243.

Id.

244. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064-65
(9th Cir. 1999).
245. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-734-A, 1998 WL
724000, *3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998).

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
See id. at *4.
See id. at *3.
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believing the asian-playmates Web site is connected with, or somehow
sponsored by, [Playboy] 250
In the context of the other facts as determined by the court,
this
analysis is quite plausible. When taken with defendants' unauthorized
use of Playboy's marks in defendants' domain names and in connection
with their sale of certain goods, their further use of these marks could
reasonably have been taken as evidence of the defendants' intent and of
the willfulness of their infringement.2 Moreover, as the Asiafocus court
noted, the machine-readable code containing Playboy's trademarks
helped place defendants' web site more prominently on a list of search
results. 252 If that web site were identified in the list of results by an
infringing domain name, then the metatag use would have appeared to
become part and parcel of an entire strategy of infringement containing
visible and invisible elements. I see no reason to refrain from taking
metatag use into account as secondary support for imposing liability (for
example, by holding that metatag use supports a finding of intent to
infringe) in a situation where the evidentiary foundation for the
trademark claim consists of the defendant's open and notorious use of
plaintiff's mark.
That is not how Brookfield read Asiafocus.253 In the hands of the
Brookfield court, the metatag use by the defendants, of Playboy's marks
in Asiafocus became the primary support of the trademark claim: When
Playboy "sued [Asiafocus] for trademark infringement resulting from
AsiaFocus's use of [Playboy's marks] in its HTML code, a district court
granted judgment in Playboy's favor, reasoning that AsiaFocus
intentionally misled viewers into believing that its Web site was
connected with, or sponsored by, Playboy. 2 54 Brookfield told the
AsiaFocus story in severely truncated form. This lead to an equally
severe distortion of trademark law.
Niton, the third case on which Brookfield relied, is quite different.
There, the defendant not only used the plaintiffs marks in its invisible
250. Id. (citations omitted).
251. See infra text and accompanying notes 391-98, discussing one decision in which the
Seventh Circuit understood metatag use along these lines, namely as "significant evidence of intent
to confuse and mislead" in connection with defendant's otherwise open and notorious (that is,
consumer-perceptible) use of plaintiff's trademark. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233
F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2000). That would seem to be a legitimate use for courts to make of such
metatag use.
252. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc., 1998 VL 724000 at *3.
253. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th
Cir. 1999).
254. Id.
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metatags (which the court called "META keywords"), 255 but also used
what the court called "META descriptions" of plaintiffs web site.256
They are the short descriptions of web sites that appear in the lists of
search results returned by search engines. They are, of course, highly
visible to Internet users and are, in fact, routinely used to locate the
appropriate web site from a long list of search results. The plaintiff
found that a search for its own web site returned a result that was
described as "home page of [plaintiff] Corporation,, 257 but it pointed to
defendant's web site. 258 The Brookfield court did remark on this
"interesting twist" in Niton,259 but it nevertheless used Niton as plain
support for its thesis that260 invisible metatag use can, by itself, constitute
trademark infringement.
There is a difference in kind, I submit, between a case involving
invisible metatag use that serves to propel a web site to a favorable
placement in a search result list where the visible identification of that
web site within the list, including its domain name, does not contain the
plaintiff's mark, and another case where metatag use leads to a search
result identification that is overtly, that is, visibly to consumers, utilizing
the plaintiff's marks. These situations are entirely separate. In the second
case, the defendant's visible use of the plaintiffs mark at the level of
search results meets the requirements of trademark use under the
Lanham Act and the common law of trademark infringement upon
which it is based. In the first situation, these requirements are not met.
The distinction is crucial, and until very recently, courts not only failed
to draw it, but disregarded it with a vengeance.261
C. The Evolution of the Law of the Horse
It took remarkably little time for the doctrine of trademark use to
become distorted in the Internet context. The misapplication of the
trademark use requirement 262 can be traced back to the early cases
255. Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D. Mass.
1998). Actually, the defendant had simply copied the metatags from plaintiffs website wholesale
into its website. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th
Cir. 1999).
260. See id.
261. Even in the second case, it is not the invisible metatag use that is actionable. Only the
visible use constitutes trademark infringement.
262. Formally understood to mean "use in commerce" under § 1127.
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dealing with the Internet. In Intermatic v. Toeppen, the facts were such
that a finding that the defendant, an early cybersquatter named Dennis
Toeppen, used the plaintiffs mark in commerce would seem to be
relatively unproblematic.2 63 The mark at issue was INTERMATIC, valid
and owned by plaintiff Intermatic, Inc.264 Toeppen registered the domain
name intermatic.com and pointed it to "a web page regarding a software
program he was developing and intended to call 'Intermatic.' ' '265 In other
words, Toeppen-for a while, at least 26 6 -made prominently visible use
of Intermatic's mark in his domain name and on his web site, all in
conjunction with a product he was planning to offer. Since Toeppen
never sold any software programs under that name,267 a question might
arise under Buti whether his use was, in fact, trademark use under
section 45 of the Lanham Act. But putting that little twist to one side,
invisible use was plainly not the problem here. The court was somewhat
imprecise when explaining this. As I have shown, the commerce
requirement and the trademark use requirement are two rather different
concepts grouped under the statutory phrase "use in commerce." The
former focuses on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause, and the latter focuses on the use of a
symbol in a way that allows consumers to associate it with a product or
service. The Intermatic court conflated the two. Citing a passage from
the Supreme Court's 1952 decision in Steele v. Bulova, that dealt with
Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause,26 8 the court held that
the "use in commerce" requirement was met because Mr. Toeppen's
conduct took place on the Internet, and hence, in interstate commerce.2 69
"[T]he Court finds that use of the Internet is sufficient to meet the 'in
commerce' requirement of the [Lanham] Act. 27 0
This substitution of the commerce inquiry for the trademark use
inquiry had far-reaching consequences. Obviously, the former is far
easier to meet than the latter and substantially extends the reach of the
Lanham Act. Intermatic's analytic sloppiness blossomed into fullfledged error in Planned Parenthoodv. Bucci.271 ' The facts of the case
263. See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1229-30 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
264.

See id. at 1230.

265. Id. at 1232.
266. When Intermatic complained, Toeppen substituted "a map of Champaign-Urbana, the
community where Toeppen resides." Id. at 1232.
267.

See id.

268. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283-84 (1952).
269.

See IntermaticInc., 947 F. Supp. at 1240.

270. Id. at 1240.
271.

No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997).
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are interesting. The Planned Parenthood Federation of America has
owned the registered service mark272 PLANNED PARENTHOOD since
1955.273 As is universally known, Planned Parenthood is an exceedingly
important source of resources concerning reproductive rights. 74 Richard
Bucci, the defendant, was an opponent of legalized abortion.275 In 1996,
he registered the domain name plannedparenthood.com, pointing it to a
web site containing partial reprints of an anti-abortion book entitled The
Cost of Abortion.276 His purpose in doing so was "'to reach a broader
audience' '' 277 and "to get people who are sympathetic to the proabortion
position, [because] that's who you want to reach., 278 Planned
Parenthood sued, alleging trademark infringement and dilution under the
Lanham Act, and moved for a preliminary injunction.279
Mr. Bucci's first line of defense-and perhaps his best argumentwas to claim "that his use of plaintiffs mark cannot be reached under
the Lanham Act because it is non-commercial speech., 280 The court,

after specifically quoting the "use in commerce" requirement set forth in
§§ 1114 and 1125(a), formulated the requisite test thus: "The 'use in
commerce' requirement of the Lanham Act is a jurisdictional predicate
to any law passed by Congress., 281 As § 1127 plainly shows, this is
radically incomplete. The court then held "that defendant's actions are
'in commerce' within the meaning of that term for jurisdictional
purposes.'282 Despite the court's misunderstanding of "in commerce"
(Commerce Clause) and trademark use, the determination that
defendant's activities took place in commerce for Commerce Clause
purposes appears correct. Unfortunately, the court aggravated its mistake
in a strange passage discussing the predicate requirements under § 1127,
in which the court appeared to recognize for a moment that Commerce
Clause use and trademark use are not the same thing under the Lanham
272. The difference between service mark, trademark, and other statutorily recognized forms of
marks such as certification marks or collective marks is mainly administrative; all such marks are
equivalent in terms of basic requirements for validity and protectability against infringement. See 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2004) ("The term 'mark' includes any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or
certification mark.").
273. See PlannedParenthoodFed'n ofAm., Inc., 1997 WL 133313 at *1.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. Id. at *2 (quoting Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 3).
278. Id.
279. See id. at *3.
280. Id.
281. Id.

282. Id. at *3.
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Act, but then quickly again confused the tWo. 2 8 3 The court noted that the
requirements of § 1.127 are "narrower" than those under the Commerce
Clause,284 but nevertheless held that they were met here285 because
defendant's
activities over the Internet occur everywhere that internet users may
access his web site .... Second, defendant is "engaged in commerce"
in connection with his web site due to his use of the Internet and his
effect on plaintiff's activities, because those activities constitute
commerce within the meaning of § 1127, which defines "commerce"
286
as "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress."
In the next section of the opinion, the court finally discussed
whether defendant was making use of Planned Parenthood's mark "in
connection with the... distribution or advertising of goods or
services, '287 but the court did so under § 1114 rather than under § 1127
(which defines the "use in commerce requirement" for the Lanham Act
in its entirety). Thus, the damage was done. The court's conflation of the
"in commerce" requirement and the trademark use requirement under
§ 1127 introduced-or, at a minimum, reinforced-a dangerously
erroneous notion into trademark law, namely that trademark use, i.e.,
"use in commerce," can be shown by reference to the Commerce Clause
standard. In cases such as Bucci, where the defendant makes open and
prominently visible use of the plaintiffs trademark (indeed, such
visibility was precisely the intent of Mr. Bucci), this error does not tend
to lead to a wrong outcome. But it does make trademark use easier to
prove and, via an apt example of "doctrinal creep,, 288 gives the courts
that deal expressly with metatags, or other invisible code, useful
language for holding that the trademark use requirement has been met in
those cases, notwithstanding the fact that the Bucci language will have
been taken completely out of context.
The 1997 decision in Juno Online Services, L.P., v. Juno Lighting,
Inc.,289 is an interesting decision that correctly applies the relevant

283. See id. at *3 n.7.
284. See id.
285. As a matter of outcome or result, the court may actually be right, but that is beside the
point. What matters is the court's oddly muddled § 1127 analysis.
286. PlannedParenthoodFed'n ofAm., Inc., 1997 WL 133313 at *3.
287. Id. at *4 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000)).
288. Lemley, Modern Lanham Act, supra note 1, at 1698.
289. 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Il1. 1997).
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doctrinal principles. While Juno has been cited several times,2 9 ° it has
unfortunately not been able to gain the more widespread acceptance that
its outstanding treatment of the trademark use issue warrants. The
decision was prevented from gaining broader recognition by the peculiar
facts of the parties' dispute. The conflict between the two Junos,
pertaining to allegations of trademark infringement, was solely over the
defendant Juno Lighting's registration of the domain name, junoonline.com. 29 1 Juno Lighting had registered that domain name but had
done absolutely nothing else with it. Juno Lighting argued that this act of
mere registration of juno-online.com did not constitute trademark use.
The court agreed.2 92 It noted that "[t]he only factual allegation in the
complaint relating to 'use' is that defendant might be 'warehousing' the
domain name in hopes of reselling it or trading it to Juno Online. 293 The
court correctly apprehended the use requirement under the Lanham Act.
"To claim successfully a violation of Section 43(a), plaintiff must allege
that defendant used the trademark in commerce.. . . 'Use in commerce'
is defined as 'the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of
trade,' and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark., 29 4 Under this
test, the court held, Juno Lighting had not made "use in commerce" (i.e.,
trademark use) of the Juno trademark; thus, a Lanham Act claim could
not be maintained against it.
[T]he "use in commerce" requirement would only be fulfilled if
defendant were to use the Internet.... The mere "warehousing" of the'
domain name is not enough to find that defendant placed the mark on
goods or "used or displayed [the mark] in the sale or advertising of
services" as required. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Since the complaint contains
no factual allegation supporting an inference that defendant
295 "used" the
Internet, the court must dismiss [the Lanham Act count].
The fact that the defendant merely registered the domain name but
had absolutely no Internet presence greatly narrowed the reach of the
Juno decision. But a valuable lesson can still be learned from it. At a
minimum, Juno shows that the set of situations where a defendant uses
(understanding that term colloquially rather than statutorily) a plaintiff's
290. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (citing Juno for its discussion of the "warehousing" concept of trademark use); Cline v.
1-888-Plumbing Group, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 351, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).
291. Juno Online Servs., L.P., 979 F. Supp. at 686.
292. See id. at691.
293. Id.
294. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (emphasis added)).
295. Id. at 691-92 (citation omitted).
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mark in an Internet-related context, thus perhaps meeting the "in
commerce" requirement, andwhere that (colloquial) use does not rise to
trademark use under the Lanham Act, is not empty. Later courts tend to
overlook this possibility. Situations such as Juno show that traditional
trademark law initially did not easily adapt to certain factual situations
arising in the then-novel online context. Just as domain name
warehousing may well not constitute trademark use-as the Juno court
held-certain domain name uses do not give rise to a likelihood of
confusion, even though the trademark use requirement may have been
met. As a result, crafty defendants may have managed to elude, or
threatened to elude, the grasp of trademark law altogether. This was an
important factor behind the passage of the ACPA.296
Lacking efficient remedies against apparent domain name abusers
in the days before the ACPA, several trademark owners attempted to
proceed against the registrar (as well as the registry) of domain names
directly. At the time, this entity was called Network Solutions, 'Inc., and
it united the registrar and registry functions for .com, .net, and .org toplevel domain names within itself.297 NSI quickly proved immune to legal
attacks. In fact, until 2003 it did not lose any case in which it was
accused of wrongdoing in connection with a domain name
registration. 298 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.2 9 9 is a
representative example of NSI's consistent success in this regard. The
case also shows, similar to Juno, that at the margins courts were quite
able to apply the trademark use requirement stringently. It was the
Brookfield line of cases that marginalized the trademark use requirement
in the Internet context. Nevertheless, the doctrinal correctives,
marginalized though they may be, stand ready to be used to remedy
misdevelopments at the core.
The issue in Lockheed was as follows:
The issue presented by this litigation is whether NSI violated federal
trademark law by accepting registrations of Internet domain names that
are identical or similar to [Lockheed's] SKUNK WORKS service
mark. Lockheed asserts that NSI directly infringed and diluted its mark
by accepting the registrations. Lockheed also asserts that NSI is liable
296. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5-6, 11 (1999).
297. Today, registrars for .com, net, and org top-level domains are located all around the
globe. But this development postdates the passage of the ACPA in November 1999. Also, NSI-or
rather its successor, VeriSign-is still the only registry of .com, .net, .org, and .edu domain names
in the world.
298. The 2003 loss was based on an extraordinary and today anachronistic factual situation.
See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1026-28 (9th Cir. 2003).
299. 985 F. Supp. 949, 950 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (granting NSI's motion for summary judgment).
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as a contributory infringer because NSI did
300 not comply with
Lockheed's demands to cancel the registrations.
The court decided the issue by drawing a distinction between the use of
domain names for "a non-trademark technical purpose, to designate a set
of computers on the Internet, and for trademark purposes, to identify an
' '3 1
Internet user who offers goods or services on the Internet.
This is an extraordinarily fruitful analytic distinction. It points the
way to revising trademark doctrine more generally to differentiate
between trademark and non-trademark uses on the Internet. Lockheed
points to a way out of the Brookfield dilemma. Citing solely non-Internet
cases, the Lockheed court announced the following principle: "Domain
names, like trade names, do not act as trademarks when they are used
merely to identify a business entity; in order to infringe they must be
used to identify the source of goods or services. 30 2 The court contrasted
its holding to that in Bucci.30 3 Here, the Lockheed court argued, nothing
but the mere acceptance of domain name registrations was alleged
against NSI. 30 4 In Bucci, on the other hand, the defendant had "created a
home page that uses plaintiffs mark as its address, conveying the
impression to Internet users that plaintiff is the sponsor of defendant's
web site. 30 5 This distinction carries the Lockheed decision. Finding that
"NSI's acceptance of the domain name registrations is connected only
with the names' technical function on the Internet to designate a set of
computers, 30 6 rather than "to the names' trademark function to
distinguish goods and services, 30 7 the court held that trademark
infringement claims could not be maintained against NSI in this situation
because the basis for such claims, trademark use, was missing. 308
Technical function and trademark use function are clearly separated. In
this regard, Lockheed strongly evokes the analysis in Interactive
Productsand Patmont Motor Werks, the post-domain path cases.30 9
Not even a month after Lockheed was decided, the same court-the
district court for the Central District of California-issued another
300. Id. at 950.
301. Id. at 956. The analogy to metatags and keywords is obvious.
302.
303.

Id.
See id.at 957.

304. See id. at 950, 957.
305. Id. at 957 (quoting Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997
WL 133313, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997)).
306.
307.

Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 957.
Id. at 960; see also id. at 967.

308.

See id. at 967.

309.

See discussion supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
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decision confirming the Lockheed principle and exonerating NSI from
liability for trademark infringement or dilution. 310 In Academy of Motion
Pictures Arts and Sciences v. Network Solutions, Inc.,311 the Academy
contended that NSI had violated its trademark right by accepting
names
such
as,
inter alia,
registrations
for
"domain
'academyaward.com,' 'academy-awards.net,' 'academyawards.net,' 'the
oscars.net,' and 'oscar.net,' to parties other than the Academy., 312 The
court rebuffed the Academy's claim. "The mere registering of a domain
name [does not] constitute[] a use 'in commerce' [under Section
1127].'
At a minimum, Academy confirms what Juno anticipated, namely
that there exists a set of Internet uses of trademarks that do not give rise
to trademark claims because they do not constitute trademark use. To be
sure, both Lockheed and Academy were decided upon evidence showing
that no goods or services were offered by NSI in connection with the
registration of the domain names. That, one can argue, is a very different
proposition than the argument that invisible metatag and keyword use of
trademarks should not give rise to Lanham Act liability, the central
argument of this article. In the second situation, there is very much an
offering of goods and services by the defendant, and the defendant avails
itself of the plaintiffs mark precisely to foster its sales of its goods and
services. Nevertheless, the trademark use requirement-which Supreme
Court cases from Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.3 14 to Theodore
Rectanus315 to Mishawaka Rubber 316 to Qualitex317 have understood to
mean a requirement that the trademark in question be in some way
sensorily registered by the human perception of the consumer 31 8-is not
met. However, this is not decisive here. What really matters is that
judicial awareness existed all along, parallel, that is, to the Brookfleld
line of cases, that the concept of trademark use-rather than the concept
310. See Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp.
1276, 1280 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
311. Seeid. at1278.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1279.
314. See Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51, 53 (1879).
315. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918), superseded by
15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2000).
316. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942).
317. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
318. "[T]he aim [of a mark's owner is] ... to convey through the mark, in the minds of
potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears." Mishawaka Rubber
& Woolen Mfg. Co., 316 U.S. at 205 (emphasis added).
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of "in commerce"-independently limits the application of the Lanham
Act. As I said before, the set of Internet uses that fail to meet the test is
not empty. 319 I want to draw special attention to the clarity with which
Lockheed and Academy were decided, and contrast this to the doctrinal
befuddlement of cases such as Bucci. Sure, they address differentfactual
problems. But they address the same doctrinal problem. And it is in this
regard that Lockheed and Academy offer an antidote to the confusion
that reigns in Bucci, Brookfield, and their progeny. As we shall see, this
confusion comes to a head in the 2004 Playboy v. Netscape decision of
the Ninth Circuit.
Playboy Enterprises is an organization that has been exceptionally
productive of intellectual property disputes, and of rather influential
court decisions resolving those disputes. We have already discussed
several cases involving Playboy and its marks. The three substantive
decisions in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles,32 ° like other Playboy
cases, have raised thorny doctrinal issues, particularly with regard to a
peculiar innovation to trademark law created by the Ninth Circuit that is
known by the label "nominative fair use." A detailed treatment of that
judge-made doctrine is beyond the purview of the present article.
Nevertheless, the Welles cases have also contributed substantially to the
entrenchment of the Brookfield approach to metatags. The facts are
these. Terri Welles, the defendant, began modeling for Playboy in 1980.
She was the "Playmate Of The Month" in December 1980, the
"Playmate Of The Year" in 1981, and appeared in thirteen issues of
Playboy magazine and eighteen newsstand specials published by
Playboy. 32' Here is how this situation devolved into litigation:
On June 29, 1997, Ms. Welles opened a website,
http://www.terriwelles.com, which includes photographs of herself and
others (both nude and clothed), a fan club posting board, an
autobiography section, and a listing of current events and personal
appearances. The domain name for defendant's site is "terriwelles," the
heading for the web site is "Terri Welles-Playmate of the Year
1981," and the title of the link page is "Terri Welles-Playboy
Playmate of the Year 1981." Each of the pages uses "PMOY '81" as a
repeating watermark in the background. [Most pages of the website
expressly disclaim affiliation with Playboy.] Defendant uses the terms
319. See discussion of Juno, supra notes 289-96 and accompanying text.
320. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd in part by
279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998),
rev 'd in part by 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Welles 1].
321. See Welles/,7 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
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Playboy and Playmate along with other terms within the keywords
section of the meta tags, which constitutes
the internal index of the
32
website used by some search engines.
Playboy owns the trademarks PLAYBOY, PLAYMATE, PLAYMATE
OF THE MONTH, and PLAYMATE OF THE YEAR, and claims
trademark rights in the acronym PMOY. 323 Despite initially supporting
Ms. Welles's online ventures,3 24 Playboy later objected to them and sued
Ms. Welles for trademark infringement 325
and dilution and unfair
law.
California
and
federal
under
competition
The first Welles decision326 predated Brookfield by almost a year.327
The court was very concerned with questions of trademark use, but from
a rather different angle than Brookfield.
The problem in this case is that the trademarks that defendant uses, and
the manner in which she uses them, describe her and identify her. This
raises a question in the court's mind of whether there is a "fair use"
328 of
these marks pursuant to 15 U.S.C §§ 1115(b)(4) and 1125(c)(4).
The court readily found that Ms. Welles's use of Playboy's marks to
identify herself-truthfully-as a former "playmate of the year" was
fair. 329 In making this finding, however, the court made no
differentiation between visible and invisible use by Ms. Welles of
Playboy's marks. 330 That is understandable, since the court's focus was
on fair use rather than on any aspect of the "use in commerce"
requirement, 33 1 and since Ms. Welles plainly did use Playboy's marks in
many highly visible forms (title of link page, heading of website,
watermarks).332 But the court's lumping together of visible and invisible
uses helped set the stage for the uncritical acceptance of the idea-as
prevalent in today's trademark law as it is mistaken-that invisible

322. Id. at 1100-01.
323. Id.at 1100.
324. Id.at 1101.
325. Id. at 1099-1100.
326. Id. at 1098.
327. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
1999) (dated April 22, 1999).
328. Welles I, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. Section 1125(c)(4) of the Lanham Act sets forth
trademark uses that are not actionable under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(4) (2000).
329. WellesI, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.
330. See id.
331. Id. at 1103-04.
332. Seeid. at1100.
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metatag use is trademark use and hence can give rise to liability. Here is
the court's analysis:
With respect to the meta tags, the court finds there to be no trademark
infringement where defendant has used plaintiffs trademarks in good
faith to index the content of her website. The meta tags are not visible'
to the websurfer although some search engines rely on these tags to
help websurfers find certain websites. Much like the subject index of a
card catalog, the meta tags give the websurfer
333using a search engine a
clearer indication of the content of a website.
The court then concluded that this use-as well as the visible use of
the Playboy marks-was fair because it truthfully identified the
defendant.33 4 This lack of differentiation between visible and invisible
use is particularly unfortunate in light of the court's powerful metaphor
describing the function of metatags. Metatags, the court mused, are "like
the subject index of a card catalog." 335 This is a simile with some depth.
Subject indices of card catalogs are, by their very nature intended to be
viewed by the human eye. In that regard, a subject index and metatags
are not like each other, since metatags are invisible. But this permits an a
fortiori conclusion. Assume a library--or better yet, a commercial
bookstore-with a card catalog that contains a section or subsection
devoted to NASCAR racing, and further assume that the subject index
for that section is the word NASCAR. NASCAR is, of course, a
registered trademark owned by the National Association For Stock Car
Auto Racing. 336 Is the bookstore therefore prohibited from using
NASCAR in its subject index? Hardly. Thus, it may be argued that, if
the use of a trademark in the subject index of a card catalog, which is
visible to the human eye, cannot support a trademark infringement claim
(because use, the condition precedent for such a claim, is lacking), then
the use of a trademark in metatags, which are not visible to the human
eye, must a fortiori be precluded from supporting a trademark
infringement claim. None of this, however, gets discussed in the 1998
Welles decision.
In that decision, the court denied Playboy's motion for a
preliminary injunction against Terri Welles.3 37 . A year and a half later,
333. Id. at 1104.
334.

See id.

335. Id.
336. See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1054100 (issued Dec. 7, 1976). The number
was issued to NASCAR for, among other things, "regulating, governing, sanctioning, and
promoting stock car automobile racing." Id.
337. See Wellesl,71F. Supp. 2dat 1105.
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the same court granted summary judgment in Ms. Welles's favor.338
That decision is remarkable for the utterly explicit way in which it
separates its factual and legal discussions of the "visible use of
[Playboy's] trademarked terms: title or masthead, watermarks, and
advertising banners"339 on the one hand, and "the non-visible title, meta
code description and meta tag keywords' 340 on the other. With regard to
the visible use of Playboy's marks, the court held that Ms. Welles's use
of those marks was fair, using the same rationale-albeit based on a
greatly expanded discussion-as in the 1998 decision. 34 The discussion
is fairly standard stuff, concerned mainly with fair use and the
nominative fair use sub-doctrine adopted (or rather, created) by the
Ninth Circuit in its well-known New Kids On The Block opinion.342
The section on Ms. Welles's invisible use of Playboy's marks
focused on Brookfield, which had been issued by the Ninth Circuit only
a few months before. 3 The court emphasized that the uses of Playboy's
marks discussed in this section were "not ordinarily viewed by users,
but instead were "mostly used to provide additional information about a
web page" 345 so that search engines' automated web crawlers could
"'read' individual web pages by reading much of the text in the HTML
source code and store in cyberspace memory the text they find on each
page" for the purpose of compiling and ranking search results. 346 Despite
expressly finding that the use of, Playboy's marks discussed in this
section was not ordinarily perceived by Internet users, the court in no
way attempted to base any legal conclusions on what would, at a
minimum, seem to qualify as a factual oddity that might raise a doctrinal
eyebrow. Instead, the court concentrated its analytic energies on

338. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1100 (S.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd in
partby 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Welles I1].
339. Id. at 1076 (heading (a)) (emphasis added).
340. Id. at 1091 (heading (b)) (emphasis added).
341. Seeid.at 1078-91.
342. See Welles II, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1075, 1079, 1089-90 (citing New Kids on the Block v.
News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992)). The problem with the Welles II court's
analysis of nominative fair use is the extreme particularity of the fact situation in that case. It simply
resists any attempt at universalization. Not many defendants are likely to find themselves in a
situation where their self-identification almost inescapably requires them to use the plaintiffs
trademark. Whatever the merits of the nominative fair use defense, its application in this case makes
the finding of no liability for Ms. Welles's use of Playboy's marks in the metatags of her website
useless as a limiting principle for delineating the outer boundaries of liability for metatag use.
343. See Welles II, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1091-96.
344. Id. at 1092.
345. Id.
346. See id.
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distinguishing the case at hand from Brookfield.3 47 It did so in two steps.
The court already determined that the fair use defense precluded liability
for Ms. Welles's visible uses of the Playboy marks. The court now
observed that Brookfield "did not involve the use of the fair use defense
within the metatags context., 348 Noting that Brookfield expressly sought
to avoid curtailing the fair use defense,349 the court applied the defense3 50
and then turned-as the paradoxical law of the Ninth Circuit controlling
at the time forced it to do-to an examination of whether there was a
likelihood of confusion. 351 Noting that the applicable doctrine is initial
interest confusion, 35 2 and via a somewhat tortured analysis, 353 the court
distinguished the facts at hand from those in Brookfield and found that
Playboy "has failed to raise a material issue of fact concerning the fair
use of [Playboy's] terms in [Ms. Welles's] metatags. 3 54 Accordingly,
the court granted summary judgment for defendants on all trademark
claims.3 55
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's
grant of summary judgment entirely under the nominative fair use
doctrine.356 In a rather perfunctory analysis, the appellate court held that
Ms. Welles's use of Playboy's marks in the metatags of her website
constituted nominative fair use and thus did not give rise to liability for
trademark infringement or dilution.35 7 In an aside, the court
demonstrated that visibility-or lack thereof-of the metatag use played
no role in its decision. The court observed, "[w]e note that our decision
might differ if the metatags listed the trademarked term so repeatedly
that Welles' [sic] site would regularly appear above [Playboy's] in
searches for one of the trademarked terms. 35 8
With Welles II and III confirming the direction taken by the
Brookfield court, the issue of metatag liability is no longer genuinely

347. See id. at 1092-1096.
348. Id. at 1093 (emphasis in original).
349. "[W]e are not in any way restricting [the defendant's] right to use terms in a manner
which would constitute fair use under the Lanham Act." Brookfield Communications, Inc., v. W.
Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999), quoted in Welles II, 78 F. Supp. 2d at
1093.
350. See Welles H, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1092-93.
351. See id. at 1093-95.
352. See id. at 1094.
353. See id. at 1094-95.

354. Id. at 1096.
355.
356.
357.

See id. at 1100.
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
See id. at 804-06.

358. Id.at 804.
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open to debate in the courts. In factually unusual situations, however,
courts have sometimes displayed a substantial sensitivity to the issues
involved and, perhaps, in recognition of the need-never precisely
articulated, though-to have a limiting principle in place to keep
trademark liability from becoming hopelessly overbroad. A prime
example is Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber,359 a preBrookfield decision. In Bally, the court examined defendant Faber's
online use of Bally's mark "in the context of consumer criticism., 360 The
court affirmed Faber's right to use Bally's mark on his web site for
purposes of such criticism.

36 1

Moreover, the court held that since Faber

had the right to criticize Bally online, Faber also had the right to use
metatags to2 enable Internet users to find his website to view the
36

criticism.

The [Internet] user may want to access [Bally's] official Internet site to
see how Bally sells itself. Likewise, the user may also want to be
apprised of the opinions of others about Bally. This individual will be
unable to locate sites containing outside commentary unless those sites
include Bally's marks in the machine readable code upon which search
engines rely. Prohibiting Faber from using Bally's name in the
effectively isolate him from all but the
machine readable code would
3 63
users.
Internet
savvy
most
By "machine readable code," the Bally court meant metatags, as that
term was understood in Brookfield and the Welles decisions.
This is a holding with deep resonances in the First Amendment and
with regard to the right to engage in comparative advertising. Metatags,
the court said, serve a crucial informative function because they make
retrieval of information via search engines possible. Consumers have a
legitimate interest in retrieving information about companies. In many
cases, the most efficient way for a consumer to access the information
will be to use the company's name or trademark as a search term. If third
parties are categorically prohibited from using others' trademarks as
359. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
360. Id.at 1165.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. Id.
364. The court explained metatags in the following terms:
The machine readable code is the hidden part of the Internet upon which search engines
rely to find sites that contain content which the individual user wishes to locate. The
basic mechanics is that the web page designer places certain keywords in an unreadable
portion of the web page that tells the search engines what is on a particular page.
Id. at 1165 n.3.
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search terms, they will be effectively isolated from ordinary users, and
consumers will not be able to benefit from potentially relevant
information. Here, at any rate, is an outer limit to the ability of a plaintiff
to stop a defendant's use of the plaintiffs marks in the metatags of the
defendant's website. The courts might have developed the rudimentary
thought in Bally into a broader right to gather information for both First
Amendment and comparative advertising (or better: comparative
shopping) purposes. Informational rights have a basis in constitutional
law. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, for example, the Supreme
Court held that consumers of broadcast offerings have a strong right to
receive a full spectrum of information.365 Bally's analysis is resonant of
the reasoning in RedLion.
The Bally principle has not developed beyond the truism that uses
of trademarks that qualify as criticism or parody enjoy First Amendment
protection and therefore are immunized from Lanham Act liability. In
particular, the courts have not differentiated between visible and
invisible uses even with regard to uses protected under the First
Amendment. For example, apart from Bally, there is no well-formed
body of caselaw holding that parodists or critics are permitted to use
trademarks as metatags in order to draw consumers to their sites. By
analogy, such a First Amendment principle--opaquely hinted at in
Bally--might have given rise to an analogous principle for comparative
advertising, or, more precisely, a principle holding that a competitor's
invisible metatag use for the purpose of achieving favorable search
engine placement is, absent any visible use of the marks in question, a
legitimate exercise in competition that is not only condoned but
welcomed in a capitalist system.
Instead, the judicial misapprehensions continue unabated. In SNA,
Inc. v. Array,366 the court endorsed a specious distinction first hinted at
in Welles L In Welles I, the court held that Terri Welles had used
Playboy's marks in her metatags "in good faith to index the content of
her website. 367 The SNA court rejected a defense along these lines.
[D]efendants intentionally use plaintiffs' mark [in the metatags of their
web site] to lure internet users to their site instead of SNA's official
site. This is true whether the meta tagging is visible or hidden in the
code, and no matter what the [defendants'] website's domain name
365. See 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (finding that the public has the important right "to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences").
366. 51 F. Supp. 2d 554, 562-63 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
367. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104 (S.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd in part
by 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
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is.... [In contrast to the mere indexing in Welles 1], based on the
repetitious usage and the evidence of defendants' general intent to
harm plaintiffs, the court cannot find that this use is a similar good
faith effort simply to index the content of the website; instead, it is a
bad faith effort to confuse internet users that368is likely to succeed.
Defendants' meta tagging will thus be enjoined.
SNA marks the point at which the doctrine of metatag liability
becomes fully entrenched. With SNA, the ability of consumers to
perceive the use of the symbol in question becomes an irrelevant
criterion. SNA is remarkable only for the explicitness with which the
court announces that irrelevancy.369 Many other courts signed on to the
Brookfield principles. The language and analysis employed by the courts
is becoming noticeably routine. In New York State Society of Certified
Public Accountants v. Eric Louis Associates, Inc.,370 the court quickly
rejected the defendant's argument that their use of plaintiffs marks in
the metatags of their web site did not, for various reasons, create
actionable likelihood of confusion. 371 Relying on Bucci and Brookfield,
the court held that "[d]efendant's use of the 'nysscpa.com' domain name
and the 'NYSSCPA' meta-tag caused a likelihood of confusion because
it created initial interest confusion., 372 At this point in the development
of the case law, such a finding did not need, and did not receive, a
particularly extended analysis. Judicial creativity is at a low ebb.
Yet, strangely, despite all this entrenchment a noticeable
equilibrium somehow continues to elude the courts. The judges continue
to be beset by confusion, and continue to struggle with basic legal
concepts. OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine373 decided in 2000 is a good
example. The court explained that "use in commerce" is "simply a
jurisdictional predicate to any law passed by Congress under the
Commerce Clause., 374 As discussed above, this is flat wrong. OBH then
discussed the requirement of § 1114 that the defendant's allegedly
infringing term be used "'in connection with' the distribution or
advertising of goods or services, 3 75 a requirement that is coextensive
with the trademark use requirement of § 1127.376 But the court disposed
368.
369.

SNA, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63 (emphasis added).
See id.

370.
371.

79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Seeid. at342.

372.
373.
374.
375.

Id.
86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 185.
Id. at186.

376.

Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000), with 15 U.S.C, § 1127 (2000).
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of it by relying on a principle first introduced into trademark law by
Bucci and further developed in Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky. 3 That
principle is that the "in connection with" requirement of § 1114 "is not
only met by use of the mark in connection with goods or services
distributed or advertised by the alleged infringer; it may also be met by
use in connection with the goods or services distributed by the
trademark holder.' 378 Put another way, use made by the plaintiff,rather
than by the defendant, can be imputed to the defendant, thus-via this
legal fiction-satisfying the requirement that the defendant, in order to
incur liability, has engaged in trademark use.
Notice that this form of argument is structurally analogous to the
"implicit labeling" doctrine invented by the Ninth Circuit in Playboy v.
Netscape Communications Corp.379 Just like implicit labeling, this
argument permits application of the Lanham Act based on a showing of
constructive use. In Playboy v. Netscape Communications Corp., the
constructive use was supplied by consumers' implicit labeling of
defendant's unbranded banner ads; in OBH, the constructive use was
supplied by the plaintiffs use of its own mark. The absurdity of the
principle is plain. Once other parties (the plaintiff, consumers, who
else?) can stand in for the defendant to supply statutorily required use by
the defendant of the mark in question, trademark law becomes nearlimitless. This is Internet law-Law of the Horse-par excellence;
constructive trademark use does not exist in the bricks-and-mortar
world. And rightly so. Constructive use obviates trademark use, the core
limitation of trademark law, altogether.
OBITs mistake with regard to the "use in commerce" requirement
38
is repeated in Trade Media Holdings, Ltd., v. Huang & Associates. 0
The case exemplifies the efficacy of misunderstanding "in commerce"
and "use in commerce" for broadening trademark infringement liability.
Quoting Bucci, the court found that "[t]he 'use in commerce'
requirement was meant to be a jurisdictional predicate with a 'sweeping
reach.' . . . The nature of the Internet indicates that establishing a typical
home page on the Internet, for access to all users, would satisfy the
Lanham Act's 'in commerce' requirement. ' '381 This kind of obliteration

377. 993 F. Supp. 282, 309 (D. N.J. 1998).
378. OBH, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 186 (emphasis added).
379. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th
Cir. 2004).
380. See 123 F. Supp. 2d 233, 242 (D. N.J. 2000).
381. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 WL 133313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997)).
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of the "use in commerce" requirement, together with broad liability for
metatag use, broadens the reach of the Lanham Act far beyond what is
reasonable for the proper and efficient functioning of trademark law on
the Internet. A recent example, from the Seventh Circuit, is Promatek
Industries, Ltd v. Equitrac Corp.382 Promatek is the purest embodiment
of the Brookfield doctrine, and perhaps the most characteristic flowering
of the mutant species of trademark doctrine 383 that has held sway over
the Internet. It is the simplicity of its facts that gives the case its
representative significance. Here is the court's recitation of the facts:
Promatek and Equitrac are competitors in selling cost-recovery
equipment. Equitrac's marketing department advised its web designer
that certain words and phrases should be used as metatags for
Equitrac's website. In response, the web designer placed the term
"Copitrack" in the contents of Equitrac's website as a metatag....
Promatek holds the trademark for Copitrak, and once it learned of
Equitrac's use of the term Copitrack in the metatag, it brought suit.
After learning of Promatek's suit, Equitrac contacted all of the search
engines known to it and requested that they remove any link between
Equitrac also removed the
the term Copitrack and Equitrac's website.
384
Copitrack metatag from its website.
Despite these remedial measures, Promatek pressed on with the suit
and obtained a preliminary injunction. The injunction directed Equitrac
to place the following disclaimer on its website: "If you were directed to
this site through the term 'Copitrack,' that is in error as there is no
affiliation between Equitrac and that term. The mark 'Copitrak' is a
registered trademark of Promatek Industries, Ltd., which can be found at
www.promatek.com or www.copitrak.com. ' '385 The court adopted the
Brookfield rationale hook, line and sinker.3 86 It conceptualized the harm
as a "misappropriation of Promatek's goodwill '387 and reasoned that "by
Equitrac's placing the term Copitrack in its metatag, consumers are

382. 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002).
383. This is a paraphrase of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Dastar,in which the Court
abrogated the Ninth Circuit's transformation of trademark law into a "species of mutant copyright
law." See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003); see also
supra note 4.
384. PromatekIndus., Ltd., 300 F.3d at 810-11 (footnote omitted). Amusingly, this is actually
a misspelling of Promatek's trademark, which is properly spelled COPITRAK. Defendant Equitrac
admitted it made a mistake and actually meant to use the properly spelled trademark in its metatags.
See id.
at 812.
385. Id. at 811.
386. See id. at 812-13.
387. Id.
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diverted to its website and Equitrac reaps the goodwill Promatek
developed in the Copitrak mark. 3 88 Curiously, unlike in Brookfield, it is
not clear from the Promatek decision whether the allegedly infringing
metatags used by defendant Equitrac are visible to consumers or not.
The court pointed out that both "description" and "keyword" metatags
were at issue in the case. 389 "Description" metatags are that part of a web
site's code which contains the short descriptor of the web site that is
visible when the web site is listed as part of a list of search results on
search engines such as Yahoo or Google. 390 There can be no doubt, of
course, that unauthorized use of another party's trademarks to describe
one's web site to consumers meets the "use in commerce" requirement
and may constitute trademark infringement. We all routinely read and
rely on these short descriptors to gain a sense of the content of a given
website. So insofar as Promatek addressed "description" metatags, its
conclusions would be unquestionably correct. But that is less than clear.
The court appears to address both "description" and "keyword"
metatags. "Keyword" metatags are the invisible metatags familiar from
Brookfield and associated decisions. 391 A differentiation between visible
and invisible use is not attempted. Promatek,then, is the rare case where
liability is imposed based solely on metatag use. In all other cases
discussed so far, the metatag use was accompanied by overt uses that, by
themselves, were arguably able to meet the trademark use requirement.
One court at least tried to take a different approach. In Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc.,392 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit developed the idea that metatag use might be an apt indicator of
an intent to infringe in a situation where infringement has otherwise
been shown via overt use of the plaintiffs mark in the defendant's
domain name, web site, or visible meta descriptors. More generally,
metatag use might be seen as a secondary instrumentality of an
infringement established with other facts, and hence used to confirm the
imposition of liability and perhaps justify a finding of willfulness

393

and

thus a statutory enhancement of the damages award. Perhaps ironically,
Eli Lilly was decided two years prior to Promatek Industries, Ltd., in
which the court managed to negate the potential doctrinal advance that
Eli Lilly might have signaled. In Eli Lilly, the defendant had marketed an
388. Id. at 812.
389. Seeid.at81On.1.
390.

See, e.g., Lastowka, supra note 35, at 846.

391. See PromatekIndus., Ltd., 300 F.3d at 810 n.1.
392. 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
393. See id. at 460, 465-66.
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herbal "mood elevator" under the mark HERBROZAC via defendant's
web site.394 The court held that the HERBROZAC mark infringed Eli
Lilly's famous PROZAC mark. 395 Beyond the infringing name of
defendant's product, defendant's web site included the mark PROZAC
in its metatags.3 96 The court observed that "Natural Answers' Web site
does not visibly mention PROZAC or Lilly., 397 The court's use of this
fact is interesting. "Natural Answers' use of the 'Prozac' metatag ... is

significant evidence of intent to confuse and mislead. 3 98 This
conclusion-rather different from the initial interest confusion approach
practiced by other courts-is supported by citations to Brookfield and
NYSCCPA, which the court reads as predominantly intent and bad faith
cases. 399 The Seventh Circuit's approach was novel, and certainly much
more true to the letter and spirit of trademark law than the Brookfield
approach. But it did not mark a decisive break with that line of
precedent, and, as Promatek conclusively shows, it did not make a
noticeable impression on the subsequent development of the law.
D. Pinnacleand Revolution: The Recent Keyword Cases
The metatag cases I have discussed so far tended to be factually
mixed-the defendants used the plaintiffs' marks not only in the buried
code of their web sites, but also in at least some of their domain names,
visibly on their web sites, or on other products. This open and notorious
use makes the courts' findings that the defendants had engaged in
trademark infringement (or likelihood of prevailing on the merits in the
preliminary injunction cases) unremarkable and essentially correct. I
speculate that it was this overall plausibility of the plaintiffs' complaints,
the fact that these complaints were at least in part justifiable under
traditional trademark doctrine, that permitted the courts-or perhaps one
should say, misled the courts-to regard metatag use with a doctrinally
uncritical eye and develop it as a separate infringement offense. What
we have here, then, is a conceptual lumping together of disparate facts, a
failure of differentiation, helped along, no doubt, by the novelty (for
judges, at least) of the virtual environment of the Internet, and by a
powerful desire to impose law and order, preserve doctrinal normalcy,
and not be bedazzled before the self-proclaimed utopia of this
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

See id. at 460.
See id. at 465-66.
Id.at 460.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.
See id.
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revolutionary technology. As one court memorably put it, in a different
context:
Some of the evidence in this case strongly suggests that some
companies operating in the area of the Internet may have a
misconception that, because their technology is somewhat novel, they
are somehow immune from the ordinary application of laws of the
United States, including copyright law.400They need to understand that
the law's domain knows no such limits.
But this desire to carry on with business as usual, to avoid
permitting an enclave not reached by law, led to a detrimental mutation
in the basic principles of trademark law. Only now are the courts
reaching the point of sufficient familiarity with the Internet, and only
now are the doctrinal mis-developments starting to produce sufficiently
paradoxical consequences for the courts to start to have serious second
thoughts. But we need a wholesale adjustment of the law to weed out the
perversions of doctrine caused by the radical novelty of the Internet; we
need to return to the solid roots of an essentially healthy body of law.
Several recent cases bring the matter to a head and neatly sum up
the issue. All involve keyword-linked advertising. Their outcomes are
disparate. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications
Corp.,40 1 the Ninth Circuit imposed liability on Netscape's use of
trademarks in lists for keyed banner advertisements. The decision relied
heavily on the initial interest confusion doctrine.40 2 In her fascinating
concurrence, Judge Berzon voiced her dismay at the near-automatic
functioning of that doctrine in permitting findings of trademark
infringement.4 °3 But the en banc review of Brookfield, the leading case
applying the initial interest confusion doctrine to the Internet, does not
have much of a chance to produce a reasonable revision of trademark
doctrine in this area if the problem is not properly conceptualized.
A movement toward clarification comes from the three
WhenU.com cases. By virtue of its business model, WhenU.com
provokes substantial thought among at least some courts about the
trademark use requirement. 40 4 WhenU.com provides pop-up
advertisements whose content is customized depending on what search
400. UMG Recordings, Inc., v. MP3.com, Inc., 00 Civ. 472, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13293, at
*18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000).
401. 354 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004).
402. See id. at 1024-26.
403. See id. at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring).
404. Once again, empirical developments are openly driving the evolution of the law-but this
time, hopefully, in the right direction.
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terms a computer user types into his or her search engine. WhenU.com's
program correlates such search terms with product categories and causes
an appropriate pop-up (or pop-under, as the case may be) to appear on
the user's computer screen. The legal problems for WhenU.com have
their origin in the fact that some of the search terms that cause
WhenU.com's program to bring up pop-up ads are trademarks owned by
third parties. In other words, a search for "United Airlines" may cause
the WhenU.com program to put forth a pop-up ad for American Airlines.
Several trademark owners did not relish such immediacy and
proximity of competition. After all, it is quite conceivable that a
potential customer of United Airlines might, upon seeing a better fare on
the pop-up ad for American, decide to save money and fly American,
despite his or her initial intent to purchase a ticket from United (such
intent being evidenced by the Internet search using the term "United
Airlines" that originated the pop-up ad by American). In late 2003, the
U.S. courts issued three lengthy and thoughtful opinions in lawsuits
challenging WhenU.com's use of trademarks to deliver relevant pop-up
ads.40 5 WhenU prevailed twice and lost once.40 6
1. The WhenUCases
WhenU is in a line of business called, perhaps euphemistically,
"'contextual marketing. ' ' 40 7 "WhenU's proprietary software allows
WhenU to deliver contextually relevant advertising at the moment the
consumer demonstrates an interest in the product or service, without any
knowledge of the consumer's past history or personal characteristics. ''4 8
The U-Haul court described the situation in grittier terms:

405. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Wells
Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003); U-Haul Int'l, Inc., v.
WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003).
406. Finally, in 2004, Google failed to prevail on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss GEICO's
trademark infringement claims against it. The suit was based on Google's sale of the GEICO
trademark as a keyword. See GEICO v. Google, Inc. 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701-02 (E.D. Va. 2004).
Relying on U-Haul and Wells Fargo, Google argued that GEICO had failed to allege trademark use.
Accepting all of GEICO's allegations as true, the court disagreed. Id. at 704. In so doing, the court
stated that 1-800 Contacts and Playboy were "better reasoned." Id. at 703. However, the court
provided little independent substantive analysis of the trademark use issue. See id. at 703-04. On
December 15, 2004, the court granted Google's motion for summary judgment on the ground that
GEICO had not brought forth evidence that using trademarks as keywords for sponsored advertising
causes consumer confusion. See Diane Duhaime, GEICO vs. Google and Overture Trademark
Lawsuit, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Dec. 21, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 14490493. To date, the
court has not issued a written opinion on its summary judgment ruling.
407. Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
408. Id.
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[T]his case is an attempt by a trademark owner and copyright holder to
limit annoying pop-up advertising from blotting out its website on the
individual computer user's screen. The average computer user who
conducts a web search for the U-Haul website would expect the UHaul website to appear on their computer screen; however, in this case,
the computer screen fills with the advertisement of a U-Haul
competitor. The user must then click and close the pop-up
advertisement
window in order to get to their destination, the U-Haul
40 9
web site.
That description is slightly imprecise. As is well known, a
Windows-based environment permits the opening and/or display of
multiple windows at the same time.410 WhenU's programs providing
pop-up ads are based on this feature of the dominant computing
environment. The pop-up ads do not actually "fill" the entire screen of a
computer user, and they do not have to be closed in order for the target
website to be visible. Instead, WhenU utilizes three formats of
"contextualized" advertisement:
(1) a small format "pop-up" window that typically appears flush to the
bottom right-hand comer of the consumer's desktop; (2) a larger "popunder" window that appears behind some or all of the browser
windows that the consumer is viewing; (3) a horizontal "panoramic"
window that runs along the bottom of the user's computer screen.
Regardless of the format used, the WhenU Window is a distinct,
411
separate window ....
How does an ordinary computer user end up with WhenU's
proprietary software on his or her computer? After all, the court in UHaul was surely correct in opining that most people find pop-up
advertisements "annoying." WhenU offers two kinds of software, called
"Save" and "SaveNow." They function identically, but are distributed in
slightly different ways and under different conditions. Both Save and
SaveNow are "typically download[ed] in return for obtaining a free
software application. ' 4 12 Software bundled with Save can often be
obtained for a premium without the Save program.4 13 But once the (free)
software bundled with Save is installed on the user's computer, Save can
be removed only by also removing the free software with which it was

409. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
410. See, e.g., Wells Fargo,293 F. Supp. 2d at 742-43.
411. Id.
at 745.
412. Id.
at 739.
413. See id
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bundled.4 14 In contrast, SaveNow, while also typically obtained as a
bundle, can be removed by itself and separately from the associated
software. Downloading the SaveNow program requires users to assent
(by clicking) to a license agreement that explains the way SaveNow
operates.415
WhenU launched its services in early 2001.416 Since then, it has
delivered "online marketing for more than four hundred advertisers,
including such well-known companies as Bank of America, Citibank,
Verizon, JPMorgan Chase, Panasonic, Cingular Wireless, Merck, and
ING Bank. 417 WhenU uses a directory of terms to link a user's
browsing activity to categories of goods and services, for which it then
provides pop-up ads. That directory is sizeable. "As of July 1, 2003, the
Directory contained approximately 32,000 URLs and URL fragments,
29,000 search terms and 1,200 keyword algorithms.... The Directory
categorizes these elements into various categories in much the same way
as a local Yellow Pages indexes businesses into categories. '4 18 The
Wells Fargo court gives the following description of how a computer
user's browsing activity interacts with WhenU's directory to cause
WhenU's Save or SaveNow program to produce a competitive pop-up
advertisement:
As a participating consumer browses the internet, the SaveNow
software studies the user's browsing activity and compares it against
the elements contained in the Directory. Simultaneously, the SaveNow
software determines whether: (a) any of those elements are associated
with a category in the Directory, and (b) whether those categories are
associated with particular advertisements. If the software finds a
match, it identifies the associated product or service category,
determines whether appropriate ads are available to be displayed, and,
if so, selects an ad based on the system's priority rules, subject to
internal frequency limitations.... Thus, if a consumer were to enter
[www.wellsfargo.com] into the address box in an open browser
window or conduct a search using a search engine by typing in the
words "Wells Fargo," SaveNow would detect that activity and scan the
proprietary directory for a match to a WhenU category such as
[Finally,] WhenU sells advertising to
"finance.mortgage."...
advertisers on the basis of sales categories, which are grouped into
certain product and service categories.... [And] WhenU does not
414.

Id.at 740.

415. Id. at 739-40.
416.
417.
418.

See id at 738.
Id.
Id. at 743 (citation omitted).
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guarantee advertisers that their advertisements will appear 4when
19
participating consumers access content from a particular website
We have, then, a fairly coherent description of WhenU's business
model. Develop a directory of commercially significant terms used by
consumers during their internet browsing activities '(regardless of
whether these terms occur as URLs, parts of URLs, search terms,
keywords, or other); make that directory part of software that links the
terms to commercial categories; get companies to subscribe to WhenU's
services and become WhenU advertisers; display pop-up (or pop-under,
or banner) advertisements for WhenU advertisers for goods or services
that are related to those the consumer-as indicated by the terms the
consumer is using-is probably looking for.420
Wherein, then, lies the trademark infringement? Well-some of the
terms in WhenU's directory are trademarks. A consumer typing, for
example, "Nike" into her search engine or "nike.com" into her browser's
address window may be presented with a pop-up ad for Adidas or
a user types in
Reebok. Or, less hypothetically, "when
'1800contacts.com,' the URL for Plaintiff's website, the SaveNow
software recognizes that the user is interested in the eye-care category,
and retrieves from an Internet server a pop-up advertisement from that
category. ' 421 Quite obviously, some trademark owners do not relish
having consumers who go looking for their specific offerings (as
evidenced by consumers' use of their trademarks as search or address
terms) confronted with their direct competitors' offerings. Because the
link between the (presumptively) searched-for companies and their
competitors' pop-up ads is the formers' trademarks contained in
WhenU's directory, a claim for trademark infringement against WhenU
user's
is thought to exist. As the U-Haul court put it, "this detour in the
'4 22
web search seems like a siphon-off of a business opportunity.
As it happens, though, competition is a fact of life in a market
economy. Trademark law not only recognizes this fact, but is
instrumental in fostering competition by increasing and facilitating
419. Id. at 743-45. "Participating consumer" is a misleading term; the court refers to a
computer user whose computer happens to be storing the Save or SaveNow program. See id at 743.
420. WhenU presents consumers with pop-up ads for competitors of its own advertisers. Wells
Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 745. In other words, WhenU advertisers do not enjoy immunity
from the enhanced competition caused by WhenU's services.
421. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); accord
Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 744; U-Haul Int'l, Inc., v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d
723, 725 (E.D. Va. 2003). Plaintiff owns the trademark "1-800 CONTACTS." 1-800 Contacts, 309
F. Supp. 2d at 473.
422. U-HaulInt'l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
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consumer choices.423 It does that by intervening to preserve and
strengthen the recognition value of certain symbols on which consumers
can rely, or which they can use as a proxy, in aid of choosing desirable
products, or products from a source from which they have previously
made satisfactory purchases. 24 Those who poach upon the "commercial
magnetism of [the congenial] symbol[s],, 425 used by others to hawk their

wares can and should be stopped under the law. But the "poaching" that
Justice Frankfurter so rightly identified as the gravamen of the tortious
act committed by an infringer is a limited concept. It does not
encompass legitimate competition.
What is legitimate competition under the Lanham Act? The answer
requires us to revisit the structure of trademark law, discussed earlier.
The Lanham Act evaluates behavior via a set of concentric circles.426
Noncommercial activity falls into the outermost circle and is irrelevant
altogether. Insofar as an activity is commercial, Congress may generally
regulate it under the Commerce Clause. This constitutes the next circle.
Since we are here discussing economically competitive behavior, that
requirement is satisfied. But inhabiting the second circle does not yet
permit an inference of Lanham Act liability. For that liability to attach,
427
there has to be trademark use by the defendant of the relevant symbol.
If so, the defendant's conduct falls within the third concentric circle, and
liability may attach if the additional requirements of no fair use and
likelihood of confusion are satisfied (and, it goes without saying, if the
plaintiff has valid trademark rights).
Let us examine the use WhenU is making of the trademarks in
question in its directory, and let us see whether regarding such use as
"trademark use" under the Lanham Act leads to a coherent theory of
trademark infringement. The salient fact about WhenU's use is that no
consumer-and no one except an experienced hacker who deliberately
takes apart the WhenU software to get at the directory--ever sees the
directory, or any of the terms of which it is composed. Specifically,
when a consumer types a trademark contained in the WhenU directory
into a search engine or browser address window, and WhenU's software,
executing the job for which it was designed, presents that consumer with
a pop-up ad of a competitor of the trademark's owner, then the process
by which the pop-up ad is created, or, better perhaps, correlated to the
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supranote 6, at 167-68.
Id.at 167.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v:S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
See discussion supraPart I.C.1.
Of course, the plaintiff also must have used its mark to have rights in it in the first place.
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consumer's search activities as demonstrated by his or her use of search
terms, is entirely opaque and mysterious to the ordinary consumer
unfamiliar with the WhenU business model.4 28 No ordinary member of
the public can be expected to have an understanding of how those oddly
appropriate and pertinent advertisements are created. Their
appropriateness, parenthetically, arises only from their content, that is,
the relatedness of the goods and services to those the consumer was
seeking in the first place. They are not branded with any of the
trademarks the consumer used in her initial search. On the contrary, they
are conspicuously branded only with the competitor's marks.429 In other
words, the consumer is faced with an online world where a deliberate
search for Nike shoes will bring to light not only purveyors of those
shoes, but also purveyors of Reeboks and the like. Other than using the
Nike trademark as an indicator for the consumer's apparent interest in a
certain kind of shoe, WhenU would contend that its program does not
take advantage of that trademark in any way.
WhenU indubitably does use the Nike trademark in the following
way. The mark serves as a proxy to show to an agent in the
background-WhenU, via its Save or SaveNow program-that a certain
consumer has evidenced a possible interest in purchasing sneakers. Not
generic sneakers, but those of a specific company. What does the agent
in the background do? It exploits that interest in a specific sneaker brand
to shove related brands into the consumer's face. This is, by any
colloquial standard, a commercial exploitation of the Nike brand by
WhenU. More precisely, it is an exploitation of the informational content
of the consumer's use of the Nike brand in browsing the Internet, where
that informational content is taken (reasonably, it would seem) as an
indicator of interest in the kinds of products offered under that brand.
Why, then, should there be any doubt that such plain commercial
exploitation of a well-known brand can in principle be actionable under
trademark law? Assume consumers are confused by the pop-up ads in
the way that the Lanham Act understands confusion. In other words,
assume consumers believe-if only for a short period of time-that the
pop-up ads or the products advertised in them are somehow put out by or
associated with or authorized by the owner of the original mark the
consumer used to conduct her search. Suppose I look for Nike shoes. In
addition to a list of search results for web sites where I can buy Nike
428. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467,480 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
429. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenUcom, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 745-46 (E.D.
Mich. 2003). Note that the banner ads in Playboy are unbranded. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v.
Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004).
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shoes, I get a pop-up advertisement for Reebok shoes. "Hmm," I think,
"I didn't know those guys were related." They must be, though (I might
naively assume), because why else would I be getting Reebok stuff in
response to a Nike search? I click on the Reebok ad (because it's there),
like what I see, and make a purchase. Now Nike has lost a sale. But once
I click and am taken to a Reebok site to look around, I am probably
perfectly aware that Reebok and Nike haven't suddenly merged. I know
I am dealing with a competitor. No matter. Trademark law has the initial
interest confusion doctrine, which permits imposition of liability for presale confusion that is dispelled well prior to a sale actually taking
place. 430 This is how the courts handle such situations and capture
infringers in situations where consumer confusion is short-lived, if not
downright ephemeral.
Note that we are now talking about confusion, which is quite
inevitable. Confusion becomes quite naturally the gravamen of the kind
of thumbnail analysis of the WhenU situation that I just performed.
Trademark law, however, contains doctrinal constraints that must not be
neglected. From our previous analysis we know that the trademark use
inquiry precedes the confusion inquiry. If there is no trademark use,
there can be no Lanham Act liability, making confusion irrelevant. Many
courts, however, appear to have applied the principle that use of a
trademark invisible to consumers is actionable if confusion-most often
conceptualized as initial interest confusion-results. Many of these cases
are Internet-related, and we examined them previously. What is it about
the Internet that brings about this short-circuiting? Outside the Internet, a
situation where a defendant "uses" (in a trademark sense) a plaintiffs
mark in a way that completely eludes the visual or aural perception of
consumers, but where that "use" nevertheless constitutes a predicate act
for trademark infringement, is inconceivable. There is, quite simply, no
case in U.S. law imposing trademark liability in a situation where the
consumer does not know that the defendant made any use of the
plaintiffs marks, or, put differently, where the consumer does not see,
hear, or otherwise perceive in some form the defendant's use of the
plaintiffs mark (or of the term alleged to cause confusion).
Let's go back to the statute for a moment. As we have seen, it is
actionable under the Lanham Act to use in commerce either a
"reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
430. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062-63
(9th Cir. 1999).
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advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion,, 43' or "any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which is likely to cause confusion. ' 432 It is the
"reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation" of the registered
mark, or the "word, term, name, symbol, or device" with regard to an
unregistered mark, that has to cause the confusion in order for Lanham
Act liability to attach. In order to do that, the allegedly infringing term
must be available in some form for sensory perception by the consumer.
There is no grand body of precedent on this "sensory perception of the
infringing term by the consumer" requirement. The reason for this
judicial silence is straightforward. The "sensory perception" requirement
is utterly understood and obvious in the bricks-and-mortar world. It is a
foundational but generally 'unstated premise of all trademark law.
Sensory perception is the very essence of the trademark use requirement
codified in § 1127, but it is so deeply embedded in the very concept of
what a trademark is that courts dealing with non-Internet cases do not
think of explaining it in any conscious detail. In an odd but typical
wrinkle, then, the Internet knocks the unstated limiting principle out
from under this foundational requirement and offers up for debate-and
for imposition of liability-conduct that traditionally no one, not even a
hyper-aggressive and litigation-happy trademark
owner, thought of as
433
even potentially subject to Lanham Act liability.
WhenU performs an invisible correlation between a product the
consumer seeks and a product the consumer, if confronted with it at the
moment of seeking the other one, might actually prefer over the one the
consumer seeks. It is a favorite sport of courts and commentators to
come up with analogies for online phenomena in order to render them
somewhat more accessible to experience and sensibilities trained in a
very different world.4 34 I would like to try one here. What, if anything,
does WhenU's correlation of (ostensibly) sought product with
competitive product via invisible, nay imperceptible, use of the sought
product's trademark analogize to in the bricks-and-mortar world?
431. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a) (2000).
432. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)-(a)(1)(A) (2000).
433. Professor Lessig has famously analyzed the regulatory effects of the structure of
cyberspace. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).

Chapter One of that book is entitled "Code Is Law." Id. at 3. The phenomenon I describe might be
summarized as "Code Enables Law"-to a hitherto unimagined degree.
434. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REv. 521 (2003)
(analyzing courts' attempts to conceptualize the Internet via metaphor).
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Nothing so much as the manager of a supermarket who puts competitive
products on the same or adjacent shelves. How does that manager-or,
more generally, the person or persons who develop use plans of
supermarkets to maximize sales-know to put the Kellogg Raisin Bran
next to the Post Raisin Bran? How come different brands of soup or soap
or bread or frozen pizza or ice cream or peanut butter are always
grouped together in grocery stores? Because in the brain of the store
manager, or (more visibly, actually) in the written store layout plans of
modem supermarkets, the competing brands are correlated and grouped.
The manager thinks "Kellogg" and, from the proprietary directory of
brand names stored either in her mind's memory banks or the equally
proprietary layout plan for the supermarket, correlates "Post" or
"Nabisco," causing her to group them together on the shelves. The
consumer does not see that list, of course. The list's invisibility does not
depend on its existence only in the mind of an individual store manager
or as a written plan for a store or an entire chain of stores (the latter
alternative would make it available to many store employees, but not
ordinarily to customers). From the consumer's perspective, it makes no
difference. The consumer walks into the store intending to purchase
Kellogg's Frosted Flakes. Having located the relevant aisle, the
consumer scans the offerings for Kellogg's Frosted Flakes. His gaze
happens on the analogous cereal marketed by Post-and for some
reason, he finds Post's product more appealing. He chooses Post.
Plainly, a sale that, judging by the consumer's initial intent and attitude,
should have gone to Kellogg has been diverted.43 5
Trademark infringement? Of course not. It can't be. That would be
the death of our system of competitive product offerings, which is
crucial for the functioning of our market economy, 436 by permitting
"trademark holders [to assert] a generalized right to control

435. Rajzer, supra note 35, at 462-63 (setting forth a similar supermarket analogy but
concluding, without further analysis, that "[o]ne would definitely not consider a suit for trademark
infringement or dilution in that scenario"). Judge Berzon, in her concurrence in Playboy, makes use
of a similar analogy. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1035 (9th Cir. 2004). But she does not link it to the trademark use requirement, instead remaining
mired in an initial interest confusion analysis. See id. Others have likewise availed themselves of
this analogy, but, like Judge Berzon, have not drawn the correct doctrinal conclusions. See, e.g.,
Shea, supra note 35, at 554 (using the supermarket analogy to support an argument about consumer
expectations and, hence, likelihood of confusion).
436. This statement is, of course, based on Landes's and Posner's famous argument that the
economic value of trademarks lies in "the saving in consumers' search costs made possible by the
information that the trademark conveys or embodies about the quality of the firm's brand." LANDES
& POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 6, at 168.
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language .... ,,411 If my (perfectly un-)hypothetical situation were to
give rise to a claim for trademark infringement, it would likewise be
trademark infringement for the Toyota dealer to perceive a Honda
dealership with a vacant lot next door, correlate the trademark Honda
with the directory of relevant terms in her mind, figure out that Honda
cars are being offered, purchase the vacant lot next door, and open a
Toyota dealership for the express purpose of funneling customers from
the Honda dealership to the Toyota dealership.43 8
Why is that not trademark infringement? Because the Toyota dealer
makes no use of the Honda trademark. 439 It is for this reason that
WhenU-like cases do not exist in the traditional bricks-and-mortar world
that used to be the sum total of our living environment. But the Internet
changed things and opened up avenues of imposing liability that no one
thought existed. What does the Internet add here that was not present in
our grocery story or car dealership hypotheticals? Instant reaction to
consumer desires. In the grocery store, the goods sit on the shelf. They
don't reshuffle themselves based on where a consumer is looking.
Neither do the car dealerships.44 ° Moreover, the consumer knows exactly
what to expect. Everyone who goes to a grocery store knows that he or
she will be bombarded with advertisements for competing products. I,
for one, find it difficult to stay on task and come out of the store with
what I originally intended to buy when I walked in. But the law expects
me to be able to live with that challenge.
With regard to the Internet, one might argue, the situation is
different. A consumer logging on to find a specific product intends to get
437. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 32, at 809.
438. Dogan and Lemley list the following hypotheticals along the same lines:
Makers of telephone directories are not liable for putting all the ads for taxi services
together on the same page. In-house marketing surveyors aren't liable for asking people
what they think of a competitor's brand-name product. Magazines are not liable for
selling advertisements that relate to the content of their special issues, even when that
content involves trademark owners. Gas stations and restaurants are not liable for
locating across the street from an established competitor, trading on the attraction the
established company has created or benefiting from the size of the sign the established
company has put up. Individuals are not liable for their use of a trademark in
conversation, even in an inaccurate or misleading way (referring to a Puffs brand facial
tissue as a "Kleenex," or a competing cola as a "Coke," for example). Generic drug
manufacturers are not liable for placing their drugs near their brand-name equivalents on
drug store shelves, and the stores are not liable for accepting the placement.
1d. at 809-10.
439. The situation would, of course, be different if the Post brand frosted flakes had a
confusingly similar imitation of the Kellogg trademark imprinted on them, or if the Toyota dealer
next door were to put up Honda signage. But that is precisely what we are not talking about here.
440. But even if they did, that would not be trademark infringement.
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exactly that product. That's why she logged on in the first place.
Therefore, the unasked-for presentation of competing goods is a
deception of the consumer who knows what he wants and simply wants
to obtain it. This argument is doctrinally flawed because it does not
answer the question of how to satisfy the trademark use requirement. It
is also flawed as a matter of policy because it misperceives the nature of
the Internet. As the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACL U 4 1 recognized quite
clearly, the Internet is not a new medium, but an extension of human
reality.442 The Court's realization, which came rather early on in the
judiciary's engagement with the phenomenon of virtual reality, is truer
today than it ever was. As we all can plainly see, the Internet partakes of
all the messiness, the unruliness, the petty annoyances, and distractions
posed by human reality. Why? Because we live on the Internet: we do
business on it, learn and study on it, express our opinions on it, shop on
it, date on it, chat and gossip on it, gamble on it, have sex on it. Any
expectation that the Internet would somehow spare us the seemingly
ever-present commercialism of modem American life is totally
unfounded,44 3 and as unreasonable with regard to cyberspace as it would
be with regard to a suburban strip mall. If we have to endure miles of
competing signage when driving to the car dealership from which we
have resolved to purchase a vehicle (with the attendant risk, of course,
that our resolve may weaken and we may end up visiting the
competitor's shop instead), then we also have to endure the online
equivalent of that unrelenting advertisement pressure. Contextualized
advertising and metatag use, then, is nothing more than code's
approximation--or better: reconstitution-of modem commercial
reality. 444 Whatever heightened sensitivity we may have to these online
impositions and annoyances is merely a result of our technological
naivetd, a product of the comparative novelty of the Internet. It is
certainly not worth destroying trademark law over a quixotic desire to

441. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
442. See id. at 885 (describing the "dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas"); see
also id. at 853 (comparing the Internet "from the readers' viewpoint, to both a vast library including
millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and
services, [and] [f]rom the publishers' point of view, [to] a vast platform from which to address and
hear from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers").
443. Such an expectation might spring in no small part from a certain naive utopianism of
some early proponents of cyberspace. "The world ha[s] moved on since then." STEPHEN KING, THE
DARK TOWER I: THE GUNSLINGER 3 (rev'd ed. 2003).
444. See LESSIG, supra note 433, at 153-54, 198 ("As the rules that govern real space compete,
cyberspace increasingly wins out.").
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preserve an innocence from commercialism that, in fact, has long been
lost.
Back to trademark use. Perhaps surprisingly, given prior courts'
obtuseness on the issue, the courts in U-Haul and Wells Fargo made
trademark use the linchpin of their rulings. In both cases, the courts
found no trademark use and thus, necessarily, no infringement. In UHaul, defendant WhenU prevailed on summary judgment. The court
observed, correctly, that "[a] fundamental prerequisite for claims of
trademark infringement.., and of unfair competition [under the Lanham
Act] ... is proof that the defendant used one of the plaintiffs protected
marks in commerce, ' 445 and noted that the statutory test for meeting that
prerequisite is set forth in section 45.446 U-Haul argued that WhenU
made statutory use in commerce of the U-HAUL mark because: (1) the
pop-up ad appeared on the same computer screen as U-Haul's web site;
(2) because of the triggering of the pop-up ad via the WhenU directory
(which contains the U-Haul mark); and (3) because the pop-up ads
"interfere[] with the use of U-Haul's web site by its customers and
dealers. 4 47 The court decisively rejected U-Haul's arguments. First, the
court held pop-up ads are not part of a "single visual presentation as part
of U-Haul's website ' 448 for the simple reason that the Microsoft
Windows environment permits having several windows of different sizes
open at the same time. In other words, the pop-up ads do not "frame" UHaul's site. 449 Second, the simultaneous appearance of the U-Haul web
site and the pop-up window (which is branded with the trademark of UHaul's competitor, but NOT with U-Haul's trademark) constitutes
comparative advertising. 450 Third, the use of the U-HAUL trademark in
the directory of the WhenU software does not constitute Lanham Act
use.45 1 Fourth, since WhenU's software "does not interact with U-Haul's
computer servers," and since users consciously decide to install the
SaveNow program, the pop-up ads "do not interfere with the use of UHaul's web site by its customers and dealers. 452
The court's first argument depended heavily on taking the desktop
metaphor of the graphics-based Microsoft windows operating
445. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenUcom, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(citations omitted).
446. See id. at 727-28.
447. Id. at 728.
448. Id. at 727-28.
449. Id.at 727.
450. See id. at 728.
451. See id.
452. Id. at 728.
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environment seriously. To give U-Haul's claim even a shadow of
validity, one must refer to the phenomenon of framing. There are
relatively few cases that deal with that phenomenon. Framing is
ordinarily understood to occur when a second web site is opened inside
the visual frame created by the first web site presenting a "smoothly
integrated ' '4 53 whole to the Internet user that leaves the impression that
he or she is, in fact, still "located" on the first web site.
In the WhenU situation, the facts are reversed. It is obviously not
U-Haul who is causing the pop-up ad to appear simultaneously with the
U-Haul web site. Not only is there a lack of smooth visual integration of
the web site and the pop-up, but on the contrary there is sharp visual
differentiation, in particular via the clear branding of the pop-up ad. The
court understood all this quite well:
[U-Haul's] argument is that WhenU's ads appear as a single visual
presentation as part of U-Haul's website. This position, however, is
untenable. When a WhenU ad appears on a user's computer screen, it
opens in a WhenU-branded window that is separate and distinct from
the window in which the U-Haul website appears.... It is important to
note that in the Microsoft Windows environment, each program that
the user launches generally appears on a separate window on the user's
computer screen. In addition, the computer user may have multiple
windows open at once; and in many instances, a separate window may
pop-up on the user's screen notifying the user of an event: incoming
454 eetc.
appointment,
an
computer,
the
by
task
a
of
completion
mail,
This refutation of the framing claim also resolved the court's
second and fourth arguments (comparative advertising and interference
with U-Haul's website). Although they led to the correct result (i.e., no
liability on WhenU's part), arguments two and four, as applied by the
court, are confused and doctrinally mistaken. They reflect the profound
befuddlement the courts have experienced in this particular corner of
trademark doctrine. Argument two, the comparative advertising issue,
misses the mark entirely. Comparative advertising is a species of fair
use. Competitors are permitted to compare their wares to those of their
competitors. The U-Haul court quoted Diversified Marketing, Inc. v.
Estee Lauder, Inc.,455 for the correct-but irrelevant-proposition that it
was lawful comparative advertising for the defendant to use the slogan

453. See Hard Rock Caf6 v. Morton, No. 97 CIV. 9483, 1999 WL 717995, at *15, *25
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1999).
454. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 727-28.
455. 705 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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defendant's product packaging and point of sale advertising. In fact,
comparative advertising is such an important engine of commerce and
competition that the FTC has long taken the position that "[i]ndustry
codes which restrain comparative advertising... are subject to challenge
by the Federal Trade Commission. 45 7 Desirable though it may be,
comparative advertising was not at issue in the WhenU situation at all.
By definition, comparative advertising pertains to situations where one
party refers to the goods of another to compare them with the first
party's goods-overtly and prominently so. Comparative advertising,
then, is all about one party using another party's mark. "A use of a
rival's mark that does not engender confusion about origin or quality
is... permissible. 45 8 But that is precisely not what WhenU is doing,
and neither is it what the parties whose pop-up ads WhenU is launching
are doing. No one is making comparative statements, least of all WhenU.
All that is happening is that party A's offerings appear in immediate
vicinity to party B's comparable goods. But neither party A nor party B
are drawing express comparisons to the other's goods, and neither is
mentioning the trademarks under which the other's goods are being sold.
One might argue that the immediate "physical" (to accept the threedimensionality metaphor) juxtaposition of party B's goods to party A's
goods in response to an inquiry geared-by hypothesis-to party A's
goods constitutes constructive comparative advertising. However, there
is no statutory or case law support for that proposition. To do so, would
push the law of comparative advertising decidedly too far and would
bring, at least potentially, within the purview of the trademark laws
conduct that they have never been held to reach. In particular, physically
adjacent groupings of related goods in supermarkets, malls, and any
other commercial context--done, among other things, to facilitate
comparisons-would then also become subject to a comparative
advertising analysis. That is unnecessary, and precisely the kind of thing
that the trademark use requirement is meant to forestall.459
Comparative advertising, then, must be ruled out as a ground for
finding trademark use, and thus providing a foundation on which to
456. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (quoting Diversified Mktg., Inc., 705 F. Supp,
at 130).
457. Commercial Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(c)(1) (2004).
458. August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995).
459. By saying that, I may be begging the question because I am in the process of examining
the contours of the trademark use requirement. Suffice it to say, then, that the use requirement as
traditionally understood and deeply rooted in common-law trademark doctrine does not provide for
such situations to come within the purview of trademark use, constructive or otherwise.
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build a case for liability. The U-Haul court's fourth argument that
interference by the defendant with the plaintiff's web page can constitute
use by the defendant of plaintiffs mark fares no better. 460 This argument
does not hold water because it comes out of a number of rather confused
Internet cases in which the courts had a very hard time constructing
liability against defendants whom the judges plainly viewed as acting in
bad faith.461 In those cases, the defendants openly used the plaintiffs'
marks in the defendants' domain name, but ran web sites that were quite
clearly noncommercial in nature. The courts surmised that defendants'
use of such domain names was likely to hinder consumer access to the
plaintiffs' own web site and held that the defendants had used the marks
in question "incommerce." That rule plainly has no relevance to the
WhenU situation. No one is disputing that WhenU's conduct occurs in
commerce for Commerce Clause purposes.4 62 Moreover, "WhenU is not
cybersquatting on U-Haul's trademark which serves as its domain name
on the Internet. Nor is a computer user taken to a WhenU website when
the user searches for U-Haul's domain name. 4 63 In other words, there is
no interference, and the U-Haul court was correct in quickly rejecting
this argument.

460. See U-Haul Int'l,Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728-29.
461. See PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 369 (4th Cir. 2001); OBH, Inc., v. Spotlight
Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 189 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
462. It is easy to test this proposition. Could Congress, and an administrative agency by
extension, regulate pop-up ads under its Commerce Clause powers? Of course it could. See, e.g.,
Michael A. Leon, Note, Unauthorized Pop-Up Advertising and the Copyright and Unfair
Competition Implications,32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 953, 968-69 (2004).
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is responsible for the enforcement of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The FTC is the primary government agency responsible for
regulation of Internet commerce and advertising. The goals of the act are to promote
commercial competition and protect the public from unfair, deceptive acts, or practices
in the advertising and marketing of goods and services. More specifically, 15 U.S.C. §
45 prohibits '[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . ' The role and effect of
unauthorized pop-up advertisements will most likely trigger FTC involvement. The FTC
regulates deceptive acts and practices without reference to a particular medium of
dissemination. Therefore, United States Internet regulation is well within its jurisdiction.
Regulating online advertising and marketing has generally been considered one of the
FTC's roles.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The
Federal Trade Commission brought this suit pursuant to sections 5(a) and 12 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 52. Section 5(a) of the Act declares unlawful 'unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce' and empowers the Commission to prevent
such acts or practices. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) & (2). Section 12 of the Act is specifically directed to
false advertising.").
463. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 729.
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This leaves the argument that defendant's conduct did not
constitute trademark use. It is the only argument based on anyone
actually doing something with the plaintiffs trademark. Whether that
something amounts to trademark use is, of course, the question at issue.
But at least the question now focuses on what is actually happening with
the plaintiffs mark. The argument is that WhenU's inclusion of the UHAUL trademark in the WhenU directory constitutes trademark use,
thus permitting the analysis to progress to the confusion inquiry, and
ultimately to the potential imposition of liability. The U-Haul court did
not waste much time disposing of the use argument. The court found that
WhenU's use of U-Haul's trademark was a "'pure machine-linking
function'... and in no way advertised or promoted U-Haul's web
address or any other U-Haul trademark.A 64 In other words, what decided
the question for the U-Haul court was the absence of any open display
by WhenU of U-Haul's mark to the consumer to advertise or promote
goods or services. In other words, the criteria of section 45 are not even
remotely met. This finding obviates U-Haul's entire case.
The Wells Fargo court came to the same conclusion, but reached it
via a somewhat less straightforward analysis. Similar to U-Haul, the
plaintiffs in Wells Fargoargued that WhenU made trademark use of the
WELLS FARGO mark by hindering consumer access to Wells Fargo's
web site, by positioning the pop-up ads in close proximity to the
WELLS FARGO mark, and by using the mark to trigger the pop-up ads
in the first place. 465 The Wells Fargo court started the use section of its
opinion with a brief but pointed reminder of the nature of the case and
the legal requirements of trademark use. The court reasoned:
[Under §§ 1114(1)(a) and 1127, t]here can be no liability under the
Lanham Act absent the use of a trademark in a way that identifies the
products and services being advertised by the defendant.... Plaintiffs'
trademarks do not appear in WhenU ads or coupons. The only
trademarks that appear in a WhenU ad are WhenU's own marks and
the marks of its advertisers.... Thus, this is not the "usual trademark
case" where "the defendant is using a mark to identify its goods that is
similar to the plaintiffs trademark. '' 66
For reasons analogous to those set forth in the U-Haul decision, the
Wells Fargo court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments. As in U-Haul, the

464. Id. at 728 (citing Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, 985 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956
(C.D. Cal. 1997)).
465. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
466. Id. at 757-58 (citations omitted).
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court found that the WhenU-triggered pop-up ads did not constitute
actionable framing of the plaintiffs web site because the visual
presentation of the pop-up ads was not smoothly and seamlessly
integrated with the plaintiff's website, as those terms were understood in
Hard Rock Cafi v. Morton.4 67 On the contrary, the appearance of the
Fargo
pop-up ads on the user's screen on top of the underlying Wells
4 68
material.
of
sources
distinct
"two
were
these
showed
site
web
Like U-Haul, however, the Wells Fargo court fell into the trap of
conceptualizing the pop-up ads as "a form of comparative
advertising. ' '4 69 The court put forth a clear and crisp definition of
comparative advertising. That definition should have tipped the court off
to the obvious fact that in the WhenU situation, no comparative
advertising is in fact taking place. "Comparative advertisements may
therefore make use of competitors' trademarks even if the advertiser
reaps the benefit of the product recognition engendered by the owner's
popularization, through expensive advertising, of the mark., 470 Once
again, the confusion over the meaning of trademark use revealed itself in
the court's adoption of the comparative advertising argument. Plainly,
the court intended its comparative advertising argument to aid WhenU
and to remove the possibility of liability. In doing so, however, it
assumed implicitly that some sort of consumer-perceptible use of Wells
Fargo's mark by WhenU was taking place. But that was simply not the
clear. 471
case with regard to WhenU's conduct, as the court itself made
The permission granted to the parties to "make use of competitors'
trademarks even if the advertiser reaps the benefit of the product
recognition engendered by the owner's popularization '472 was therefore
473
on
inapposite. The contrast to August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc.,
which the court actually relied in support of its finding of lawful
comparative advertising, is instructive in this regard. As summarized by
the Wells Fargo Court, -the August Storck K.G. court ruled "that the
simultaneous presentation of the plaintiffs trademarks on the
defendant's packaging was lawful competitive advertising. ''474 However,
in the Wells Fargo case, there was no "simultaneous presentation" of
467. No. 97 CIV. 9483, 1999 WL 717995 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1999).
468. Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 761.
469. Id.
470. Id. (quoting Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
471. See Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 757-58.
472. Id. at 761 (quoting Anti-Monopoly, Inc., 611 F.2d at 301 n.2).
473. 59 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 1995).
474. Wells Fargo& Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (citing August StorckK.G., 59 F.3d at 620).
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plaintiffs mark on anything put out by WhenU, and the doctrine of
comparative advertisement was inapplicable.
Wells Fargo also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the pop-up
ads somehow impeded consumer access to the plaintiffs' websites.4 75
Instead of challenging the premise on which the "use through
impediment" cases 47 6 are based, the court distinguished them by pointing
out that "[p]laintiffs present no evidence to suggest that consumers are
unable to reach their sites as a result of the simultaneous appearance of
WhenU's advertisements on their computer screens."47 7 That is, of
course, true. But just like in U-Haul, this careful distinguishing of
Planned Parenthood, OBH, and PETA amounted to an implicit
endorsement of the confused view expressed in those cases that
defendant's impeding of consumer access to the plaintiffs web site can
by itself constitute trademark use under section 45 of the Lanham Act.
Which brings us to the claim that use of plaintiffs' marks in
WhenU's directory constitutes use of those marks in commerce under
the Lanham Act. The Wells Fargo court's analysis of this issue was
somewhat more confused than that of U-Haul.478 While it reached the
correct result, it betrayed the wrongheaded state of the law in this area.
The court's dispositive argument was strongly tinged with misplaced
considerations of fair use, nominative fair use, and comparative
advertising.
The advertisement that is displayed does not bear the plaintiffs'
trademarks. To the contrary, it bears WhenU's marks and branding as
well as those of the advertiser. Thus, the SaveNow software only uses
URLs to identify the website itself, just like one would have to use the
word "Macy's" to describe the Macy's department store.
This does not constitute the "use" of any trademark belonging to
plaintiffs, as that term is used in the Lanham Act, because WhenU

475. See Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
476. See id. at 758-59 (citing PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001) and Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,
1997) as cases recognizing "use" where pop-ups resulting frustration in anger that causes the
consumer to stop visiting plaintiff's site); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d
723, 728-29 (E.D. Va. 2003) (citing PETA and OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp.
2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000), as cases recognizing "use" where the defendants prevented or hindered
Internet users from accessing plaintiffs' services).
477. Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
478. That differential in judicial treatment is surprising, since the U-Haul court granted
summary judgment to defendants, while the Wells Fargo court merely denied the plaintiffs' motion
for entry of a preliminary injunction.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss2/7

92

Widmaier: Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law
2004]

USE, LIABILITY & STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LAW

anything
does not use any of the plaintiffs' trademarks to indicate
4 79
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More important than whether one "would have to use the word
'Macy's' to describe the Macy's department store" was the fact that it is
of the very essence of the SaveNow program that it operates covertly.
The consumer never sees the directory linking the consumer's browsing
terms with the relevant pop-up ads, meaning WhenU never engages in
any kind of display to consumers of plaintiffs' marks. The court
recognized this, and to that extent, its analysis was entirely correct. That
should have ended the inquiry.
Unfortunately, we get more analysis. That is only in small part the
fault of the Wells Fargo court, and largely the responsibility of previous
courts, which have muddled the trademark use requirement beyond
recognition. In the passage quoted above, the court surmised that
plaintiffs' trademarks were necessary to identify plaintiffs' websites.
This approach carries with it more than a whiff of the Ninth Circuit's
"nominative fair use" doctrine. 480 The basic idea underlying that doctrine
is that a party should be allowed to refer to a well-known commercial
product or organization by the name that everybody knows it under,
rather than having to use a circuitous, confusing, and unclear
description.4 81 When describing the Chicago Bulls, for example, one
should be allowed to call them by their name (which is, of course,
protected under trademark law), rather than laboriously calling them "the
professional basketball team from Chicago. ' ' 82 As it happens, the Ninth
Circuit recently introduced severe logical and doctrinal problems into
the doctrine.483 But regardless of the doctrine's current viability, it
should not have been considered in the evaluation of WhenU's conduct.
As all the cases employing the nominative fair use doctrine make clear,
the doctrine applies in situations where the defendant makes public
use-that is, use visible or otherwiseperceptible by the public-of the
plaintiffs mark. That is emphatically not the case with regard to
WhenU. Thus, any application of the nominative fair use doctrine to the
WhenU situation must be rejected. The court opened the door slightly to
this possibility. That door should be quickly closed.

479. Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
480. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
481. See discussion of Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Welles, supra notes 321-59.
482. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992).
483. See Chad J. Doellinger's perceptive analysis in Nominative Fair Use: Jardine and the
Demise of a Doctrine, 1 Nw. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 66 (2003).
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The Wells Fargo court faced, of course, the troubling question of
what to do with the metatag cases.484 How to distinguish Brookfield?.4 85
As I have shown, it is doctrinally and logically impossible to do so.
Metatags and keywords have the same function and do not permit any
differential doctrinal treatment. Thus, it is impossible for the holdings in
both Wells Fargo and Brookfield to be correct. One of them must be
false. The Wells Fargo court managed, just barely, to gloss over this
contradiction. It did so by waging a battle of the analogies. We have
previously examined the famous Brookfield "Blockbuster billboard"
simile.4 86 Recall that the basic infirmity of that simile was the
assumed-but in the case of metatags wrongly assumed-visibility or
perceptibility of the signs or billboards on which the analogy was based.
The district court in Playboy v. Netscape,487 seeking to avoid imposition
of liability for Netscape's keyword advertising activities, came up with
its own counter-analogy (set forth below). That counter-analogy is a fine
creative writing exercise, but it missed entirely the fundamental infirmity
of Brookfield. Just like the Brookfield court, the district court in Playboy
simply assumed away the question of visibility altogether.
Wells Fargo, without any analysis, simply announced that it liked
the Playboy story better than the Brookfield story. "The Playboy court's
analogy presents a closer scenario to the present case than that used in
Brookfield, and it supports the conclusion that the inclusion of plaintiffs'
marks in defendant's Directory is not a use in commerce., 488 Wells
Fargo's acceptance of the Playboy analogy over Brookfield obviously
accomplished something the court found itself compelled to do:
distinguish on-point precedent going the other way. But in truth, the
Playboy analogy was just as ill-taken as that of Brookfield because it
missed the visibility issue altogether. On the contrary, it was based
entirely on the idea that the use of the marks in question was plainly
visible to any member of the public:
This case presents a scenario more akin to a driver pulling off the
freeway in response to a sign that reads "Fast Food Burgers" to find a
well-known fast food burger restaurant, next to which stands a
billboard that reads: "Better burgers: 1 Block Further." The driver,
previously enticed by the prospect of a burger from the well-known
484.
485.
486.
487.
1999).
488.

Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 762-63.
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
See supranote 214 and accompanying text.
Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal.
Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 764.
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restaurant, now decides she wants to explore other burger options.
Assuming that the same entity owns the land on which both the burger
restaurant and the competitor's billboard stand, should
489 that entity be
liable to the burger restaurant for diverting the driver?
The central fact about keywords and metatags is that they are not
seen by the ordinary consumer (the pop-up ads are, of course, seen by
consumers, but they do not bear plaintiffs mark). To analyze this
situation on the basis of a simile that is entirely vision- and perceptionoriented is illogical, counterproductive, and just plain wrong. Ironically,
then, the Playboy analogy (if it were true to the facts of the case and thus
had any validity, which it emphatically does not), refuted the central
assertion of the district court in Playboy, which was that keyword
advertising does not constitute trademark use. Wells Fargo, as noted, did
not expressly seek to resolve these difficulties; it merely sidestepped
them. But the overall holding of Wells Fargo, and the fundamental
analysis employed by the court, not only refuted Brookfield and its
progeny but also did away with the need for the contorted analysis and
strained metaphorization of the kind employed in Playboy.
But WhenU was not consistently successful in defeating the
trademark infringement claims launched against it. In 1-800 Contacts,
the plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction against WhenU and its codefendant, Vision Direct, Inc.49 ° With one important exception, the facts
were identical to those in U-Haul and Wells Fargo. That exception was
the presence of WhenU's co-defendant. Vision Direct was a direct
competitor of the plaintiff.49' It maintained a web site at the domain
name www.wwwl800Contacts.com, thus incorporating the plaintiffs
trademark at issue in the case.492 Vision Direct was also a customer of
WhenU, so that a Vision Direct pop-up ad may appear on a consumer's
computer screen in response to a search for plaintiffs mark.493 The
presence of Vision Direct may have influenced the court. Vision Direct
was a cybersquatter, as the court correctly found,494 because it used

plaintiffs trademark as its domain name. Moreover, Vision Direct's
domain name was creatively misspelled via insertion of the additional
"www," permitting the court-again correctly-to conclude that Vision
Direct had acted with bad faith for purposes of the Anti-Cybersquatting
489. Playboy Enters., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
490. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
491. See id. at 474.
492. See id.at 474, 496 & n.52.
493. See id. at 489.
494. See id. at 506.
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Consumer Protection Act.495 Given that Vision Direct and the plaintiff
were competitors, Vision Direct was also, and obviously, infringing
plaintiffs trademark. Strangely, the court did not directly comment on
this plain fact in its trademark infringement analysis; instead, the court
based its (preliminary) finding of trademark infringement exclusively on
WhenU's use of plaintiff's mark in its directory of terms.496
One suspects the court may have been tempted by the presence of
one clear infringer among the defendants to be sympathetic to extending
liability to the second party as well. But that is not quite what's going
on. Instead, the court flatly rejected WhenU's arguments. WhenU's
argument, supported by a cite to Lone Star Steakhouse v. Longhorn
Steaks,49 7 that "use in commerce" of a mark requires actually displaying
the mark to consumers, was countered by the court as follows:
[E]ven if this Court were to find that the standard for "use" required to
establish a valid service mark is the same as the standard for "use" in
the infringement context,... WhenU.com is doing far more than
merely "displaying" Plaintiffs mark. WhenU's advertisements are
delivered to a SaveNow user when the user directly accesses Plaintiff's
website-thus allowing Defendant Vision Direct to profit from the
goodwill and reputation in Plaintiff's498website that led the user to access
Plaintiffs website in the first place.
This is true enough in a way-WhenU does far more than merely
display the plaintiff's mark. But WhenU's "use" is different in kind from
trademark use. Since display is a necessary condition for trademark use,
and hence for finding trademark infringement, the "far more" must
remain irrelevant as long as that condition is not met. The court,
however, disagreed. Not on any precise statutory grounds, but quite
clearly on the basis of the normative notion that a consumer who
specifically wishes to reach' plaintiffs website should not have to
contend with competing advertisements. "[B]y causing pop-up
advertisements to appear when SaveNow users have specifically
attempted to find or access Plaintiffs website [by typing 1-800 Contacts
into a search engine], Defendants are 'using' Plaintiff's marks that
appear on Plaintiff's website. ' 499
495.

See id.

496. See generally id. at 488-505 (describing what "uses" are likely to cause confusion and,
therefore, lead to liability under the Lanham Act).
497.

106 F.3d 355 (11th Cir. 1997).

498. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 489-90. The identity in principle of those
standards is part of the central thesis of this article. See discussion supra at Part I.C.
499. Id. at 489.
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The court, then, implemented its normative vision of the Internet
via a notion of constructive use. The court's argument went something
like this.. Consumers specifically attempted to access plaintiff's site
based on remembering and using the plaintiff's trademark. Hence,
defendants' delivery of competing pop-up ads in response to consumers'
use of that trademark became inextricably linked with such use so that
consumers' use became defendants' use. I have already shown that this
inference is unjustified.0 ° What is it, though, that motivated the court to
make it in the first place?. I think it was the discrepancy, the clash,
between consumers' specific attempt to reach plaintiff-the court
emphasizes that specificity twice-and the diversion of consumers'
attention via the pop-up ads from their specific goal to a competing
one. 50 1 As discussed above, the preservation of the purity of consumers'
initial purchasing goals and intentions is not something in which U.S.
law is interested. Otherwise every supermarket would have to stop
advertising competing offers for the same goods, and to display
competing goods in a way that invites comparison and brand shopping,
under the rationale that they might cause a consumer who has already
made up his mind to buy, say, Breyer's vanilla ice cream to purchase
Dean's vanilla ice cream instead. This, of course, is wildly economically
inefficient, and in fact antithetical to the very notion of robust
competition. Thus, the court was unlikely to have meant to reach it in
such global fashion. More likely, the court was driven by a normative
view of the Internet. Is the Internet a specialized medium, a pristine,
rarefied and efficient data retrieval system, that allows users to access
information without the distractions, noise, confusion, annoyances, and
complexities of the "real world," or is it rather an extension of that real
world, quite different no doubt in many important ways, but ultimately
embodying and reflecting all the messiness and disorderliness with
which human affairs tend to be saddled? If the former, then it may at
least be understandable (although still not doctrinally justifiable) that a
court wishes to use a roughly applicable statute such as the Lanham Act
and twist it a bit to stop wanton intrusions into user convenience and
wanton distraction of user goals. If the latter, then doctrinal distortions
of the kind found in the 1-800 Contacts decision are utterly without
basis not only in law, but also in policy.

500. See supra notes 434-44 and accompanying text.
501. See309F. Supp. 2dat489.
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50 2
2. The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Playboy v. Netscape
The doctrine of constructive use comes into its own in the Ninth
Circuit's 2004 decision in Playboy v. Netscape. As previously discussed,
in this decision the court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that "[g]enuine issues of
material fact exist as to [Playboy's] trademark infringement and dilution
claims., 50 3 Compared to the exhaustive analyses in U-Haul, Wells Fargo
and 1-800 Contacts, the appellate decision in Playboy v. Netscape is
quite abbreviated. The question of trademark use, determinative here as
much as in the WhenU cases, was almost entirely sidelined. The court
expressly took it up only with respect to the dilution claim, and only to
resolve it via the "implicit labeling" doctrine.5 °4 That judicial invention
constitutes an express acceptance of the notion of constructive use into
the heart of trademark law. For all the reasons I have already discussed,
that is contrary to both the doctrine and the purpose of trademark law.
But despite this serious distortion of proper trademark doctrine, or
perhaps exactly because of it, the Ninth Circuit's decision is very useful.
It demonstrates the dangerous consequences of cutting a body of law
loose from its doctrinal moorings, and of removing foundational
restrictions on the applicability of a law, causing a sudden and
uncontrolled-and unsupported-broadening of its reach. Playboy
presented the case to the court entirely within Brookfield's analytic
framework, and that was the way in which the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals analyzed it. 50 5 "[Playboy's] theory strongly resembles the
theory adopted by this court in [Brookfield] ....,506 In other words, just
as in Brookfield, the question of trademark use played next to no role in
the court's analysis, and all the emphasis was placed on the likelihood of
confusion prong of the trademark infringement inquiry. Given this
approach, it is unsurprising that initial interest confusion quickly took
analytic center stage. The absence of any overt use by the defendants of
Playboy's trademarks was readily conceded by the court. The court
characterized the facts of the case as "a situation in which defendants
display competitors' unlabeled banner advertisements, with no label or

502.
2004).
503.
504.
505.
506.

See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.
Id.at1034.
Id.at1033.
Id.at1025.
Id.
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overt comparison to [Playboy], after Internet users type in [Playboy's]
trademarks. 5 °7 The court's theory of liability is most familiar:
In this case, [Playboy] claims that defendants, in conjunction with
advertisers, have misappropriated the goodwill of [Playboy's] marks
by leading Internet users to competitors' websites just as West Coast
video misappropriated the goodwill of Brookfield's mark. Some
consumers, initially seeking [Playboy's] sites, may initially believe
that unlabeled banner advertisements are links to [Playboy's] sites or
to sites affiliated with [Playboy]. Once they follow the instructions to
"click here," and they access the site, they may well realize that they
are not at a [Playboy]-sponsored site. However, they may be perfectly
happy to remaih on the competitor's site, just as the Brookfield court
surmised that some searchers initially seeking Brookfield's site would
happily remain on West Coast's site. The Internet user will have
of defendants' use of [Playboy's] mark. Such
reached the site because
50 8
use is actionable.
"Such use"? What use? Answer: the use of Playboy's marks within
the list of over 400 adult search terms that causes other adult companies'
banner ads to appear when a user performs an Internet search with one
of those terms.50 9 With trademark use understood so broadly that
consumers never actually have to see defendants' allegedly confusing
mark, and with the initial interest confusion doctrine so sensitized as to
pick up on-and make actionable-any possible fleeting distraction of a
consumer interested in Product A by Product B, trademark law is now
poised to eliminate, in cyberspace, practices that are beyond a shadow of
a doubt legitimate in the "real world."
Judge Berzon, in her concurrence, declared herself deeply
perturbed by this apparently uncontrolled expansion of trademark
infringement liability. 5 0 Her critique, however, focused on the initial
interest confusion doctrine and on the need to rein it in. Despite
remarking that the metatags at issue in Brookfield "are part of the HTML
code of a web page, and therefore are invisible to internet users, 511 the
judge did not criticize the trademark use presumption applied in that
case and in Playboy. Nevertheless, her concurrence succeeded in
pointing out that the law as developed, in the Brookfield line of cases,

507. Id. at 1030.
508. Id. at 1025-26.
509.
510.
511.

See id. at 1023.
See id.at 1034-36.
Id.at 1034.
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lead to consequences that are facially unacceptable outside of
cyberspace. She offered the following hypothetical:
I walk into Macy's and ask for the Calvin Klein section and am
directed upstairs to the second floor. Once I get to the second floor, on
my way to the Calvin Klein section, I notice a more prominently
displayed line of Charter Club clothes, Macy's own brand, designed to
appeal to the same people attracted by the style of Calvin Klein's latest
line of clothes. Let's say I get diverted from my goal of reaching the
Calvin Klein section, the Charter Club stuff looks good enough to me,
and I purchase some Charter Club shirts instead. Has Charter Club or
Macy's infringed Calvin Klein's trademark, simply by having another
product more prominently displayed before one reaches the Klein line?
Certainly not.
The judge was, of course, quite right that there was no trademark
infringement here. I argue exactly the same thing, using an analogous
hypothetical. 513 But our reasons for declining to find liability are quite
different. In Judge Berzon's view, the reason there should be no liability
in this situation had everything to do with an overextension of initial
interest confusion.5 14 Her hypothetical, though, did not bear this out.
Without seeming to realize it, she put together a most effective
trademark use argument. In Judge Berzon's perfectly realistic
hypothetical, no one except for Calvin Klein uses the Calvin Klein mark.
Therefore, trademark law does not apply to Macy's or Charter Club's
conduct. Whatever the parties' conduct may otherwise be, and whatever
laws may regulate it, it does not fall within the purview of the Lanham
Act. Unfortunately, the judge conceptualized her criticism as directed
against Brookfield's application of the initial interest confusion
doctrine. 15 Sure, Brookfield is incoherent, but not because of an
overbroad application of initial interest confusion, but rather because the
confusion analysis as a whole lacks any foundation in trademark law.
Judge Berzon's call for en banc reconsideration of Brookfield is
therefore perfectly justified and, in fact, extremely timely, but that
review stands a chance of success-that is, a chance of coherently
resolving the doctrinal muddle that Judge Berzon so acutely perceivedonly if the court clearly realizes that the problem at the root of
Brookfield is the absence of trademark use by the defendant in the

512.
513.
514.
515.

Id. at 1035.
See supra notes 434-40 and accompanying text.
See 354 F.3d at 1035.
Id. ("I simply cannot understand the broad principle set forth in Brookfield.").
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metatag context. The "insupportable rule, ' 516 as Judge Berzon put it, of
Brookfield's initial interest confusion and517its near-limitless reach can be
changed only by attacking the root cause.
E. Phone Numbers and Trademark Use: Putting the Horse out of its
Misery
Some of the most instructive language on the trademark use
requirement in the context of a defendant's alleged infringement to come
518
out of the federal court was occasioned by vanity telephone numbers.
Vanity telephone numbers are phone numbers that translate into easily
remembered monikers or trademarks via telephone key pad. In each of
these situations, the plaintiff alleged that defendant's use of a telephone
number that translates into plaintiffs trademark constituted trademark
infringement. Remarkably, and in great contrast to the metatag cases,
success has proved largely elusive for these plaintiffs. Here, more than
in any other area of trademark law, the courts have insisted upon
rigorous proof that the defendants activities constituted trademark use
under§ 1127.
These cases flatly refute the doctrine of implicit labeling created by
the Ninth Circuit in its 2004 decision in Playboy v. Netscape.5 19 Properly
understood and broadly applied, they are the perfect antidote to
trademark law's current ailment. Here is why. When consumers dial a
vanity number, it stands to reason that the vast majority of them had
plaintiffs' mark in mind since that is how they probably remembered the
number. Recall the Ninth Circuit's argument: "According to [Playboy's]
evidence, in the minds of consumers, defendants implicitly label the
goods of [Playboy's] competitors with its marks. '520 Therefore, if
implicit labeling and constructive trademark use exist, they must exist in
that situation. If dialing a vanity phone number isn't implicit labeling,
nothing is. But the courts deciding the vanity number cases evidenced no
516. Id. at 1036.
517. Accord Goldman, supra note 31, at *61.
518. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2003) (1-800MERCEDES); Holiday Inns, Inc., v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996) (1-800HOLIDAY); Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989) (1-800MATTRESS); Miss Dig Sys., Inc., v. Power Plus Eng'g, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(1-800-MISS-DIG); U-Haul Int'l, Inc., v. Kresch, 943 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (1-800-GOU-HAUL); Am. Airlines, Inc., v. A 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ill.
1985).
519. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th
Cir. 2004).
520. Id. at 1033 (emphasis added).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

101

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 33:603

interest in such constructive use theories. Instead, they stubbornly
insisted upon proof of trademark use of the allegedly infringing mark by
the defendants themselves. That is the correct viewpoint, and the
doctrinal nail
in the coffin of the Brookfield/1-800 Contacts/Playboy
5 21
aberration.

The leading case is Holiday Inns. The plaintiff, Holiday Inns, Inc.,
5 22
had owned the HOLIDAY INN trademark since the early 1950S.
Holiday Inns also owned trademark rights in the vanity telephone
number 1-800-HOLIDAY, used "to secure reservations or to obtain
information about lodging facilities.... [although t]he telephone number
[wa]s not ... officially registered as a trademark" 523 The actual phone
number used by Holiday Inns was 1-800-465-4329. The defendants,
aware of the widespread "phenomenon of misdialed vanity numbers, 5 24
acquired the phone number 1-800-405-4329525 for the "sole purpose...
[of] intercept[ing] calls from misdialed customers who were attempting
to reach Holiday Inns. 526 Defendants offered travel agency services at
the phone number.52 7 Defendants' substitution of "405" for Holiday
Inn's "465" was based on their observations that customers frequently
misdial "the number '0' (zero) for the letter '0.,, 528 Defendants' strategy
succeeded rather well, and they "reaped benefits in direct proportion to
Holiday Inns's efforts at marketing 1-800-HOLIDAY for securing
reservations., 529 Registering the "405" telephone number, accepting
phone calls at that number, and offering travel agency services to
consumers were the only activities engaged in by defendants with regard
to the "405" number. 530 In particular, defendants never used the
521.

See supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text (discussing post-domain path cases). In

their analysis and critique of the keyword cases, Professors Dogan and Lemley focus on the
difference between direct and contributory infringement, criticizing courts' imposition of "liability
[in Playboy and 1-800 Contacts] against parties that neither used the trademark as a brand for their
own products, nor satisfied the rigorous standard for contributory liability." Dogan & Lemley, supra
note 32, at 780. Under my approach, this distinction is moot because applying the trademark use
requirement is the necessary and sufficient reason for rejecting liability in both the metatag and the
keyword contexts, regardless of whether the alleged infringement is conceptualized as direct or
contributory.
522. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 620.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 621.
525. Id. at 620.
526. Id. at 621 (internal quotation marks omitted).
527. See id. at 621-22 & n.2. Defendants also clearly disclaimed any association with Holiday
Inns to anyone dialing the "405" number. Id.
528. Id. at 621.
529. Id.
530. See id. at 623-24.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss2/7

102

Widmaier: Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law
2004]

USE, LIABILITY & STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LA W

HOLIDAY INN or the 1-800-HOLIDAY marks owned by the plaintiff,
and they never advertised the "405" number.5 31
Nevertheless, the district court took a dim view of defendants'
activities. Quite explicitly jettisoning the literal requirements of the
Lanham Act, the district court held defendants liable for infringing
Holiday Inns's trademark:
The defendants derive benefit solely from Holiday Inns' reputation. In
fact, defendants have no independent reputation. The consumer is not
even aware of defendants' existence until after he has misdialed
Holiday Inns' vanity number. If not for Holiday Inns spending millions
of dollars on advertising each year, defendants would have no service
whatsoever to provide to the consumer. For the defendants to be able
to reap profits based solely on the advertising efforts and expenditures
be a clear violation of the spirit, ifnot the letter, of
of others seems to
532
the Lanham Act.
Defendants, in other words, are the perfect parasites. Their
commercial existence is predicated in its entirety on living off of
Holiday Inns's goodwill. If not this, then, precisely what does trademark
law prohibit? The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals's answer is clear. The
Lanham Act is a law with precise requirements; it demands more than
proto-moralistic condemnation. As postulated in the case and as
conceded by defendants, 533 Holiday Inns's trademark at issue is 1-800HOLIDAY. It is not the number string 1-800-465-4329. Holiday Inns
has no rights, and claims no rights, in that number string.534 Accordingly,
it has no rights in defendant's "405" number string, either. "We
conclude that although Holiday Inns owns trademark rights in its vanity
number 1-800-HOLIDAY, it cannot claim such rights in the 405
number., 535 Thus, "[t]he defendants in this case never used Holiday
Inns's trademark nor any facsimile of Holiday Inns's marks. 5 36 Without
trademark use, however, a finding of trademark infringement is
foreclosed. "[T]he defendants' use of a protected mark or their use of a
misleading representation is a prerequisiteto the finding of a Lanham

531. Seeid.at623.
532. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1247, 1255 (E.D. Tenn. 1993),
rev'dby 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996) (second emphasis added).
533. See Holiday Inns, Inc., 86 F.3d at 623 n.5.
534. See id. at 625.
535. Id.
536. Id.
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Act violation. Absent such a finding, 537
the eight-factor test [to determine
likelihood of confusion] is irrelevant.,
This holding crystallizes the correct, and universally applicable,
rule of trademark law. The rule is simplicity itself. Conduct that does not
involve trademark use of a term or symbol does not invoke trademark
law at all. The Holiday Inns case was decided on this fundamental rule.
This was confirmed when the court distinguished two prior vanity
number cases, Dial-a-Mattress538 and American Airlines, Inc., 539 in

which the defendants had advertised their slight variations on the
plaintiffs' vanity numbers independently as vanity'numbers themselves
(i.e., they had promoted the verbal translation of their number strings). 4 °
Since in both cases-as in the Holiday Inns case itself-it was that
verbal translation, rather than the number string itself, which constituted
the trademark in question. The defendants in Dial-a-Mattress and
American Airlines, Inc. had in fact made actual trademark use of
plaintiffs' marks. It was precisely that use which was absent in the
Holiday Inns case, thus preempting the application of the Lanham Act to
defendants' acts. 4 t
Holiday Inns has been followed several times in cases with
analogous fact patterns. 542 The most important of these cases is
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, in which the Eighth Circuit fully
endorsed the Holiday Inns rule.543 The facts in both cases were nearly
identical. The Eighth Circuit, perhaps even more clearly than the Sixth
in Holiday Inns, emphasized the statutory universality of the "use in
commerce" requirement, noting that it is a necessary element in section
32 (trademark infringement), 43(a) (false advertising) and 43(c)
(dilution), and expressly drawing attention to the definition of "use in
commerce" in section 45. 544 The court rejected the notion that
defendants' intent could serve to establish trademark use. The test must
work the other way, the court reasoned: intent becomes relevant only
537.

Id. at 626.

538. See Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1989).
539. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-8-0-0-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673, 682
(N.D. I11.1985).
540. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 624.
541. Id. at 624-26.
542. See, e.g., Miss Dig Sys., Inc., v. Power Plus Eng'g, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich.
1996); U-Haul Int'l, Inc., v. Kresch, 943 F. Supp. 802, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (clarifying that
Holiday Inns's holding depends solely on the absence of trademark use and not on any disclaimer
offered by the defendants).
543. 315 F.3d 932, 938 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Holiday Inns is virtually indistinguishable from the
present case, and we find it persuasive.").
544. Id. at 936.
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after trademark use is independently established. The court quoted UHaul Int'l, Inc. for the decisive proposition that "this court cannot look
to the defendants' intent as a ground for a § 1125 violation, but must
first find an actual use of the mark or use of a misleading
representation."545 The court also rejected plaintiffs contention that the
number string at issue in the case-l-800-637-2333-had become
synonymous in the minds of consumers with plaintiff's MERCEDES
trademark. 546 Referring to the facts in Panavision v. Toeppen,547 the
court made a strong distinction between that defendant's open and
visible use of the PANAVISION trademark in the domain name
www.panavision.com on the one hand and the attenuated relationship
hand. 548
between a set of numbers and a verbal trademark on the other
Accordingly, the court concluded "that the licensing of a toll-free
telephone number, without more, is not a 'use' within the meaning of the
Lanham Act, even where one possible alphanumeric translation of such
number might spell out a protected mark. 5 49 The fundamental principle
affirmed here is, of course, the same as in Holiday Inns, namely the
indispensability of trademark use for imposing Lanham Act liability. But
the Eighth Circuit goes a bit farther. It relies on what trademark use
actually is. In order to meet the requirement, consumers must perceive
the mark itself (or a confusingly similar term or symbol). Consumer
perception of a symbol, such as a telephone number, that is capable of
being translatedinto the mark, is insufficient. Consumer perception, the
gravamen of trademark use, must be actual. Constructive consumer
perception, and hence constructive trademark use, is an oxymoron. On
this principle founders the entire body of law imposing liability for
invisible metatag and keyword use.
IV.

CONCLUSION

U.S. trademark law is a regime based on use and consumer
perception. By its very structure, it does not create, and is inimical to,
"property rights in gross." 550 This fundamental structure of trademark
law has been under sustained attack by the courts for several years.
Under the pressures exerted on intellectual property law generally by the
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
449, 454

Id.at 938 (quoting U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 943 F. Supp. at 810) (emphasis in original).
See id.
See 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
See DaimlerChryslerAG,315 F.3d at 938.
Id. at 939.
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d
(4th Cir. 1999).
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Internet and the new ways of infringing and violating such rights to
which the Internet gave rise, the concept of trademark use has become
expanded far beyond its traditional confines. This has led to a drastic
broadening of the purview of the Lanham Act. As I have shown, many
courts have felt that such a broadening was necessary in order to stem
the apparent tide of infringement. And it is quite clear, and by and large
undisputed in the courts, that some broadening of trademark liability was
necessary to combat specific new evils made possible by the Internet. An
obvious example is domain names and the phenomenon of
cybersquatting. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 551 a
specific
statutory
provision,
highly
tailored
to eliminate
cybersquatting--or at the least to give trademark owners an effective
weapon in their ongoing battle against ever-creative cybersquatters-has
turned out to be efficacious and, apart from some egregious but isolated
examples, not overly broad. In particular, it has not given rise to what
Professor Lemley has fortuitously called "doctrinal creep, 552 but instead
has by and large stayed strictly within its statutory confines. Yet the
misinterpretation of the trademark use requirement-or more accurately,
the flat-out disregard of that requirement-has given rise to a veritable
cottage industry among the courts, an entire line of cases that are
wrongly decided, that impose trademark infringement liability where
none exists, and that, in the process, have made a hash of certain
originally useful judicially created sub-doctrines that are by now so
over-expansive as to be almost silly. The chief example is the initial
interest confusion doctrine, which has evolved into a highly effective
means of imposing Lanham Act liability in the Internet context, but
which makes the imposition of liability so easy and almost inevitable in
certain situations that judges have begun to wonder aloud how such a
thing can be and how some limits can be imposed.
The disintegration of trademark law has gone too far. Trademark
use must become once again a mandatory element of all trademark
claims. The courts must stop disregarding this foundational premise of
trademark law. There ought to be no liability for invisible keyword and
metatag use of another's trademarks. The metatag cases-Brookfieldand
its ilk-were wrongly decided as a matter of black-letter law. Once this
is understood, the complicated problems posed by the recent keyword
advertising cases become doctrinally manageable, and initial interest
confusion-boosted by the demise of the use requirement into a doctrine

551. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
552. Lemley, Modern LanhamAct, supra note 1, at 1698.
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of almost limitless efficacy-recedes to the proper and humble place it
used to inhabit prior to the rise of the Internet.
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